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Before the shocking events of May, 1969, the 
popular picture of Curacao and the other 
islands of the Netherlands Antilles was of a 
thoroughly attractive, charmingly quaint, re­
mote, and relatively isolated remnant of a van­
ished empire that had, through some happy 
accident of history, managed to remain 
blessedly free from the political strife and labor 
unrest that have come, with greater frequency 
and more alarming results, to disrupt the com­
plex societies of the modern world. The in­
habitants of the islands, including the 140,000 
or so living on Curacao, the largest of the 
group, impressed tourists and other visitors 
as eminently peaceful. 
This appealing image of the Antilles was to 
be abruptly and dramatically shattered on May 
30, 1969, when what had become a widespread 
strike reflecting a general discontent among 
workers, was to erupt into a massive riot in­
volving thousands of workers who took to the 
streets. The end result was millions of dollars' 
worth of property destroyed. The Antilles were 
not, after all, it seems, an isolated and placid 
outpost protected by distance, temperament, 
and inclination from the complexities of a 
troubled world. 
In tracing the "natural" history of the chain 
of events that has become known as the May 
Movement (or, among some Antilleans them­
selves, as the May Rebellion), the authors of 
this fascinating study discuss the preconditions 
and evolution of the movement from the eco­
nomic strike phase, through the destructive 
riot, and to the shift to a political phase that 
successfully toppled the Antillean government 
and led to the creation of an effective new 
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Preface

When we first casually read a brief account of the May, 1969, 
violence in Curacao in a local newspaper, little did we know at 
the time that we would become involved in a study of events taking 
place there over a two-year period, and would make three field 
trips to the small island. We both had an interest in the sociology of 
the human response to crisis, and had been involved in studies on 
natural disasters and civil disturbances. This interest led us to 
undertake the present study, which we found to be a most reward­
ing intellectual experience. 
The focus of this study is upon the May Movement, the violence 
that initially attracted our attention being only one of its many 
phases. We have devoted most of our attention to those sociologi­
cal aspects of the May Movement which we hope will contribute 
most to furthering the understanding of social movements in gen­
eral: the conditions that gave rise to the movement; its career; and 
its consequences for Curacao and possible implications for the 
future. The notion of social change has been used to tie these three 
aspects of the study together. Drawing on the literature in the field, 
we have attempted to indicate some of the general implications of 
the study by comparing the May Movement with other social 
movements. 
Many people assisted us in this effort. There were those in 
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Curacao, too numerous to mention individually, who gave will­
ingly of their time and knowledge. Researchers from another 
society could not have asked for better cooperation and hospitality 
than we received during our field work in Curacao. We especially 
appreciate the help of Stanley Brown, A. J. Kusters, andRolofvan 
Hovel. We also owe a special thanks to fellow sociologist R. A. 
Romer who read the entire manuscript and offered many valuable 
suggestions. 
The assistance of Norma Anderson, who made valuable com­
ments and typed part of the initial draft of the manuscript, is also 
appreciated. The study was financed by two grants from Arizona 
State University's University Grants Committee and a grant from 
the Ohio State University's Mershon Center. We gratefully ac­
knowledge this support. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Social Movements and Social Change 
This is a study of social protest and change in Curacao, a small 
developing island-society in the Caribbean. Located 35 miles 
north of Venezuela, it is the largest and most populous island of the 
Netherlands Antilles, a former Dutch colony that also includes 
Aruba, Bonaire, Saint Maarten, Saba, and Saint Eustatuis. The 
population of Curacao is around 141,000, of whom over 65,000 
live in Willemstad, the capital of the Antilles.1 
In studying social change in Curasao, we have chosen to focus 
on social movements, especially the May Movement that crystal­
lized in 1969. This movement grew out of a labor dispute and 
assumed several different forms, the most dramatic being a riot in 
which there was loss of life, many injuries, and millions of dollars 
in property damage. One of the local newspapers provides an 
initial introduction to this event. 
The capital of the Netherlands Antilles, Willemstad, on the last day 
of May 1969, looks like a city struck by disaster. A tidal wave of 
violence flooded the city yesterday and it seems many lives were lost 
and many injured. There has been damage of many millions due to 
fires and looting on a large scale. Trade has suffered heavy loss and it 
may be assumed that many people lost their lifework in a few hours 
time. . 
In less than 24 hours, the leaden mask of an unconcerned and 
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carefree life has been ripped off a large part of Curacao in the 
Caribbean Sea. From behind this mask came the ugly face which wa.s 
lined with suppressed racial sentiments. The view which the world has 
was one which revealed itself in arson and looting. The myth of the 
carefreeness of the Antillean people was destroyed abruptly in the 
burning ruins of buildings.2 
As the newspaper excerpt suggests, the violent episode sur­
prised many persons because the inhabitants of Curasao, most of 
whom are nonwhite, were considered among the most peaceful in 
the Caribbean and perhaps the most unlikely to engage in radical 
protest of any sort. It is even doubtful that the few self-proclaimed 
radicals on the island could anticipate that the inhabitants were 
prepared to protest in as dramatic fashion as they did, on May 30, 
such conditions as low wages, high unemployment, and the domi­
nation of the economy by local and foreign whites. The central 
government of the Antilles had attributed the labor tranquility in 
the society to Antilleans' strong traditional family ties that al­
ledgedly made them immune from radical politics and forms of 
protest. In fact, this theory was mentioned in a 1965 government 
publication aimed at prospective foreign investors. 
Antillian families are bound together by unusually strong ties and 
therefore extremist elements have little chance to interfere in labor 
relations. There is no communist party. Labor unions and their leaders 
refrain from excessive demands which might result in more 
unemployment.3 
On May 30, 1969, however, this image of the Antilles was 
dramatically shattered as striking workers were mobilized into the 
mass movement that we now call the May Movement and that 
some of the inhabitants refer to as the May Revolution. Thousands 
of workers, led by black radical and moderate labor leaders and 
some radical teachers, took to the streets and battled police, 
harassed whites, and destroyed millions of dollars in property. 
This violent episode was only one part of the May Movement, but 
it was certainly an important phase. We will describe it in more 
detail in order to set the stage for the context in which the May 
Movement will be examined. 
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THE RIOT 
The riot in Curacao had its immediate roots in a labor dispute 
between the Curacao Federation of Workers (CFW) and 
Werkspoor Caribbean (WESCAR), a contractor for the most im­
portant business enterprise on the island, the Royal Dutch Shell 
Company. The CFW was seeking a wage agreement that was 
equivalent to one that had been negotiated earlier for Shell em­
ployees by another union, the Petroleum Workers Federation of 
Curacao (PWFC). On May 6, 1969, the CFW led a group of 400 
workers on a strike against WESCAR. From this initial action, the 
labor unrest was to spread to Shell itself and, more important, 
take on political and racial overtones. 
The crucial point during the crisis came on May 30. After 
calling a sympathy strike against Shell in support of the CFW, 
members of the PWFC, along with members of several other 
unions that had also gone on strike against their employers, 
gathered in the morning at the entrance to the Shell refinery. Labor 
leaders began making speeches to the crowd, which had grown to 
an estimated size of between three and four thousand men. A few 
of these leaders, including one popular figure in particular by the 
name of Papa Godett who was head of a radical union, began 
advocating that the strikers' protest take on broader dimensions. 
Godett called on the strikers to march on Fort Amsterdam, the seat 
of government located in downtown Willemstad, to overthrow the 
government, declaring that it was basically responsible for the 
economic plight of workers, especially black workers. He was 
quoted as having said, "If we don't succeed without force, then we 
have to use force. I will lead, but if I get killed, then I want the 
struggle to continue. But I will lead, and I want you to follow 
me. The people is the government. The present government is no 
good and we will replace it."4 
The crowd began to move toward downtown Willemstad, led by 
Godett and several other labor leaders, to register its protest with 
the government. Along the way, cars were overturned and burned 
and some whites were harassed. Stores were also looted. Youths 
began participating in the protest march. Before the marchers 
could reach Fort Amsterdam, they were met by the police, and 
6 Social Movements, Violence and Change 
during the ensuing confrontation Papa Godett was shot. Left 
leaderless because most of the other union leaders on the march 
went to the hospital with the wounded Godett and remained there 
until they saw that he would recover, the bulk of the crowd broke 
up into smaller groups and quickly spread through the downtown 
business district breaking windows, looting, and setting fires. 
Some of the buildings that were set afire by the rioters were several 
hundred years old and thus burned quickly. Also the compactness 
of the business district made access difficult for fire-fighting 
equipment. The fires in the downtown area were not brought under 
control until the next day, ending the danger of fire spreading to 
other parts of the city. A curfew was enforced on Friday, May 30, 
and remained in effect over the weekend. On June 1, Dutch 
Marines arrived in Curacao from the Netherlands to provide relief 
for weary local security forces. 
One of the most significant consequences of the disturbance was 
that the unions, through the threat of calling a general strike, 
forced the government to resign and call for new elections. In 
issuing their ultimatum, the unions claimed that the government 
had "used weapons in order to stop the desires of the workers." 
This development overshadowed a new agreement negotiated by 
the CFW with WESCAR during the riot. 
There were many persons in Curasao who attempted to explain 
what occurred on that "most historic day," May 30, 1969. Among 
them was a writer, Edward A. de Jongh, who observed the day's 
events by walking the streets of Willemstad and later wrote a book 
titled May 30, 1969: The Most Historic Day.5 The author used a 
fictitious young man named Boy Kalino as the main character in 
the book. Boy is the youngest son of a fatherless family of three. 
His sister, Rosita, works at one of the stores owned and operated 
by a Jewish merchant. His sick mother receives a small amount of 
relief from public funds, and Boy is unemployed. Through this 
poor family, de Jongh paints a picture of what he sees as the social 
causes underlying the rebellion against authority, the wanton de­
struction, arson, and pilfering on May 30. 
Boy Kalino and his family are seen as victims of widespread 
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unemployment in Curacao, the lack of adequate social laws (in­
cluding those governing termination of employment and layoff 
procedures), and discrimination based on color and race. Boy puts 
on his one good shirt to go and look for a job. He finds one, but is 
arbitrarily fired on the very first day as he arrives late through no 
fault of his own. He is not given the chance to explain what 
happened. As the story develops, Boy is first a shocked eyewitness 
to the May 30 events, but then after some liquor he becomes a 
participant and vents his pent-up aggression by throwing a 
Molotov cocktail at the store where he was fired. He accepts three 
very expensive gold watches that were looted from the well-known 
jewelers Spritzer and Fuhrman and is apprehended and sentenced 
to jail for seven months. 
As de Jongh indicates in his book, the May riot resulted from 
both immediate and deep-seated problems in the society. Thus the 
May Movement did not come to an end with the termination of the 
riot and the government's forced resignation. For example, a 
group of dissenters formed a new labor party and in the special 
election held after the May rebellion managed to capture seats in 
parliament by campaigning on an Antillean nationalist platform. 
Somewhat later, a second party was formed with an emphasis upon 
black nationalism. 
THE MAY MOVEMENT AS A SYNTHESIS 
One of the highest government officials in the Netherlands 
Antilles astutely observed that the evolution of the May Movement 
in Curacao was related to the fact that this Caribbean island, like 
most societies in the modern world, did not live in isolation from 
events transpiring in other lands. He pointed to Curacao's well-
developed mass media as a major means whereby information 
about happenings and circumstances in places like the United 
States, Europe, South America, and other parts of the Caribbean 
was channeled onto the island. It could be added too that Antilleans 
go abroad for many reasons, such as for business and educational 
purposes, thus having the opportunity to come in contact with new 
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ideas and perspectives. This has been especially true of students 
who have gone to universities abroad. Of some importance also is 
the fact that Antilleans are exposed to many outsiders who visit 
their country as a result of its location, climate, and oil industry. Its 
location in the Caribbean makes it a sort of crossroads, as indicated 
in the following excerpt. 
This capital of the Netherlands Antilles is becoming embroiled again 
in Caribbean politics. Willemstad, a tranquil center of tourism and 
Dutch trading has become a relay point for hundreds of political and 
technical expeditions to Cuba. Because of geography and transporta­
tion advantages, Curasao has long been known as the gateway to the 
Caribbean from the Latin-American mainland. However, the Gov­
ernment is finding it increasingly embarrassing that the island's role is 
turning it into a staging area for Cuba-bound Soviet, Czechoslovak 
and Chinese technicians, Polish "tourists" and Latin American "stu­
dents." The number of ideologically receptive Latin Americans 
streaming through here toward Cuba is increasing daily. Several 
hundred arrive monthly.6 
The climate also attracts many tourists from North America and 
the Netherlands, and the oil industry has attracted many workers 
from the Netherlands as well as other Caribbean islands. With 
Curacao's openess, then, it is not surprising that the May Move­
ment was a blend of characteristics manifested by movements 
elsewhere. It articulated themes that could be seen in youth, labor, 
and ethnic movements found in many parts of the world, including 
the Caribbean, the United States, and Europe along with many 
indigenous ideas. These themes were reinterpreted in the light of 
Curacao's own sociohistorical experience. This synthesis made 
the May Movement similar to, yet different from, many other 
political movements that have emerged around the same period. 
The Netherlands Antilles is a developing society, or part of what 
is now commonly referred to as the Third World. In this part of the 
world, there are many movements aimed at eradicating color 
barriers and the political and economic subordination of the mas­
ses. In Africa, South America, and the Caribbean, there has been a 
proliferation of movements attempting to transform colonial and 
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neo-colonial systems. The May Movement is a part of this trend. 
The recent revolutionary changes Cuba has undergone, of course, 
have captured the imagination of many developing nations. Unlike 
what some government officials in Curacao were prepared to 
believe, however, there was no concrete evidence that the May 
rebellion was sparked by communists or was directly influenced 
by Cuba. Yet in a sense the Cuban revolution did have a kind of 
indirect influence. It became a romantic symbol for many of the 
leading dissidents in the May Movement. For example, some of 
them imitated the khaki military dress made famous by Castro and 
his followers and rode around the island in a jeep. This practice 
provoked disapproval from many persons it was probably de­
signed to bother, for example, government officials, which more 
than likely contributed to its continuation. Cuba was also used by 
some of the dissidents as a standard by which to compare circum­
stances in Curacao, as in the case, for example, of the leader who 
suggested that Antilleans should be as free as the Cubans have 
been since the Castro-led revolution. 
Recently in the Commonwealth Caribbean or West Indies, 
black power movements have been the major form that radical 
movements for change have assumed. Such movements have been 
active on such Caribbean islands as Barbados, Grenada, Saint 
Lucia, Jamaica, and Trinidad-Tobago. McDonald provides us 
with insight into the conditions that give rise to such movements in 
the following observation. 
The Caribbean is a beautiful "house with an African personality"; but 
its wealth and beauty have been the privilege and property of Euro­
peans or North Americans for over three hundred years. And all the 
while, the Afro-Caribbean character of the region has been continu­
ously exploited or oppressed. It seems inescapable that this contradic­
tion, dehumanizing both for the oppressor and the oppressed, will 
have to be radically changed, one way or another.7 
The most dramatic action by any of the black power movements 
took place in Trinidad from February 26 to April 22, 1970. During 
this period, a small activist organization called the National Joint 
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Action Committee led a mass movement consisting of students, 
unemployed blacks and East Indians, and trade union leaders in 
protest demonstrations against the political and economic estab­
lishment. One of the leaders voiced the goal of the movement in 
the following way. 
Our movement is working toward the day when each black person will 
be able to get a fair deal, be he of African or East Indian descent, will 
be able to feel that he has a stake in the future of our society. We are 
therefore against the present system in Trinidad which can only result 
in the perpetuation of the status-quo. In Trinidad we have a black 
Government which is not working in the interest of the people, for 
they strive to perpetuate a system of capitalism, a system which serves 
to provide huge profits for the foreign firms like the Royal Bank of 
Canada, Alcan, or Texaco Trinidad. We cannot and indeed will not 
allow our black people to be further dehumanized. And I say to you, 
there must be change.8 
The movement kept Trinidad in a state of turmoil for eight weeks, 
with even half of the army rebelling, before the government was 
finally able to end the protest. 
As was true of events in Cuba, the black power movements that 
developed in Jamaica, Barbados, and other parts of the Caribbean 
touched Curacao indirectly rather than directly. There was no 
evidence, for example, that local dissidents in Curacao were 
"advised" by black power leaders from other islands. Yet what 
developed in Curacao was not isolated from happenings in the rest 
of the Caribbean. Dissidents in Curacao were not unaware of what 
was occurring throughout the Caribbean, just as they were not 
unaware of the riots by ghetto residents and the black power 
movement in the United States. Some of the symbols, rhetoric, 
and issues used by May Movement protestors were similar to those 
associated with movements on other Caribbean islands and in the 
United States. Again this is understandable since Curacao shares 
with other Caribbean islands and the United States problems of 
race and poverty, and the ease with which strategies of protest can 
be shared among societies given the effective means of communi­
cation and transportation available in the modern world. Seeing 
12 Social Movements, Violence and Change 
parallels between the May Movement and black power movements 
in the Caribbean and the United States, some Antillean govern­
ment officials looked for an explanation in some type of conspir­
acy. One conspiracy "theory" that gained considerable attention 
in Curacao involved a man by the name of Fox. This man was an 
Antillean who had spent many years in New York before returning 
to Curacao sometime before the outbreak of the May 30 rebellion. 
In conversations around the island, Fox often used black power 
rhetoric and told people that he had been associated with the black 
power movement while living in the United States. He wore a 
dashiki and showed his identification with the cultural aspects of 
the black radical movement in other ways, such as giving the black 
power handshake and the clenched fist greeting symbolizing the 
call for black power. Because of his mode of behavior and because 
he arrived just before the May 30 violence, some government 
officials were of the opinion that he might have been sent by black 
power groups in the United States to organize the riot in Curacao. 
However, there was no evidence to support this view. And a 
commission that was later appointed by the government to investi­
gate the causes of the riot did not mention Fox as having any 
responsibility for the violence that took place (see Appendix B for 
the conclusions and some of the recommendations that appeared in 
the commission's report). 
Although similar to the black power movements that evolved in 
the Caribbean and the United States around the same period, the 
May Movement was also different from them in many significant 
ways because of Curasao's different sociohistorical background, 
which we will consider at some length later. Strictly speaking, the 
May Movement was not a black power movement. There certainly 
was a call for a more equitable distribution of power between the 
races and an end to racism in the Antilles. But the movement's 
basic message was a demand for greater Antillean influence over 
the affairs of the former Dutch colony and a new, more dignified 
identity to replace the one that had been badly damaged by years of 
Dutch colonial rule and more recently by the foreign domination of 
the local economy and way of life. Certainly black Antilleans were 
seen as those most in need of such changes in the society, but many 
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May Movement dissidents also felt that local whites would and 
should benefit from them too. Furthermore, whites were hardly 
excluded from participating in the May Movement. In fact, a white 
school teacher was one of the principal leaders of the May Move­
ment and was largely responsible for the involvement of many 
teachers and intellectuals in its activities. Clearly, too, some of the 
dissidents were inspired by other forms of radicalism in addition to 
black power politics. For example, some of the teachers who 
participated in May Movement activities had been radicalized 
while attending universities in the Netherlands. For them, the 
student experience afforded the opportunity to associate with per­
sons possessing different outlooks, leading in many cases to their 
acquiring a new political awareness and involvement in demonst­
rations and radical youth movements while in Holland. One young 
teacher and participant in the May Movement reported that she had 
had this kind of experience to the dismay of her parents, whom she 
felt had wanted her to attend a Dutch university in order to find a 
husband and settle down there rather than return to Curacao. In 
order to combat this influence on the youth, one Antillean legisla­
tor proposed a new law that would have required that recipients of 
government scholarships attend college outside the Netherlands. 
In summary, the May Movement arose at a time when consider­
able protest abound in the Caribbean and other parts of the Third 
World, as well as in the black ghettos of the United States and parts 
of Europe. Thus the May Movement reflected many of the charac­
teristics of such protest efforts outside of the Netherlands Antilles. 
Still the May Movement represented a different mixture of charac­
teristics since its participants reshaped ideas that were borrowed 
else >vhere to make them fit their experiences and added many new 
ideas of their own. These ideas will be elaborated in succeeding 
chapters. Now let us turn to a discussion of the mode of analysis we 
used in this study. 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AJMD SOCIAL CHANGE 
Although our initial interest in Curacao was in the violence 
described above, as we attempted to understand it, we found 
ourselves considering the past; and as we took time to understand 
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the past, questions came to mind regarding Curasao's future. 
Thus, we became involved in a study of social change. We soon 
found it useful to see the violent incident as one part of a totality of 
collective action that we call the May Movement. We came to 
appreciate the importance of this social movement in the process of 
social change in Curacao. Thus Turner and Killian s definition of a 
social movement seems adequate for the purpose of this study: "a 
collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a 
change in the society or group of which it is a part."9 
We will consider the several ways in which the May Movement 
was related to social change. Many of the ideas that guided us in 
our analysis were drawn from the growing, but still diffuse, 
literature on social movements.10 Some of these ideas will be 
introduced before we move on to further description and analysis. 
We will briefly discuss (a) the relation of social movements to 
social strain, (b) some of the internal dynamics that characterize 
social movements, and (c) some of the considerations that have to 
be given in assessing the success of a movement. 
Social Movements and Social Strain 
Simple societies are less likely to have social movements since a 
certain level of complexity is required. With increasing complex­
ity, there will be increasing heterogeneity and more diversity of 
viewpoints about the necessity of change. In such societies, it is 
more likely that people will be able to find others with similar ideas 
to join collectively to press for change. Too, some of the dimen­
sions that have created the increasing complexity are likely to be 
productive of social strain.11 Social and cultural conflicts, depriva­
tions and discrepancies are the types of strain that scholars have 
most often associated with the rise of movements. For example, 
social movements are likely to develop when there is conflict 
between two cultures, especially when one culture threatens to 
dominate another. In such a case, the threatened cultural group 
may form a social movement to protect or to revitalize its cultural 
heritage. Different types of deprivations have been identified as 
contributing to the generation of social movements. Some groups 
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in a society may see themselves, relative to others, as being 
economically oppressed. They may thus form a movement to 
collectively improve their economic position. Also, deprivation 
may be interpreted by groups in political terms. For example, the 
belief may be shared among certain segments of a population that 
they possess insufficient political power and influence. In colonial 
and neo-colonial societies such beliefs have served as the catalyst 
for the organization of nationalist movements. Discrepancies such 
as inconsistencies between ideal and real norms also have been 
identified as possible sources of pressure for change in societies. 
Groups that are denied rights guaranteed by their society s legal 
statutes may, through collective action in a social movement, 
attempt to close the gap between their actual experiences and the 
ideal norms and values specified in law. Civil rights movements 
represent this type of response. 
As we shall see, there were various themes of protest in the May 
Movement that suggested that it too grew out of strains somewhat 
similar to those referred to above. The movement eventually 
addressed itself to various economic, political, and sociocultural 
problems in the society. And like movements generally, it 
emerged when more institutionalized means for bringing about 
desired change seemed inadquate. 
In addition to preexisting strains, some major event often plays a 
significant role in the final crystallization of a movement. In some 
cases, this may be a dramatic crisis that emphasizes the need for 
innovative behavior or increases the opportunity for it. The riots of 
the 1960s in the United States, for example, were the catalyst for 
the formation of several new black movements. Similarly, a period 
of labor unrest in Curacao and the violent incident previously 
described culminated in the emergence of the May Movement. 
Without this crisis, a serious collective effort to reduce certain 
strains in the society might have been longer in coming. 
Social Movement Organization and Social Change 
One of the topics we will discuss is the various organizational 
changes the May Movement underwent. Thus it would be useful at 
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this point to make several comments on how social movements are 
organized. Students of collective behavior and social movements 
characterize the organization or structure of social movements as 
being emergent in nature. Turner and Killian note, for example: 
As a collectivity, a movement is a group with indefinite and shifting 
membership and with leadership whose position is determined more 
by the informal response of the members than by formal procedures 
for legitimizing authority.12 
Like other collectivities, then, a movement has a structure and a 
division of labor, but these tend to be less clear cut than in 
established groups and organizations. Typically, movements have 
highly dedicated cadres, or core groups, that are heavily involved 
in trying to reach desired goals, and larger and less committed 
groups of members. Usually, because of their visibility, and often 
charismatic appeal, certain members of the core group come to 
symbolize the movement to outsiders as well as insiders. 
There is, however, considerable variation among social move­
ments in the degree to which they are organized or integrated. 
There are some social movements with well-defined roles, 
mechanisms for coordination, and explicit criteria for member­
ship. Generally, however, integration and coordination tend to be 
problematic. Social movements tend to be marked by considerable 
dissensus. As Killian has noted: "Many movements are comprised 
of diverse segments, each with its own structure, loosely united 
only by their allegiance to the central, explicit values and by the 
tendency of outsiders to view them as parts of a single whole."13 
In fact, the interaction between the various components of a social 
movement is often characterized by conflict. A case in point is the 
civil rights movement in the United States. 
The organization of a social movement has a dynamic quality. 
At a later point in its history, a movement may manifest considera­
bly more coordination and integration than it did earlier. Scholars 
employing a natural history model have been particularly sensitive 
to the possibilities for the internal transformation of movements. 
For example, Dawson and Gettys in their classic statement suggest 
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that movements begin during a preliminary stage of unrest, pass 
through a popular stage of collective excitement into a third stage 
of formal organization, and finally reach a fourth stage of 
institutionalization.14 Particularly relevant to our analysis is a 
model employed by some social scientists which suggests that 
movements tend to move from a low to a high degree of organiza­
tion and concomitantly from a low to high degree of political 
awareness. For example, Oppenheimer says, "Historically, it 
would seem, urban mobs and riots give way to more sophisticated 
political forms, such as modern social movements (trade un­
ionism, for example, or working class political parties), where 
such forms are feasible."1"' This kind of model of social move­
ment transformation seems useful if a simple determinism is 
avoided. We will employ such a model in this study. The May 
Movement experienced increasing organization and politicization, 
and we will seek an explanation of these internal changes in factors 
both internal and external to the movement. 
The interplay between internal consensus and conflict gives 
movements much of their dynamic quality. Movements are often 
comprised of diverse groups. Such heterogeneous components 
may be held together by their general agreement on goals, tactics, 
and ideology and by the interpersonal ties between leaders and 
followers. In addition to creating stability, the emergence of grea­
ter consensus within a movement may also at timec produce 
internal change. A coalition or merger may be formed between 
once competing factions, and even a more inclusive social move­
ment may be created that includes elements once considered out­
side the original movement. 
Although the social organization of movements may change 
because of factors that increase consensus, it is internal conflict or 
dissensus that perhaps plays a more significant role in making a 
movement dynamic. Internal conflict and competition often lead 
to factions and splits within movements.16 Indeed, such processes 
as conflict and competition are so ubiquitous to movements that 
outsiders and critics of movements arc often unable to see how 
they can achieve their goals. In our analysis of the May Move­
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ment, we will show how internal conflict, like consensus, be­
comes important at certain points in the career of a movement. 
What are some of the internal sources of dissensus that give 
movements much of their dynamic character? The ideology may 
be one important area of conflict. Even though various groups may 
generally subscribe to a common ideology, so that we can say that 
they are part of the same movement, there nevertheless may be 
disagreement over specific and even basic points, which leads to 
internal competition and conflict. Opposing factions may vie for 
recognition and the acceptance of their particular position. Dissen­
sus may also exist within a movement over tactics and strategy. 
Among civil rights groups in the United States, for example, there 
is disagreement over the means to be employed in reaching the 
goal of equality for black Americans. Personal antagonisms and 
ambitions may also lead to factionalization and the emergence of 
competing elements in movements. Aspiring leaders constantly 
appear in movements to challenge the existing leadership. Too, 
groups and organizations belonging to the same movement often 
have links to different outside organizations. Such extramovement 
associations of member groups and organizations often create 
internal conflict within a movement. This occurs when certain 
segments of a movement view these associations as a potential 
threat to the success of the movement or when the outside group to 
which a member organization is linked is generally viewed in 
negative terms. 
Quite obviously, external factors affect social movement or­
ganization. The structure of a movement may be transformed in 
response to environmental pressures, and in some cases the very 
existence and viability of a movement may be threatened by 
external elements. The response of groups in power to a move­
ment, and, in particular, the response of social control agencies, is 
important in determining its character. Those in power may effec­
tively defuse or can contribute to the breakup of a potentially 
radical movement by granting certain reforms or by coopting its 
leaders.17 On the other hand, an incipient movement may be able 
to continue its development due to outside support. 
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In this study, then, we will examine both internal and external 
factors in accounting for the dynamics of the May Movement. 
Also, we will look for characteristics it shares with other move­
ments in this regard, as well as differences. 
Social Movement Success Through Social Change 
The success of social movements has to be judged by the extent 
to which they are able to initiate change in society or reduce 
particular strains. It is not easy to determine whether a movement 
has succeeded or failed. The goals of movements are often stated 
in such vague or general terms that it may be almost impossible to 
measure the extent to which they have been achieved. It often 
becomes exceedingly difficult to credit a solution to a problem or 
an instance of social change to a particular movement since many 
movements and organizations may be operating in the same areas. 
Yet in spite of such problems, we do know that some social 
movements meet with a degree of success. In some instances this 
may be minor success, whereas in other cases it is major, with the 
movement having a profound effect upon society. Even move­
ments that "fai l" and disappear sometimes have an impact on 
society by spawning other movements.1* 
There are several ways in which movements may achieve suc­
cess. Killian notes that third-party movements in the United States 
have been successful in an indirect way. 
One way in which a movement may contribute to social change is 
through forcing the established structure of the society to come to 
terms with it and its values, incorporating some features of its pro­
grams into existing institutions. This is best exemplified by the fate of 
"third party" movements in American history which, although fail­
ing to win political power, have at times forced major parties to adopt 
modified versions of their programs.1" 
A more direct way for a movement to achieve success is through 
revolution. Again Killian notes, " A movement which is suffi­
ciently ambitious in terms of its goals and is strongly power-
oriented may be successful in seizing control of the entire group or 
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society—a revolution is effected. The movement is rapidly trans­
formed into a particular type of association, a government."20 
What determines the degree of success a movement experi­
ences? The answer to this question lies in the character of a 
movement itself and the environment in which it operates. A 
political movement, for example, will be successful to the extent 
that it has power to force other groups to accede to its demands. 
Such power comes from the possession of valued resources: or­
ganization, finances, manpower, knowledge, and the like. Being 
emergent phenomena, social movements are usually quite limited 
by their own internal make-up, often suffering from a lack of 
organization, experience, and financial resources. For example, 
the lact of experience by those in nationalist movements has been 
known to be particularly limiting. In such instances, movement 
personnel may win political office only to find themselves still 
dependent upon unsympathetic administrators from the old regime 
who had to be retained because of their expertise. Structural 
conditions, vested interest groups, and countermovements can 
limit the success of a social movement. Thus, as we will examine 
in the case of the May Movement, the success of a movement in 
achieving its goals and initiating change in society is likely to be a 
function of the relative strength of facilitating and limiting forces 
within and outside the movement. 
Many movements undergo a violent phase during their careers. 
Such violence often involves arson, looting, and, in some cases, 
even personal attacks. This kind of violence typically has a low 
degree of organization, but it may have implications for the ulti­
mate success of a social movement. This possibility is often 
overlooked. Gary Marx, for example, chided the National Advis­
ory Commission on Civil Disorders for not considering the ' 'posi­
tive" consequences of the riots of the 1960s in its report. 
The Commission asserts that violence can never be a factor in bringing 
about change. Nevertheless in a majority of the cities it studied there 
was evidence of positive change following the disorders. Just as 
Negroes taking to the streets in civil disobedience in the early 60's 
seemed to inspire much civil rights legislation and activity, so recent 
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violence has spurred great concern with what is called the "urban 
crisis.  ' 2  1 
Violence can have an effect on both those inside and outside a 
movement. It may, forexample, motivate those in power to try and 
accommodate some of the movement's demands. But perhaps 
even more significantly, violence may result in increasing solidar­
ity and political awareness within the protesting group. Marx 
suggests that this happened in the United States following the riots 
in the 1960s.22 In our analysis, we will show that a similar 
development occurred in Curacao after the May 30 violence. 
It is usual, however, to view violent protest as irrational and, by 
definition, nonproductive. The actions of hostile crowds are often 
seen as isolated episodes, unconnected with other events in soci­
ety, and having little real purpose. However, in our conceptual 
framework, we will place such violent crowd outbreaks in the 
larger context of social movements. Geschwender sees the recent 
urban riots in the United States in much the same way. 
The earlier discussion of looting strongly suggested that current urban 
disorders were a developing part of the civil rights movement. . . The 
present author no longer questions that the urban disorders are, in fact, 
creative rioting. Creative rioting falls clearly within the evolutionary 
pattern of the civil rights movement, a social movement which may or 
may not eventually become revolutionary.23 
Thus crowd violence may be, in itself, a phase of a movement, less 
organized perhaps than other phases, but yet not necessarily irra­
tional and without purpose. Furthermore, the nonutility of such 
behavior cannot be assumed since it may contribute to the success 
of a movement by making a social system more open to change and 
reform. Collective violence may also lead to the increasing organi­
zation and political sophistication of a movement, thus enabling it 
to more effectively pursue long-range goals. We shall examine 
these possibilities in Curacao. 
Our orientation regarding the relationship of social movements 
and social change can be summarized as follows. (1) Social 
movements are important to study in their own right because they 
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are a type of social change. Thus we see them as significant events 
in the history of a society. Also, since they are dynamic social 
forms, their analysis over time, that is, the study of their careers, 
should provide further insight into the nature of social change. (2) 
We assume that the deliberate and conscious efforts of men to 
modify existing political, economic and social arrangements are 
not doomed to failure. We further assume that a movement's 
actions may have both manifest and latent consequences. That is, a 
movement may not only realize its goals and produce planned 
social change but may also precipitate unanticipated changes. (3) 
Finally, we take the position that preexisting changes and other 
conditions in society should be taken into account in any analysis 
of the relationship between social movements and social change. 
However, these variables should not be emphasized to the point 
that the internal dynamics and careers of movements and their 
impact on society are ignored. 
In our analysis, we will first locate the emergence of the May 
Movement in particular preconditions and changes in Curacao. 
Then we will analyze the internal dynamics of the movement. 
Finally, we will assess the consequences that the May Movement 
had for the society over a two-year period. The major questions we 
will seek to answer about the May Movement, in one way or 
another, involve the matter of social change. Why did the May 
Movement emerge? Did it emerge because of changes in Curacao 
or because of the unwillingness of those in power to make changes 
desired by certain groups? Did the May Movement undergo inter­
nal changes similar to other movements? What changes, if any, did 
the movement initiate in the society? Was its success in achieving 
change limited by internal or external conditions? Through our 
analysis, we hope to answer these and related questions. 
Curacao has had a long and interesting history. Some under­
standing of it, particularly the sources of the population and the 
background of certain political and economic issues, are important 
in understanding the May Movement. The next chapter provides 
the initial background. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Curasao: History and Development 
To some, Curacao is a quaint stop on the Caribbean cruise circuit 
and is remembered for being a bit of Holland, since this impression 
is given by the architecture around the port at Willemstad. The 
shops downtown contain a cornucopia of items for the transient 
traveler to purchase. Some pick up a bottle of the locally made 
liqueur and go back to their ship to be off to another exotic island. 
Others who stay longer remember Curacao for its hotels—the 
Intercontinental nesting within the walls of the old fort, the lavish 
Hilton, the Flamboyant Beach, and now the inevitable Holiday 
Inn. To others, because of its oil industry, Curacao may give the 
appearance of a technological monster—a mass of intertwined 
pipes, oil storage tanks, tankers, and gas burn-off torches, which 
eerily illuminate the night. All of these manifestations are the 
result of a long and interesting history. 
Curacao's history involves people whose fame came elsewhere, 
such as Amerigo Vespucci, who wrote about Curacao as being an 
"Isle of Giants," and Peter Stuyvesant, who left a leg (sometimes 
rumored to be buried in Curacao) in the Caribbean before he went 
on to what was to become New York. Spanish buccaneers sailed 
the waters around the island as did German U-boats several 
hundred years later. The British captured it and Venezuelan re­
volutionaries almost did a century later. Until 1825, it was the site 
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of the largest Jewish community in the Americas. It is the site of 
the oldest synagogue in the Western hemisphere, founded in 1654, 
and the oldest Jewish cemetery, in 1659. Curacao also became an 
important slave depot, which supplied the Spanish colonies and 
other customers. Later, Curacao, with the Shell refinery, supplied 
most of the fuel oil used by the Allies during World War II. 
From this overview, one can see that Curacao's history is long 
and complex.1 It encompasses invasion, colonization, slavery, 
recruitment of an industrial labor force, as well as different streams 
of racial and religious groups. Some background in three impor­
tant areas is provided here: (1) the sources of the island's popula­
tion and how these sources affected the dimensions of class, status, 
and power in the development of the stratification system; (2) the 
island's economic history, with emphasis on the building of the 
refinery and the role of the labor unions; and (3) the island's 
semiautonomous status in the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
role of political parties in island politics. This information will 
provide some understanding of how this Spanish cattle ranch 
became an island "kept afloat by oil." 
POPULATION SOURCES 
Since the Arawak Indians were ultimately poor historians, we 
do not know their reaction to their''discovery" on Curacao by one 
of Columbus's lieutenants in 1499. Amerigo Vespucci was a 
member of this expedition and must have been impressed since he 
wrote about an "Isle of Giants." If his description was aimed 
toward stimulating interest, for home consumption, it did not 
attract immediate attention since it was not until 1527 that the 
Spanish colonized the island and placed it under the control of the 
governor of Coro in Venezuela. The Spanish subsequently used 
the island as a cattle ranch and did little to defend or develop it. 
Holland, at the end of the sixteenth century, needed a trade 
outlet for the business that had been made possible by the growth 
of her naval forces. The success of the Dutch East India Company 
led to the formation of a similar company to exploit the West 
Indies. In 1621, the Dutch West India Company was organized 
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and received a monopoly of trade on the west coast of Africa and 
the eastern coasts of the Americas. The charter gave the company 
all the rights of sovereignty usually reserved to political states. It 
gave the company control of the slave trade in this territory. 
In 1634, a 400-man expedition from the company occupied 
Curacao with little opposition. The Spanish surrendered on the 
condition that the garrison—32 Spanish and 450 Indians—be 
transported to Venezuela. The Dutch, by their conquest, came into 
possession of an island that had several excellent harbors to assist 
them in their effort to harass Spanish shipping. They fortified the 
island. Large warehouses and slave pens were built and gradually 
the island became a transshipment port for great quantities of 
sugar, cocoa, and tobacco. In 1635, there were 412 Europeans 
(almost all military personnel) and 50 Indians. 
In 1642, Peter Stuyvesant came to the island as director. There 
are indications that he did not like the island and he recommended 
to the company that the island be abandoned. His opinion toward 
the area was probably not enhanced when he lost his leg on one of 
his various expeditions outside the island. When his authority was 
expanded to include New Netherlands, he left Curacao in 1647 to 
go north where he gained lasting fame. He continued to administer 
Curasao from there for the next seventeen years and the North 
American colony furnished Curacao with food while the island 
supplied some slaves, salt, and horses. 
Just prior to the time that Stuyvesant came to Curacao, the 
company had seriously considered giving private individuals the 
right to colonize and trade freely in Curacao. Even with the growth 
of the slave trade, the company realized that not even a profitable 
slave trade could provide a stable economy by itself and that 
colonists and tradesmen would be needed. 
Protestant Dutchmen 
The company sent Protestant Dutchmen and other northwestern 
Europeans as employees of the company. Some other immigrants 
from the same sources were attracted by what was going on in the 
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Caribbean or were attracted by various inducements offered for 
colonization. These migrants set the tone for the island based on 
reproducing the Netherlands as they remembered it. In house 
construction and dress, they made few concessions to the differ­
ences in climate. Although these white Protestants represented 
some diversity in their class origins in Europe, their small number 
and their common heritage inhibited initially the development of 
status differences. 
Sephardic Jews 
In Amsterdam at that time were many Jews who had earlier fled 
Portugal as a consequence of the Inquisition. Many of these Jews 
were now involved in various aspects of life in Holland. In fact, the 
interpreter (and thus an officer) on the original company expedi­
tion was a Jew. In 1651, a contract was let with the company to 
establish a Jewish colony on Curacao. This contract calling for 
fifty colonists was only to produce twelve. Another contract was 
let the following year but it is unlikely that this group even reached 
the island. Faced with these failures, the company decided to 
increase its inducements for colonization. In particular, 
Stuyvesant's reluctance to sell slaves to the colonists was seen as 
forcing potential settlers to Barbados and other islands where they 
could buy slaves. 
When the Dutch abandoned Brazil in 1654, a number of Jews 
who had gone there returned to Amsterdam. One of the earlier 
settlers in Brazil, Da Costa, was willing to try again and no doubt 
had heard of previous attempts to settle Curacao. Da Costa s father 
was a prominent member of the Portuguese Jewish community in 
Amsterdam, and he probably had known the new governor in 
Curacao who had previously served in Brazil. Da Costa was able to 
gather some twelve families (about seventy people) to go to 
Curacao in 1659. These families were the progenitors of the 
current Portuguese families who still live on the island. Da Costa's 
privileges were superior to the previous contracts. The Jewish 
community could receive help from the local government in disci­
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plining their members. They could buy slaves and build houses. 
They were given two miles of land and other assistance from the 
governor. 
Although the initial intent of those who were recruited to come 
to Curacao was farming, farming was risky business. The soil was 
not as productive as most other Caribbean islands. Droughts were 
frequent and water was in short supply. Certain types of enter­
prises, for example, cattle-breeding and cattle-trading, were a 
monopoly of the company. Many of the earlier residents became 
involved in supplying the company with everything necessary for 
its garrision and its slaves. The "success" of the slave trade meant 
that provisions increasingly had to be sought outside the island 
through trade. 
The Jewish families did particularly well in this commerce since 
they had dependable representatives, generally relatives, in Am­
sterdam and in other cities. In addition, many of them had linguis­
tic skills and knowledge of the Caribbean area derived from their 
previous experience in Brazil. Later in 1674 when the company 
allowed it, some of the merchants did enter the slave trade. With 
trade of all kinds, it is not surprising that Jews also entered into the 
shipping field, as owners and as charterers of ships. By 1715, they 
had practical control of most of the commerce and navigation on 
the island. At that time there were probably 425 white families and 
3,500 slaves, excluding those owned by the company; the Jews 
represented about 35 percent of the white population. From 1726 
to 1770, the Jews outnumbered the rest of the white population.2 
The Protestant Dutchmen and the Sephardic Jews were in a 
certain sense the original residents of Curacao since almost all of 
the native Indians had left with the Spanish and those who re­
mained were absorbed into the general population. The two 
"white" sources, however, did not mold together but each main­
tained their distinctiveness. They were different not only in origin 
but also in religion and language. Their growing occupational 
differentiation reinforced the initial differences. The Dutch and 
Jews also lived in different parts of Willemstad, separated by 
water. These forms of distinctiveness were further reinforced by 
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intramarriage. The Jews managed to exercise control in these areas 
by the greater cohesiveness of their community. 
In the first century and a half after Dutch capture, classes did 
develop particularly among the Protestants. A local aristocracy 
evolved from the higher civil servants, military personnel, and 
prosperous merchants. The local status symbol—the acquisition 
of a plantation, a country house—was a mark of belonging to the 
aristocracy. Since these plantations were not particularly econom­
ically productive, they functioned more as a symbol of conspicu­
ous consumption. A lower class of white Protestants also de­
veloped composed of those in the retail trades and crafts as well as 
the captains of the sailing vessels so necessary to the trade of the 
island. Among the aristocratic Protestants in particular, a close 
identification was claimed to the Netherlands and especially to 
Amsterdam. This was evidenced by the fact that many of the 
shutters on the houses were painted red and black in the colors of 
the city of Amsterdam. Curacao was a Caribbean extension of the 
Netherlands. 
Negro Slaves 
One of the original purposes of the company was to develop the 
slave trade. Since the Spanish colonies had a shortage of labor, the 
Spanish king used to contract with a merchant an asiento—a 
contract of delivery for the exclusive right to import slaves. Since 
Spain did not want to invest the vast sums necessary, merchants 
from Amsterdam supplied much of the funding for such contracts. 
For 130 years, starting in 1648, slaves were imported to Curacao. 
The majority of them, however, were eventually sold to surround­
ing countries. The long trip across the Atlantic and its conse­
quences for the health of the slaves required some "storage" 
facilities on the island. Two slave camps were built where as many 
as 15,000 slaves were located at one time. During the period of 
contract with Spain, 4,000 slaves had to be supplied a year. The 
peak years were from 1685 to 1713. In subsequent years, the 
number declined to perhaps 500 to 600 a year in 1750. The 
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majority of slaves came from what now constitutes Ghana and the 
area surrounding it. The last slave ship docked in 1778; the slave 
trade was forbidden in 1818; and in 1863 slavery was abolished. 
In addition to being a way station for the Spanish contract, some 
of the slaves were also retained by the company and others were 
sold to plantation owners and others on the island. There are 
indications that master-slave relations on Curacao were relatively 
tranquil. Many of the slaves on the plantations were in effect house 
slaves since the plantations often had little field work. Compared 
with slavery systems in other Caribbean countries of the time 
period, it is likely that Curacao was somewhat less harsh. Local 
legislation was passed governing the treatment of slaves. For 
example, in 1824 an ordinance was passed that limited the slave's 
work day to ten hours. (In Europe at that same time, factory 
workers had just been limited to a twelve-hour day.) There were, 
however, two minor slave uprisings in 1750 and 1795, the last a 
spillover from uprisings in Haiti. 
Not all Negroes stayed slaves. Slaves were periodically freed. 
Sometimes the motives for freeing slaves were not necessarily 
charitable. Slavery placed obligations of "care" on the part of the 
masters, as the previously mentioned legislation suggests. Some 
of the slave owners obviated their obligations by freeing slaves 
who were old or not economically productive. To check the abuse 
of manumission, the company levied a fee. But by 1816, there 
were 2,781 whites, 4,003 colored freemen, and 6,026 slaves. (In 
some British Caribbean possessions at that time, there were 10 
slaves for every freeman.) 
In 1850, manumission fees were abolished and an increasing 
number of slaves were set free. Many of these slaves when they 
were freed were given names that identified them with their previ­
ous owners. For example, Jesurun was altered to Zurun, Leon was 
changed to de Leeuw, Schotborgh to Borghschot, Ellis to Sille. 
Government slaves were given names such as Ven den Lande (of 
the government). Others were named after their plantation, for 
example, Hato and Rosentak. From 1851 to 1862, 1,062 manu-
missions took place. Finally in July, 1863, the remaining slaves, 
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over 6,700, were given their freedom. More than two-thirds of 
these had been employed on various plantations. Many of them 
continued to work on these plantations as domestics and field 
hands. Some left the island, but others later settled down on land 
obtained when the government bought and parceled out some of 
the former plantations. 
The social distance between whites and blacks that was rooted in 
slavery was reinforced further by religious differences. The Prot­
estant aristocracy was almost uniformly Dutch Reformed, again 
symbolic of its ties to the mother country. Rather than encourage 
the assimilation of large numbers of blacks to this faith, they 
allowed Catholic missionaries to come to the island with the 
implicit responsibility of "Christianizing" the blacks. 
Colored 
Even though a superordinate-subordinate relationship existed 
continuously between white and black, the long and continued 
contact between the two groups led, in time, to the creation of an 
intermediate colored group, separate from the other two groups. 
Actual data on interracial alliances are, as one might expect, 
scanty, although the ultimate results within the population are 
visibly obvious. Very early in the history of Curacao, on several 
different occasions, Protestant families petitioned the states of 
Holland and West Friesland (which had interests in the company) 
to forbid intermarriage between whites and mulattos, unless there 
was prior consent of the white parents concerned. In 1656 there 
was introduced a law that compelled a white person to obtain his 
parent's permission before he could marry a colored person. There 
were also attempts to secure legislation to annul intermarriages 
between whites and mulattos. 
In addition to marriages, there were, of course, extensive ex­
tralegal relationships. One governor who had been on Curacao for 
thirty-four years wrote in his report to his superiors in 1773 that: 
"It is generally well known throughout the world that wherever 
there are colonies and slaves, it is impossible to adhere to Euro­
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pean morality with relation to marriage, but that members (of 
society) live in concubinage with their slaves in spite of 
ourselves we must tolerate this situation in our own homes if we 
wish to be served by slaves. If we wish to change this, it will be 
necessary for the ministers (of religion) to be the first to clean their 
homes." Another source suggested that "in 1788 there were not 
more than six white families who did not have illegitimate colored 
relatives."3 
The increasing complexity of Curacao's racial structure was 
reflected in the reorganization of the National Guard in 1821. 
Although Jews earlier had served as a separate company, it was 
reorganized into five companies—Caucasians, Jews, mestizos, 
mulattos, and Negroes.4 The colored category was a heterogene­
ous one, both physically and culturally. The guard reorganization 
recognized two intermediate racial categories—mestizos and 
mulattos. Culturally some of these colored looked toward the 
Netherlands as a cultural "home" as did the white Protestants 
whereas others spoke Spanish and identified themselves with 
South America, seeking marriage partners there. In these and other 
ways, they sought to minimize their identification with the blacks. 
In summary, the basic structure of Curacao toward the end of the 
nineteenth century consisted of: (1) an upper-status group of 
white, Dutch Protestants emphasizing family origins, contact with 
the mother country, Calvinism, governmental position, and the 
superiority of that which was white and European. (2) Parallel to 
this Dutch status group were the upper-status Sephardic Jews. 
They had gained economic wealth but continued to speak Por­
tuguese and Spanish, remained in their synagogues, and em­
phasized their own version of culture. Their marginal position was 
indicated by the fact that even when they constituted the majority 
of whites on the island, they were treated officially as a "Por­
tuguese Nation." About the same time as the slaves were emanci­
pated, public offices were opened to Jews (and to Catholics). In 
return, the Jews began to use the Dutch language in their 
synagogues. 
In contrast to the bifurcated upper segment was the black under 
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class. Its tenuous economic position as a consequence of the long 
history of slavery changed little with emancipation except for the 
removal of objective legal barriers. Although the blacks were 
perhaps compensated psychologically by their conversion to 
Catholicism, this too tended to reinforce their inferior position. 
In between were the colored and the lower Protestants, their 
ancestry making them superior to blacks. Both the colored and the 
lower Protestants were not accepted by the upper class, particu­
larly the Dutch Protestants, and they did not identify down. They 
were often forced into an identification with pseudo-Dutchness or 
with South America. In 1914, there were about 4,000 whites 
(including about 1,000 Jews) and about 26,000 Negroes and 
colored. 
THE IMPACT OF THE REFINERY ON CURACAO 
During the nineteenth century, Curacao suffered economically 
and politically. It was no longer particularly important within the 
Dutch empire. The slave trade was coming to an end and Indonesia 
was attracting more attention from the Netherlands. During this 
time people on Curacao lived by trade and by the shipping con­
nected with it. There were some small profits to be made in 
dye-wood and in salt, but the major domestic industry, the manu­
facture of straw hats, had to depend on straw that was imported. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, one writer s descrip­
tion of Curacao as being a losing colonial venture was appropriate. 
He said "Curacao will in time be obliged to yield to the inevitable 
and take the place that her geographic and climatic conditions have 
ordained—a lonely island with little political or commercial im­
portance and a small and poor population. Curacao assumed an 
importance which will soon be little more than a memory."5 
These dismal expectations, however, changed rapidly within 
the next several years. The opening of the Panama Canal made it 
seem likely that Curacao would become an important refueling 
port and improvements were made in the harbor in 1912 with such 
expectations. The discovery of oil in and around Lake Maracaibo 
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in Venezuela prompted the Shell Oil Company to establish a 
refinery to process this crude oil. In 1915, the construction started, 
and, in 1918, the plant was put into operation and continued to 
expand until 1930. A second period of expansion began and 
continued to its peak period in 1952, when about 11,000 were 
employed by Shell Curasao. During the initial period, inhabitants 
of Surinam, the West Indies, and Madeira were employed as 
contract laborers. Many came from other islands in the Antilles. 
Dutchmen came from the Netherlands as civil servants, techni­
cians, and as independent professionals. Eastern European and 
Askenazian Jews, Lebanese, Chinese, and East Indians entered 
the retail trades. 
In addition to the influx of migrants, the economic impact of the 
refinery affected the traditional segments of Curacao somewhat 
differentially. The Jews, mainly merchants, benefited from the 
economic renewal. On the other hand, the influence of the refinery 
was not particularly favorable to the high Protestants. New civil 
servants, coming from Europe, some with "modern" technical 
and professional skills, moved into expanded and sometimes 
superior governmental positions. They brought an increase in 
Dutch-oriented education, the use of Dutch, and contact with the 
home country. This influx led to internal criticism of the colonial 
government in the Netherlands and strengthened the in-group 
feeling among the Protestants on Curacao. The term landskind, or 
native, came to be used as a mark of differentiation as did 
makamba, or European Dutchman. This in-group feeling pro­
duced a partial rapprochement between the higher and lower 
Protestants and among the more privileged of the colored popula­
tion. The colored, having had access to better educational oppor­
tunities, tended to benefit from the impact of the refinery since it 
increased their employment opportunities in both government and 
in the private sector. In their reaction to the new migrants, the 
traditional white element found that though they had in the past 
considered Curacao as a mere extension of the Netherlands, they 
had been greatly transformed over the years into something quite 
different. This gradual awakening of their different identity was 
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expressed in a number of ways—a greater emphasis on the local 
language, Papiamento, increased pressure toward political inde­
pendence, a greater emphasis on an Antillean identity, and the 
like. 
For the blacks, the refinery did not alter their subordinate 
position. Although jobs were available, the blacks lacked many of 
the technical skills that were necessary in the new technology and 
outsiders were brought in for the jobs that required greater skill and 
training. The subordinate position of the blacks was thus con­
tinued, and their lack of skills could be used as a continued 
justification for their inferior position. 
The impact of the building of the refinery was, of course, 
important in other ways. The large number of Shell employees 
required housing, so Shell housing estates, such as Emmastad, 
Julianadorp, and Bullenbaai, were built. In addition to housing, 
Shell also had to make other provisions, since rural Curacao of the 
twenties offered few amenities. Because of a lack of water, tankers 
were used to bring river water from the Thames and Seine on their 
return trips from Europe. This water was used for gardens so that 
other better quality water could be used in other ways. Shell also 
made provisions for health care, education, and recreation. In 
addition, the company had to concern itself with the supply of food 
and other commodities as well as setting up subsidiary industries, 
such as docking facilities. In effect, the circumstances necessitated 
the development of, and perhaps more accurately the continuation 
of, a paternalistic system. 
With the refinery, other innovations of more modern industrial 
systems were introduced, such as unionization. Labor relations, 
however, were quite peaceful during the period of expansion of the 
refinery. Two minor strikes, one in 1924 and the other in 1928, 
occurred but both involved outside workers and issues that were 
only tangentially economic. Unlike many other industrializing 
countries, there were no regulations that prevented unionism in 
Curacao. A strike in 1936 did lead to the establishment of a 
contract committee for Shell workers. This contract committee, 
however, was nominated by the management and not elected by 
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the workers, whom they were supposed to represent. In 1942, 
those workers with Netherlands nationality did get the right to elect 
a Workers Advisory Committee. 
Over the years, both sides found a number of objectionable 
features in the existing system of representation. In 1952, the 
Workers Advisory Committee was divided into two bodies: (1) a 
Workers Council that was to represent the interests of workers in 
the matter of wages and labor disputes; and (2) District Representa­
tives who were to deal with complaints and grievances. Soon the 
distinction between the collective and individual problems of 
workers proved difficult to make and the Workers Council took 
over all duties. Although this council was elected, it had only an 
advisory function and was not able to use other means, such as a 
strike threat or the support of fellow unionists, to implement its 
suggestions. On the other hand, wage scales within the oil industry 
were comparatively high for the Caribbean area and workers were 
certainly better off than they had been in years past. The presence 
of large refineries, such as were found on both Aruba and Curacao, 
soon drew the attention of international unionism. 
With the help of the cio, Puerto Rican section, early in 1955 the 
Petroleum Workers Federation of Curacao was formed. The com­
pany argued that the possibility of future strike action by the unions 
might cause the Venezuelan government to enter the refinery 
business, but the PWFC continued its unionization and demanded it 
be recognized as the representative of the crews on the tankers of 
the Curacao Shipping Company. An election was held in 1956, 
and 73 percent of these workers voted for recognition. The next 
year, a collective agreement was worked out. On the basis of that 
success, the PWHC asked fora referendum among the workers at the 
refinery to decide whether they wished to be represented by the 
Workers Council or by the Federation. Seventy-one percent voted 
for the union. In December, 1957, a collective agreement was 
reached and was extended three times in 1960, 1962, and 1964. 
Although the labor force at the refinery tended to dominate the 
total labor market in Curacao, there were other groups for which 
governmental attention seemed important. In 1946, there was an 
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ordinance regulating hours and working conditions of the steve­
dores. Also in 1946, the government took on the task of setting 
minimum wages for certain workers, and certain mechanisms 
were set up to try to deal with labor disputes. Unionization in other 
industries led to strikes of bakers, dock workers, and workers of 
the phosphate company in the late 40s and 50s. Further details 
about the activities of the various unions will be presented in the 
next chapter. 
CURAC AO'S PLACE WITHIN THE KINGDOM OF THE 
NETHERLANDS 
As the previous discussion has indicated, Curacao*s relation­
ship with the Netherlands has changed over time. These changes 
have been due to the evolution of economic and political life in 
both the Netherlands and in Curacao. Curacao has gone from an 
isolated property of the Dutch West India Company to colonial 
status, which came increasingly under parliamentary control, and 
finally in 1954, to a locally autonomous part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. Also during that time, Curacao shifted from an 
important economic base for the company to an economic burden 
within a declining empire and back again to an important economic 
asset with the building of the refinery. All of these changes have 
occurred in the context of changing ideas about the nature and 
scope of government, representation, and relations of colonial 
possessions. A brief summary of these changes are indicated 
below. 
Company and Colonial Dependency 
Curacao was an outpost of the Dutch West India Company. 
Initially the Dutch West India Company had both political as well 
as economic power. The Dutch Federal Republic of the Seven 
Provinces entrusted the company with the administration of its 
American possessions. Although the company operated with pri­
vate capital, its decisions were made by a board of nineteen 
members representing the shareholders of the various cities and 
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provinces. The board nominated the governor and the chief magis­
trate in each colony. These magistrates along with three or four 
citizens formed the council of the colony. The dual character of the 
company placed a governor in an ambiguous position. The board 
often charged him with neglecting his commercial duties and the 
citizens often charged him with being too eager to make profits and 
in neglecting his political duties. The company existed until 1674 
when it was reorganized again with more limited powers but with 
the same name; the new company existed until 1791. 
After 1792, the administration of the colonies fell under the 
direct control of the Dutch government. This was a period of 
governmental turmoil in Europe. The federated provincial system 
that had operated in the Netherlands for some time was beginning 
to break down. It had led to indecisiveness. For this and other 
reasons, the dominance of Holland on the world scene had begun 
to dissipate. Even though the Dutch had been influenced by the 
democratic ideas of the French Revolution, they abandoned the 
idea of a republic and established a kingdom. The power of the 
kingdom was reflected in changes in colonial administration. 
Instead of the various boards and councils, the administration of 
the colonies and possessions became an exclusive royal preroga­
tive. The king could not delegate these powers to a company or to a 
parliament, and colonial officials were responsible to the king and 
received their orders from him. The king, William I, did take an 
interest in both the economic development and the political life of 
Curacao in attempting to revive the Netherland's declining em­
pire. Curacao reciprocated this attention by naming its capital city 
Willemstad. 
Parliamentary Rule and Representation 
Democratic currents in Europe did eventually have their impact 
on Holland. Constitutional revision in Holland in 1848 reduced the 
royal power in favor of parliamentary rule and these changes 
affected the overseas possessions. In 1865, the Netherlands de­
cided that the Antilles as well as Surinam should have colonial 
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parliaments. There were interesting differences, however. While 
Surinam had a colonial parliament of thirteen members, nine of 
whom were elected by some 800 eligible voters, the Netherlands 
Antilles parliament had no elected members at all. In Curacao 
some members were there by virtue of their offices whereas the 
others were appointed by the governor. The Dutch legislative 
assembly protested this inconsistency but finally passed the 
government's proposal. There were perhaps some logical as well 
as political reasons for such differential treatment. There were 
13,000 people on the other Antillean islands in addition to the 
20,000 on Curacao, and equitable representation for a parliament 
would have been difficult to set up. Too, communication among 
the six islands was difficult at that time. Since the right to vote was 
then based on property considerations, only some 200 in Curacao 
would have met the qualifications. Although there were some 
minor objections raised in Curacao to the differential treatment in 
the selection of the parliament, it is likely that few in Curacao 
wanted to challenge the Dutch government at that time. The 
islands in the Netherlands Antilles, unsuitable for extensive ag­
ricultural development, with the loss of the slave trade were now 
economically dependent on and nonproductive for the Dutch, who 
thus directed their attention toward the East Indies. 
Some years later, an argument surfaced that probably had been 
unstated when the issue of voting in Curacao was debated in Dutch 
government circles in the 1860s. In 1895 there was a debate about 
the problem of suffrage if election of the representatives to the 
colonial council were allowed. Hamelberg, a Protestant historian, 
was skeptical of either a propertied electorate or an electorate of 
the masses. Under the first system the Jews, then numbering about 
850 and the wealthiest of the population, would control the colo­
nial council. This was bad, he argued, because the Jews were not 
tied by "blood or history" to the Netherlands. Under an electorate 
of the masses, the colored population would dominate and 
Curacao would become a "second Haiti." Hamelberg was op­
posed in his views by Abraham Chumaceiro, a lawyer and the son 
of a famous Curacao rabbi. He argued that the Curacao Jews were 
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tied to Holland and that there were no more wealthy Jews in 
Curacao than Protestants. (He forgot to mention that at that time 
proportionately there were then almost three times as many Protes­
tants as Jews.) He also argued that the colored race was not 
inferior. He then suggested a system of voting based on property, 
or more correctly, monthly rental qualifications. Hamelberg 
responded that there were actually only a few Jewish families 
following Dutch customs and, invoking "proof from English 
historians, he asserted that Negroes were obviously inferior. He 
concluded that only a Dutch administration could be neutral for the 
colony. This bond between Jewish wealth and the numerically 
dominant colored groups would seem to have effectively post­
poned even gradual concessions to suffrage. It was not until 1937 
that the people in Curasao got the right to vote. Even then, it was 
restricted, and it was not until 1948 that it was granted to all men 
and women. 
The Move for Greater Independence-The Charter 
The building of the refinery had many noneconomic implica­
tions. The increased economic independence created the desire for 
greater self-government. In 1936, the Dutch government revised 
the regulations for the Netherlands Antilles, which led to rather 
paradoxical results. The Antillean government got more autonomy 
in local matters since the governor was given more autonomy, but, 
on the other hand, there was no corresponding increase in authority 
to the colonial parliament. The new regulations did allow for the 
election of a majority of the seats in the parliament by a limited 
electorate. This stimulated the development of some local political 
parties. Most of the political activity was directed toward criticiz­
ing the kingdom for its ineffective revisions. 
The effectiveness of this criticism, however, was destroyed by 
the outbreak of World War II. The Netherlands were invaded. 
When Queen Wilhelmina moved her government in exile to Lon­
don in 1942, she made a radio speech to the peoples of the kingdom 
thanking them for their support in resisting the invasion. She 
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promised that after the war was over, steps would be taken toward 
a new partnership within the kingdom in which the several coun­
tries would "participate with the complete self-reliance and free­
dom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs but with 
the readiness to render mutual assistance." When the war was 
over, this goal was delayed. Indonesia was moving toward inde­
pendence and had absorbed Dutch West Guinea in the process. 
The disintegration of the empire, however, brought Dutch atten­
tion back to the West Indies and increased their efforts to work out 
a satisfactory relationship with Surinam and the Netherlands Antil­
les. From 1946 until 1954, the reconstruction of the Dutch king­
dom was completed with the issuance of a new charter.6 
The charter was a complicated document. It tried to make 
possible, within the framework of a sovereign state, for two 
separate countries located four thousand miles from the Nether­
lands to have a maximum degree of autonomy. The eventual 
format developed is expressed on three different levels—the king­
dom government, the government of the Netherlands Antilles, and 
the governments of the respective islands within the Netherlands 
Antilles. Starting with the kingdom government, the king reigns 
over the kingdom and over each of the countries. There is also a 
Council of Ministers composed of the Netherlands ministers to­
gether with the ministers plenipotentiary appointed by the Nether­
lands Antilles and Surinam. When a matter concerning the Nether­
lands Antilles or Surinam comes before the Dutch cabinet, the 
respective minister has the right to participate on an equal footing 
with the others. Foreign affairs and defense remain as kingdom 
matters. A governor-general represents the kingdom government 
in the Netherlands Antilles. 
In those areas not deemed to be kingdom matters, the Nether­
lands Antilles became autonomous under the charter. The Nether­
lands Antilles government is based on a parliament called the 
Staten which has twenty-two members, all elected by universal 
suffrage of men and women from twenty-one-years old in the six 
islands. The members of the Staten are elected by party lists in a 
system of proportional representation. Curacao elects twelve 
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members, Aruba eight, Bonaire one, and the three Windward 
Islands together elect one member. This legislative body has the 
power to establish budgets and to propose new bills. The members 
may also question the cabinet. The cabinet consists of not more 
than seven ministers headed by a prime minister. The ministers are 
nominated by the governor after consultation with the parliament 
and ultimately are responsible to the parliament rather than the 
governor. 
In addition to the government of the Netherlands Antilles there 
are also island governments. Curasao had always held a special 
place within the Antilles. It was the site of the central government 
historically and, since it has the largest population, has tended to 
dominate the other islands. To mitigate this one-island domina­
tion, each of the islands, except the three Windward Islands that 
were bound together by one administrative unit, has its own 
legislative body, its own administrative council, and its own 
governor (a lieutenant governor). In the island governments, there 
is a close relationship between the legislative body and the execu­
tive body. The local governor is the actual chairman of the legisla­
tive body as well as of the executive council. The members of the 
council also may be members of the legislative body. 
Several further comments are necessary about the political pro­
cess. Although universal suffrage was instituted rather late in the 
political history of the Netherlands Antilles, elections have created 
widespread interest in the political process. Not only are elections 
rather exciting times but usually more than 90 percent of the 
electorate actually vote. The system of proportional representation 
used has led to the development of a multiparty system. Given 
this multiparty system, a one-party cabinet is exceptional. The 
parliamentary majority supporting the cabinet usually consists of 
two or more parties. The parties themselves are often coalitions of 
small island organizations. This means that elections are not just 
the result of preelection compromises; often after the election a 
considerable period of time can be consumed trying to work out the 
"best" majority. We will deal with some of the dimensions of 
these political dynamics in the next chapter. 
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In summary, Curasao's history has involved "discovery," in­
vasion, being an outpost of the Dutch West India Company, 
becoming an important link in the slave trade for Latin America, 
and later becoming a focal point for refining oil. As a result, the 
population sources of Curacao reflect these various time periods. 
Sephardic Jews came to seek refuge and opportunity. Protestant 
Dutchmen came in administrative roles and again much later as 
technicians during industrialization. Slaves came, most of them 
for a short time, but some were retained. Later when slavery 
ended, those who remained became most important numerically. 
After a century of neglect and stagnation within the Dutch colonial 
empire, oil made Curacao important again. New population ele­
ments came to build the refinery and to work in it or in the 
enterprises associated with refining. Curasao was rapidly thrust 
into the modern industrial world, with its benefits and its tensions. 
With greater affluence, issues relating to Curacao's relationship to 
the kingdom reemerged and new solutions were sought to deal 
with representation and political structure. These were elements of 
the heritage of Curasao that were important in the development of 
the May Movement. In the next chapter, we bring together some of 
the more contemporary factors and issues that were significant in 
understanding the emergence of the May Movement in 1969. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Contemporary Scene: Social Change 
And the Response to Social Strain 
Having provided a broad outline of the history of Curacao in 
Chapter two, we are now prepared to turn to more recent develop­
ments in the society. In spite of Curacao's early history, the May 
Movement might not have evolved had it not been for more recent 
changes in the society involving such aspects as politics and 
economics. Such developments were necessary ingredients for the 
emergence of the May Movement. 
THE POPULATION BASE AND THE STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 
During the nineteenth century, Curasao's economic stagnation 
forced many persons to leave, but the discovery of oil and the 
building of the refinery attracted new people. From 1916 to 1969, 
the population of Curacao increased fourfold; the greatest increase 
was from 1923 to 1948. 
In recent years, while the overall population has been increas­
ing, the number and percentage of foreigners in the population 
have been decreasing. For example, in 1959 there were 110,822 
Netherlanders and 15,281 foreigners whereas in 1965 there were 
125,580 Netherlanders and only 8,670 foreigners. Taking 1965 as 
the base, of the Netherlanders, 112,961 were Antilleans— 
105,841 from Curacao, 1,677 were born in Aruba, 3,643 in 
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Bonaire, and 1,800 in the Windward Islands. Of the non-Antillean 
Netherlanders, 6,585 were European born; 3,842 were Netherlan­
ders born in foreign countries, many in Indonesia; and 2,202 from 
Surinam. Among the foreigners, there were 3,432 British, mostly 
West Indians; 1,882 Portuguese, mostly from Madiera; 1,183 
Venezuelans; 412 Dominicans; 256 French, mostly West Indians; 
207 United States citizens; 142 from Columbia; 158 Lebanese; and 
72 Syrians. To emphasize further the diversity, the records show 
79 different nationalities including (in addition to those mentioned 
above) Romanians, Germans, Turks, Cubans, East Indians, Costa 
Ricans, as well as one Ecuadorian and one Greek. 
In terms of religious composition, in 1960 about 83 percent of 
the population was Catholic while about 10 percent was Protestant 
and less than one percent Jewish. In recent years many new 
Protestant groups have come to Curacao and some of these, par­
ticularly the Seventh Day Adventists, have made a special effort to 
attract the nonwhite population. 
The remnants of the previous stratification system are still 
evident. The bifurcated upper class is still composed of the de­
scendants of the Sephardic Jews and of the Protestant Dutchmen. 
These Jews have been joined by Ashkenazian Jews (Eastern Euro­
pean) who came during the 1930s and 40s and who have moved 
also into retail trades. The Protestants also have been sup­
plemented by other Dutchmen who came with the skills necessary 
for industrialization and others who were displaced from other 
former Dutch colonies that had gone the way of independence. 
Those from the newer groups cannot be considered upper class 
because they lacked the continuity to the past. They did, however, 
possess skills and resources that were necessary as Curacao moved 
down the road to industrialization and many of them have pros­
pered. There is still the small, heterogeneous middle class, gener­
ally characterized by lighter skin, more education, and better jobs, 
but their advancement has been somewhat impeded by the new 
layers of white migration from the outside. At the bottom is still the 
large black underclass, mostly Catholic. This category has become 
larger over the years primarily through natural increase rather than 
by further in-migration. 
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POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 
The establishment of the charter in 1954 was the culmination of 
changes that had been desired by many. Like all changes, the 
charter did not resolve issues in ways that pleased everyone. In 
addition, the charter set only the broad outlines of governmental 
structure, and within this structure political parties had to evolve 
that were both representative and effective. 
One issue that continues to be problematic is the relation of 
Curacao to the Netherlands. To many Antilleans, the semiinde­
pendent status of the country that was worked out in 1954 is still a 
satisfactory one. Many point out that it would be extremely costly 
for a country the size of the Netherlands Antilles to handle its own 
foreign affairs and national defense and that such a burden would 
even threaten its survival. Another argument used to support the 
existing relationship between the Antilles and the Netherlands is 
that it gives the former access to world trade markets that would 
otherwise be closed to it. 
However sound such arguments seem to many, if not most 
Antilleans, they do not satisfy others who see in the limited 
autonomy of the country a continuation of its colonial status. The 
call for greater independence has come from such groups, particu­
larly in recent times when nationalistic, anticolonial movements 
have emerged throughout the world, and when independence 
movements have even been successful in other areas of the Carib­
bean, such as in Jamaica and Trinidad. This pressure for change in 
the political status of the Antilles exerted by some groups in the 
society was one of the underlying strains that led to the May 
Movement. Some elements saw continued cultural as well as 
political domination by the Dutch in the kingdom government 
arrangement. To them, this meant that Antilleans would continue 
to measure themselves by Dutch values and would be destined to 
perceive themselves as failures. These elements suggested de­
veloping and accepting an Antillean culture and identity that 
would lead to self-respect, thus destroying the legacy of slavery 
and years of colonialism in the islands. 
Interestingly enough, the question of independence from the 
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Dutch has been mirrored in debate over Papiamento, the native 
language. Dutch is the official language in the Antilles and is 
taught in the schools, reflecting the former colonial status of the 
Antilles and its present ties with the kingdom government. Many 
students in the Antilles enter school unfamiliar with Dutch because 
they come from backgrounds where Papiamento is spoken at home 
rather than Dutch. Such students—similar to blacks and other 
minorities in the Unites States who must learn English as spoken 
by the white middle class upon entering school—often experience 
considerable difficulty in learning Dutch. Some groups, including 
political and cultural nationalists, have advocated that Papiamento 
be declared the official language of the Antilles and that it be 
taught in the schools. The following passage from a report on the 
problems of economic development in Curacao would seem to 
lend some support to those who call for such a change. 
It appears that there is a need to develop a uniquely Antillian educa­
tional system if economic development is to be realized. The costly 
statistic that 73 percent of the children repeat in the first six years of 
school argues strongly for change.1 
Persons who have opposed such a move have employed argu­
ments similar to those used against complete Antillean indepen­
dence. For example, it is argued that Papiamento is an "underde­
veloped" language and could not survive by itself. It is also 
suggested that it might not be worth the time and expense to 
develop the language into a flexible written form. Others who are 
opposed to the official recognition and use of Papiamento argue 
that, unlike Dutch, such a miniscule portion of the world speaks 
the language that it would lead to considerable difficulty and 
unnecessary expense when dealing with other nations. 
Yet those who support the recognition of Papiamento as the 
official language of the country say such inconveniences, even if 
they were to occur, would be a small price to pay for the self-pride 
and confidence that the Antillean people would experience in 
using their own language. Such persons not only resent the fact 
that Dutch is the official language in the Antilles but also that many 
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Dutchmen while living in the Antilles never attempt to learn 
Papiamento. 
In addition to the matter of the Antilles' relationship to Holland, 
the post-1954 period also saw the growth of discontent over local 
politics in Curacao. One way to understand the politics of the 
Netherlands Antilles as it has developed is to see it as a continuing 
process of trying to set up coalition governments. Under the 
charter, the two major political blocs in Curacao—the National 
People's Party (for years led by Moises Frumencio Da Costa 
Gomez) and the Democratic Party (founded by Efrain 
Jonckheer)—must depend on the votes of the people and parties of 
Aruba, Bonaire, and the Windward Islands in order to form a 
government for the Antilles. This requires a maximum of com­
promise and a minimum of ideology. The political parties are 
indigenous inventions. In 1936, discussion about independence 
and about the development of a meaningful franchise prompted the 
initial political parties. The parties, however, are tied up with 
particular people rather than specific issues, and are perhaps best 
described in these terms. Da Costa Gomez, a lawyer, started his 
political career as a member of the Roman Catholic Party, but 
finding the party too restrictive, he created the National People's 
Party (NVP) in the 1940s. Being "colored" himself (with a 
"Jewish" name) his party attracted primarily the black under 
class—urban laborers, rural workers, and farmers—which pro­
vided a large electoral base. The party also had some support from 
Catholics and Portuguese Jews. In the early 1950s, Da Costa 
Gomez headed a coalition government formed by his party and the 
AVP (Aruba People's Party). This NVP-AVP coalition also needed 
the added support of two smaller parties. Such a complex coalition 
was inherently weak and Da Costa Gomez dissolved it in 1954 
when the charter went into effect and went back to the polls to get a 
stronger mandate. 
In the 1940s the other major party, the Democratic Party (DP) 
was formed by Jonckheer, the great-grandson of a naval surgeon 
who arrived on the island in 1832. In the 1954 election, the 
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Democratic Party got the vote of the more urban and cosmopolitan 
sectors of Curacao, including the support of many of the workers 
and union members. In turn, the opponents of the AVP on Aruba 
had formed a new party, Partido Patriotico Arubano (PPA). It also 
appealed to the urban and industrial workers. This DP-PPA 
coalition won ten seats in the Staten and needed two more to form 
the government. They were able to do this by gaining the support 
of the member from Bonaire and the member from the Windward 
Islands. 
When the May Movement began in 1969, the Democratic Party 
had been in power since 1954. The party still led a coalition that 
controlled the Staten, and Ciro D. Kroon, leader of the DP, was 
prime minister. He had succeeded Jonckheer, the long-time party 
leader, as prime minister and party head. Jonckheer had become 
the minister at the Hague. Partly because it had fifteen years of 
uninterrupted power in the central government, the Democratic 
Party showed oligarchic tendencies, often refusing to cooperate 
with opposition parties and to consider needed reforms. However, 
its perpetual challenger, the National Party, could do little in the 
way of organizing an effective opposition at the central govern­
mental level. The Democratic Party continued to draw its support 
from industrial groups and persons of Dutch and Protestant back­
ground as well as urban workers. Its connection with industrial 
interests and persons of Dutch ancestry had given it an establish­
ment image in many quarters. And although there were some 
blacks in the party, it was severely criticized by some who believed 
that the black members were merely showpieces and that the 
party's main concern was to protect white interests. However, as is 
necessary for a successful party in Curacao, it had also received 
much support from the urban working class. Kroon had been 
popular among workers because of his earlier connection with 
union organizing efforts. The party saw itself slightly left of 
center. 
Ideologically, the National Party was very similar to the Demo­
cratic Party. Juan Evertsz became leader of the party after Da 
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Costa Gomez died in 1966. The party continued to draw its support 
from lower-class blacks in the rural area of Curacao and lower 
middle-class groups in the urban area. 
The two leading parties had both experienced serious internal 
problems prior to the May Movement. A power struggle had 
developed within the Democratic Party. Although Ciro Kroon had 
inherited the presidency of the party after serving it for many 
years, his leadership was challenged by a group of younger party 
members. The National Party was also the scene of a dispute just 
before the death of its founder, Da Costa Gomez. Some younger 
members had become dissatisfied with his leadership and the 
approach taken by the party and thus left it in 1965 to form a new 
party, the Union Reformista Antillano (URA). These internecine 
party struggles were a part of the ferment and change that emerged 
in Curacao on the heels of the political reorganization of the 
Antilles in 1954. 
POLITICS AND LABOR 
Labor soon became a central element in Curacao politics after 
the Antilles had achieved its autonomous status. Yet it is doubtful 
that this was realized by many persons in the union movement, 
especially those in the rank and file, prior to the emergence of the 
May Movement. The unions and workers were looked upon as an 
important source of support by those who wanted to maintain their 
positions of power, by those who wanted to acquire political 
power, and by those who sought social change. Some Democratic 
Party officials, including Kroon, had been involved in starting the 
labor movement in Curacao. The party appealed to labor for its 
support and publicly expressed concern for the increasing unem­
ployment and low wages in Curacao. Because of their earlier 
connection with labor and their frequently declared support for its 
aims, the Democrats always had considerable support from labor 
in their reelection bids over the years. However, this also left a 
legacy of expectation among laborers that the Democratic Party 
would do something to alleviate the many economic problems that 
plagued them. The emergence of the May Movement was not 
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unrelated to the fact that the Democratic Party, as the party in 
power in the central government, could not live up to such expecta­
tions. "Every time there was an election," observed one labor 
leader, "they would say, well, if we win you will get this and you 
will get that, but the labor leaders were not believing it anymore.'' 
Thus they began the May protest. 
Political groups, such as the National Party and the recently 
formed URA Party, which sought to cut into the strength of the 
Democratic Party, also saw the labor movement as a potential 
power base. For example, when URA was formed it immediately 
sought labor support. A few labor leaders were even nominated for 
office by the party in order to attract the labor vote. Finally, groups 
that sought fundamental change in the Antilles also turned to labor 
for support. This was especially true of a group called the Vito 
movement. 
All of these competing groups courting the support of the 
working force helped to create conflict and competition between 
various segments of the labor movement as they responded to the 
appeals of different external groups. To some degree, the labor 
movement mirrored the various political tendencies in the society. 
Certain segments of the labor movement, either knowingly or 
unknowingly, supported the existing power arrangements in the 
society, others supported a transferal of power to other groups or 
parties, and a few even supported those who called for more 
fundamental social change. 
PERSONAL POLITICS 
Another important aspect of the contemporary political system 
is its particularistic nature. The personal appeal and style of politi­
cians, for example, is often more important to voters than the 
ideological position they take or the party they belong to. Thus 
some political leaders like Ciro Kroon and Dr. Da Costa Gomez, 
who have been described as charismatic figures, were able to build 
large personal followings. Da Costa Gomez's personal appeal was 
so great that his widow was nominated for office by the National 
Party after his death in the hope that she could capture some of his 
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former following. Curacao, then, follows the Caribbean pattern of 
having charismatic-type leadership.2 Charismatic leadership is 
important not only in political organizations in Curacao but in 
other groups, such as labor unions, as well. 
People in Curacao also expect personal consideration and favors 
from politicians and government officials. "The political par­
ties," observed one government official, "often have very per­
sonal relationships as the underlying relationships. You give 
favors to the one who votes for you, and you have to make sure you 
give them, and in exchange for that they vote for you." Citizens 
may even venture to the homes of politicians seeking personal 
favors and assistance. Labor also has a paternalistic orientation 
toward the government. During the May Movement workers ex­
pressed their puzzlement over the fact that the government had not 
tried to protect them from what they considered to be oppressive 
industrialists. 
The stress on particularistic qualities is a general pattern in 
Curasao and thus goes beyond the area of politics. This charac­
teristic is probably related to some degree to the small size of the 
society. Many persons in Curacao, including politicians and other 
leaders, use nicknames given to them by their families or friends 
with more frequency than their legal names. Such names function 
to personalize individuals. 
In Curacao, then, power and influence often hinged on personal 
appeal rather than universalistic considerations. As we shall see, 
this tendency was to play a significant role in the development of 
the May Movement and related events. 
THE LABOR MOVEMENT 
The labor movement in Curacao should be viewed in the context 
of the economic situation of the society. Like other developing 
areas, Curacao faces serious economic obstacles. Its economy has 
a very narrow resource base, for example. Phosphate is the 
island's major natural resource but it is increasingly becoming less 
economical to mine. The island is also handicapped by a small 
home market. On the other hand, Curacao has an attractive cli­
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mate, a beautiful city in Willemstad, and an excellent harbor. As a 
result, Curacao's development has come to depend on tourism and 
trade with the outside world. 
Another obstacle to economic development in Curacao has been 
its heavy dependence on one industry, the oil industry, to supply 
jobs for its population. This industry, like many of those in other 
areas of the Caribbean, is experiencing a serious decline in the 
need for unskilled workers due to increasing mechanization. As a 
result of automation, the Royal Dutch Shell Company reduced its 
labor force from a peak of 11,000 in 1952 to about 4,000 in 1969. 
Initially this reduction affected only the imported workers—those 
from Portugal, Surinam, British and French West Indies, and 
Venezuela. By 1960, local workers were also being laid off. The 
employment decline, however, cannot be totally attributed to 
increased automation. Shell also decided to concentrate its efforts 
on refining. Many of the services that the company had previously 
provided, such as housing, and many of the subsidiary tasks, such 
as shipping and construction, were now subcontracted to other 
companies. At least part of the reason for this was to move away 
from the all-encompassing paternalism of the company. One con­
sequence of this, however, was that there was often a major wage 
differential between Shell workers and employees of the newer 
companies working on Shell property. Sometimes a worker might 
find that his job was no longer with Shell and would be offered the 
same work with a new company at considerably less pay. 
In the overall employment situation in Curacao, the unemploy­
ment figure increased from 5,000 in 1961 to 8,000 in 1966.3 
Twenty percent of those seeking work in 1966 were unemployed.4 
These unfavorable changes in the economic picture in Curacao 
have especially worked to the disadvantage of the unskilled work 
force. Table 1 shows the number and percentage unemployed in 
categories based on education. It indicates a somewhat dramatic 
and regular rise in the percentage unemployed as qualifications 
decline. Some labor leaders have blamed the unemployment 
among the unskilled, the bulk of whom are nonwhite, on the 
government's fiscal policies. 
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TABLE 1 
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYED 
BASED ON EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
MALE FEMALE 
N 7c N 
Less than 3 years of 
elementary school 1,572 31.1 584 18.9 
Three to 6 years of 
elementary school 2,311 45.7 1,434 46.5 
Advanced elementary school 
not completed 681 13.5 606 19.7 
Advanced elementary school 
completed 145 2.9 137 4.4 
Elementary vocational 
training 336 6.6 306 9.9 
Secondary school and 
higher education 11 0.2 14 0.5 
SOURCE: Netherlands Antilles 1969 Statistical Yearbook (Willemstad: Bureau of Statis­
tics, 1969), p. 61; "Curasao: Economic Development" (Behavior Science Center, August, 
1970), p. 4. 
Attempts to encourage other types of economic enterprises to 
pick up the employment slack were restricted by the inherent 
limitations of the island's natural resources. The question of new 
directions for economic development was, of course, of critical 
concern to the government. The Democratic Party, the party in 
power, attempted to find economic alternatives and Kroon, who 
was economic minister during the 1960s, was centrally concerned 
with such planning. The alternatives that seemed realistically 
available to them centered on the development of the tourist trade, 
in building hotels, casinos, and the like, and also to a certain extent 
on industries that were dependent on raw materials that were 
inexpensive to import and required relatively unskilled labor. The 
government's economic policy was reflected in a 1965 report. 
In order to prevent serious deterioration of the economy and living 
standard, all efforts must be directed to a further increase of domestic 
production outside the oil industry. . new private enterprises must 
be attracted in order to maintain the living standard. In 1953, a law for 
the "Promotion of Industrial Establishments and of Hotel Construc­
tion" was accepted by parliament. In this law, tax concessions are 
offered to new industries and hotels. From the beginning, it has been 
realized that additional concessions were necessary; in particular, for 
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manufacturing industries, all of which have to import their raw 
materials.5 
Although many new industries, such as hotels, attracted by the 
government's development incentives required high initial capital 
investments, they did not add impressively to opportunities for 
local employment, particularly the more highly paying jobs. An 
observation in an analysis of Curasao's economy in the 1960s 
captures its character and problems. 
The economy is an agglomeration of foreign enclaves, a local oligar­
chy, a small middle class, workers, unemployed and the rural poor. 
While there have been and will continue to be odd points of growth—a 
new hotel perhaps—they affect little beyond immediate employment 
and purchases. There is little overall linkage. Most additional income 
goes into imports, to the upper classes and to foreign corporations. 
Areas in which local endeavors and investment can be productive 
remain hard to find or, when they appear, hard to grasp.H 
The central government also pursued a policy of wage stabiliza­
tion as part of its effort to attract new investors to the Antilles. This 
policy, which would later be modified somewhat as a result of the 
May Movement, affected government workers, many of whom at 
the lower levels were union members, as well as workers in 
commerce and industry. For example, in a previously cited docu­
ment, the government boasted: "Wage stability has also been 
maintained by keeping government wages constant. The govern­
ment wage has not been increased since 1958."7 Some labor 
groups have been highly critical of the government's effort to 
stabilize wages and its policy of offering investment incentives to 
foreign companies, interpreting them as means of furthering the 
interests of Dutch and other capitalists to whom high government 
officials were said to be closely allied for reasons of class and race 
rather than as attempts to help unemployed workers who are 
mostly nonwhite. Since tourism has been one of the major indus­
tries the government has attempted to develop, some labor leaders 
have called to the attention of workers the difference between their 
standard of living as a result of low wages and unemployment and 
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TABLE 2 
A SAMPLE OF WAGES IN THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 
(IN ANTILLEAN GUILDERS: 1 NAf=U.S. $0.53) 
Minimum Maxir 
Bus driver 
Carpenter 
Charwoman 
Electrician 
Hourly 
1.33 
1.20 
.50 
1.20 
1.70 
.60 
1.90 
Female textile worker (Bonaire) .50 
Foreman 2.25 4.00 
Motor mechanic 1.00 1.50 
Semiskilled laborer 1.05 1.20 
Unskilled laborer 1.00 1.10 
Welder 1.20 2.10 
Weekly 
Waiter 40.00 80.00 
Monthly 
Assistant accountant 200.00 1,200.00 
Bookkeeper 250.00 750.00 
Clerical worker 250.00 750.00 
Domestic servants (live-in) 60.00 70.00 
Typist 160.00 225.00 
SOURCE: Investment Factors: Netherlands Antilles (Willemstad: Department of Social and 
Economic Affairs, 1965), p. 32. 
that of the increasingly visible and free-spending tourists who are 
mainly from the United States. This seems to have increased 
worker dissatisfaction in Curacao. Wages in the Antilles are much 
lower than those in the United States. An idea of what wages were 
like in the mid-sixties in the Antilles can be seen in the sample of 
wages in several occupational categories shown in Table 2. 
Let us now turn to the labor movement itself. The labor move­
ment in Curacao is fragmented and uneven. On the island there are 
large unions with well-trained leaders, but also many small ones 
with leaders who have received little formal training in union 
management. Furthermore, although unions within the same con­
federations have generally cooperated with one another, the over­
all pattern has been one of disunity, competition, and conflict. 
This pattern stems from a number of factors, the foremost being 
differences in ideology, international affiliation, local political 
allegiance, style and approach, and personal antagonisms between 
various union leaders. 
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As would be expected given its former colonial status, labor 
organization in the Netherlands served as the model for the labor 
movement in the Antilles. In the Netherlands there are three basic 
groups of trade unions: Protestant, Catholic, and Free, or 
Socialist. Roughly corresponding types can be found in the Antil­
les and are referred to as Independent, Catholic, and Free unions. 
The three groups of unions in the Netherlands often work with their 
counterparts in the Antilles, providing them with financial aid and 
advice. Prior to the May Movement, there was considerable con­
flict between the three groups of unions in Curacao based in part on 
these varying international affiliations. 
Of the three types of labor unions in Curacao, the Free unions 
had the largest membership, were the best organized, and were the 
most influential. Several Free unions formed the largest confedera­
tion in Curacao, the General Conference of Trade Unions (A we) , 
which had a membership of around 12,000. One of the major 
unions affiliated with the AVVC was the Petroleum Workers Feder­
ation of Curacao (PVVFC), which had a membership of about 2,300. 
Because of its location at Shell, the heart of industry in Curacao, 
the PWFC has played a major role in the labor movement. The labor 
agreements it has made with Shell, for example, have often be­
come the standard used by other unions in their negotiations with 
management. Prior to the May Movement, relations with Shell 
were considered good by the leaders of the PWFC. AS was generally 
true of other Avvc-affiliated unions, the leaders of the petroleum 
union took a gradualistic approach to negotiations and relations 
with management, and for this they were often criticized by the 
more radical unions and even sometimes by their own rank and 
tile. One observer noted regarding the PWFC: "People thought that 
the union didn't act tough enough against Shell. The leaders of the 
union were always willing to see the other standpoint. That makes 
them reasonable people, but makes them in the eyes of the radicals 
actually not capable." The leaders of the petroleum union, as well 
as the leaders in other Avvc-linked unions, were generally sym­
pathetic to the Democratic Party, the party in power in the central 
government. Thus they were criticized by the more radical unions 
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of being allied with what the latter referred to as neo-colonial 
forces in Curacao. However, in spite of this criticism, unlike trade 
unions in many developing societies, the Free unions in Curacao 
did not directly become involved in politics or engage in "political 
unionism."8 Indeed, most trade unions in Curacao followed the 
pattern of the Free unions by not becoming directly involved in 
political activity. This was true even though a few labor leaders did 
run for political office. 
The Curacao Federation of Workers (CFW), a Free union af­
filiated with the A w e  , was to play an important role in the 
emergence of the May Movement. It is a general union represent­
ing workers from a wide variety of businesses and industries in 
Cura§ao. Included in its membership are construction workers 
employed by the Werkspoor Caribbean Company, known locally 
as WESCAR, one of several companies under contract to do work for 
the Shell Company. As previously noted, it was a labor dispute 
between the CFW and WESCAR that led to the crisis that precipitated 
the May Movement. 
In contrast to the tendency of most groups in the labor move­
ment in Curacao to be moderate and nonpolitical, as best exem­
plified by the Free unions we have mentioned, was a smaller 
number of groups with radical leaders. Such groups differed from 
the more moderate unions in that they: (1) had different interna­
tional affiliations or allegiances, (2) had more militant and aggres­
sive styles, and (3) saw the economic goals of the labor movement 
inexorably bound to political action. 
Perhaps the most important radical union was the General Dock 
Workers Union (AHU), which was an Independent union led by 
two long-time labor leaders, Papa Godett and Amador Nita. This 
union espoused a revolutionary ideology and opposed the existing 
government and leading industrial groups on the grounds that they 
represented the colonial interests of Holland and erected barriers 
against the full participation of blacks in the economic and political 
life of the Antilles. Godett and Nita were given to flamboyant 
speech and their personal styles earned them considerable admira­
tion among laborers, though the actual membership of their union 
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was small. Both men were destined to play key roles in the May 
protest. 
Other radical unions were found in the Catholic, or Christian, 
trade movement. This movement was founded in the late 1950s by 
a radical priest by the name of Father Amado Romer. Describing 
his philosophy as a "theology of revolution," Father Romer 
stressed the significance of the laborer's work in the society and 
the idea that it was their right to share in the rewards of the society 
rather than a privilege to be granted at will by some higher 
authority. The Curacao Christian Confederation of Trade Unions 
(ccv) was the Catholic trade union s equivalent to the Free trade 
union movement's AVVC. The ccv was affiliated with the Latin 
American labor movement. Indicative of its political role, the ccv, 
under the direction of the CLASC movement,9 had attempt­
ed to provide financial assistance for guerrillas working for the 
overthrow of the government in Haiti. Such direct political activity 
by the ccv created a great deal of concern among the more 
moderate unions in Curacao who felt that the labor movement 
should focus exclusively on economic activity and not directly 
enter the political sphere. Leaders and supporters of the Christian 
trade movement in Curacao were also involved in efforts to wrest 
power from the Democratic Party bloc by supporting IRA, the 
leftist party that was formed by dissidents who left the National 
Party. Bebe Rojer, the head of the ccv, became one of the party s 
candidates for public office. 
Personal antagonisms between leaders in the various unions 
furthered the fragmentation within the labor movement. For ex­
ample, some labor leaders competed to organize the same industry 
and such competition often took on the character of personal feuds. 
And because of Curacao's small size, it was apparently more 
difficult to minimize personal hostilities through such normally 
effective techniques as avoidance. 
In summary, prior to the May Movement, the labor movement 
in Curacao was highly fragmented and largely nonpolitical, except 
for a small number of radical groups. However, part of the basis 
for more unified action existed in the strain many workers com­
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monly felt, yet traditionally did not articulate, and the presence of 
charismatic figures in the dock workers union (and another radical 
group called Vito, which we will discuss shortly) around whom 
workers could coalesce for political action. 
THE GROWTH OF RADICAL POLITICS 
We have suggested that the reorganization of the Antillean 
government ushered in a period of change in the society. One 
change that was to have important consequences for the society 
was a new educational program that was established shortly after 
the new Antillean government came into being. Under this new 
government-sponsored program, scholarships were awarded to 
promising students for university study in the Netherlands. The 
person that was given much credit for this program was Dr. Da 
Costa Gomez who believed that students who benefited from the 
scholarships could return to the Antilles to assume positions of 
leadership. Many scholarship recipients did return to Curacao to 
assume positions in the government and to teach school. However, 
others also became leaders in less traditional groups and organiza­
tions. 
Some of the students who went to Holland on government 
scholarships were transformed in unanticipated ways. For many of 
the students, exposure to university life in Holland was a liberaliz­
ing, and even in some cases a radicalizing, experience. This made 
them less tolerant of the existing political and social arrangements 
in the Antilles. The first group of students began returning to 
Curacao at the beginning of the 1960s. Out of this group came the 
nucleus for two leftist movements that were formed to challenge 
the established political and economic groups, such as the Demo­
cratic Party and the National Party, who were defined as self-
serving and oligarchic. 
Returning intellectuals helped form the Union Reformista Antil­
lano (URA) in 1965. The impetus for the formation of this new 
party came from a dissident group within the National Party. The 
dissidents, led by Papy Jesurun, felt that the National Party had 
become conservative and ineffective. Much of the blame for the 
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party's resistance to change and its inability to remain relevant was 
placed on its president, Dr. Da Costa Gomez. He was seen by the 
dissidents as an imposing charismatic figure who held tight control 
of the party and who steered it on a conservative course. The 
dissidents bolted the party and along with many young intellectu­
als who had recently returned from Holland formed URA with the 
aim of making it a progressive socialist party ideologically to the 
left of the two established parties. 
Although declaring itself to the left of the other parties, URA, 
under the leadership of Jesurun, who became its president, was 
basically a reform movement rather than a revolutionary party. It 
appealed to labor for support and even placed a few labor leaders 
including Bebe Rojer of the ccv on its list of candidates for public 
office. In 1967, the young party won two seats in the island 
legislature, and its leaders were confident that the party had a 
bright future in the political life of the country. 
A radical movement that operated outside established politics 
was also organized by returning students and young intellectuals 
with the aim of disseminating ideas on the need for radical change 
in Curacao. The movement published a paper for this purpose 
called Vito, and the movement became known by that name. The 
paper took to task those forces in Curacao identified responsible 
for the political and economic exploitation of the masses. Espe­
cially singled out was the Democratic Party and leading industries 
on the island. Such groups were viewed by the Vito movement as 
allied with Dutch neo-colonial interests. Participants in the Vito 
movement included schoolteachers and government workers. 
They were led by a young, white, former schoolteacher, Stanley 
Brown, who headed the volunteer staff that published Vito. One 
observer noted regarding Brown: 
He writes stories that bring people to discredit and he is very specific. 
He is not always right in the way he states the facts but he doesn't care 
about it. He says for him it's the purpose that is to be reached that is 
important. You can't always use the proper methods. 
This same person noted, "This is a very Caribbean way of acting. 
Latin America has a long history of this sort of paper." 
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Initially those in the Vito movement were, as one of them put it, 
"talking to themselves." The paper was written in Dutch rather 
than Papiamento and on a level that the intellectuals rather than the 
masses could understand and appreciate. Also, the young radicals 
had not become very involved in the more radical segments of the 
labor movement. However, this all changed in 1967. During that 
year, some of the core members of the Vito movement decided that 
the only way in which significant change could be achieved in the 
society was for them to become directly involved in the labor 
movement. The paper began publishing in Papiamento to attract 
the attention of the masses, and special emphasis was given to 
radicalizing the labor unions. 
Vito became the chief communication link between the radical 
intellectuals and the labor movement. After it began publishing in 
Papiamento, several thousand copies were sold weekly. The staff 
conducted a systematic campaign to identify the political, social, 
and economic injustices that workers were said to experience in the 
society, with the aim of spurring them on to demand change. 
Published in the paper, for example, was information on the profits 
companies were said to be earning in order to dramatize the 
discrepancy between the condition of the workers and those of 
management. The radicals saw their role as that of a catalyst for 
social change. 
The Vito movement also attempted to influence the structure of 
the labor movement. As previously mentioned, the labor move­
ment was highly fragmented as a result of such things as personal 
antagonisms and varying international affiliations. Vito encour­
aged the labor unions to try and minimize their differences and 
work toward greater unification. For example, it tried to get the 
laborers to support one another (or at least not to fight openly) even 
though they had disagreements on the international level. Vito also 
encouraged workers to bypass the leadership in their respective 
unions and develop unity and identification with fellow workers in 
other unions. The Vito movement through its paper attacked those 
labor leaders and boards that were felt to hinder labor solidarity. 
This was done, for example, during union elections in an effort to 
influence their outcome. 
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Stanley Brown, the editor of Vito, and Papa Godett, head of the 
dock workers union, became the key links between the radical 
intellectuals and the labor movement. This was very important in 
that they both had considerable influence within their respective 
constituencies. Brown was the most visible of the radical school­
teachers and had a large following; Godett was admired by the rank 
and file throughout the labor movement. Brown and Godett 
worked together attempting to radicalize the labor movement; they 
supported the demands of workers for higher wages and aided 
them in their strike activity. Through the leadership of Brown, 
Vito's involvement in the labor movement even included writing 
pamphlets for striking workers and contributing to strike funds. 
Laborers in Curacao were primarily concerned with wages. The 
young radicals in the Vito movement sought to broaden the labor 
movement's interests to include political goals as well as bread-
and-butter issues. For example, the Vito movement tried to con­
vince labor of the need for complete independence from the 
Netherlands. The movement also emphasized the need for Antil­
leans to become involved in a cultural revolution that would result 
in the widespread use and acceptance of Papiamento as their 
official language and the general recognition of an Antillean cul­
ture separate from the culture imposed upon them by the Dutch 
during the period of colonization. The young radicals also tied the 
political and economic plight of workers to their racial status, and 
exhorted them to demand the removal of all racial and class 
barriers to their effective participation in the society. 
The young radicals in the Vito movement were able to link their 
narrowly based group with the larger labor movement in Curacao 
and sensitize some of the latter's members to the possibility of 
achieving broader goals. Many of the demands for change that 
were made during the May Movement can be partly attributed to 
this prior interaction between Vito and the labor movement and the 
emergence of some common ideological ground. The prior rela­
tionship between Vito and the general dock workers union espe­
cially was to play a significant role during the May Movement. 
In summary, the period just prior to the May Movement was 
marked by considerable social change and strain in the Antilles, 
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especially in Curacao. The colonial status of the Antilles was 
modified in 1954 when it became a semi-independent part of the 
Netherlands, along with Surinam. Some Antilleans, however, 
were dissatisfied with the country's limited autonomy, viewing it 
as merely a continuation of their previous colonial status. Discon­
tent over the long reign of the Democratic Party also developed. 
The party was seen in some circles as self-serving and incapable of 
solving the country s myriad economic problems. The labor 
movement in Curacao also began its growth and development after 
semi-independence had been achieved. The highly fragmented 
labor movement perhaps felt the political, economic, and racial 
strains more than any other segment of the society. A new radical 
political movement called Vito also emerged in the wake of the 
Antilles new political status, largely owing its development to a 
university scholarship program sponsored by the reorganized cen­
tral government. As we will presently show, the leaders of this 
movement and radical labor leaders with whom they had previ­
ously worked formed the nucleus of the May Movement and 
became a catalyst for social change. 
On the eve of the May Movement then, there were many groups 
involved in the changing Curacao scene. The key ones up to this 
point in our analysis are listed below. Of course, others will also be 
added to the list, many of whom grew directly out of the May 
Movement. 
Political Parties and Movements 
Democratic Party of Curacao (DP) 
National People's Party of Curacao (NVP) 
Union Reformista Antillano (URA) 
Vito Movement 
Labor Unions 
Free

General Conference of Trade Unions (AVVC)

Petroleum Workers Federation of Curacao (PWFC)

Curacao Federation of Workers (CFW)
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Independent 
General Dock Workers Union (AHU) 
Catholic 
Curacao Christian Confederation of Trade Unions (ccv) 
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position here. As increasing numbers of unions became political in Curacao, the May 
Movement crystallized. 
9. Paul E. Sigmund, ed., The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1967), p. 405 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Emergence of the May Movement 
In the first chapter, we suggested that social movements develop 
within a particular sociohistorical context. That is to say, certain 
preconditions in a society set the stage for the appearance of social 
movements. Thus in Chapters two and three, we described the 
many historical and contemporary factors in Curacao that we think 
were linked to the emergence of the May Movement in 1969. 
These factors included political, economic, and racial strains. We 
further suggested that such strains were exacerbated by the rapid 
change Curacao and the rest of the Antilles were undergoing. This 
made Curacao fertile ground for the emergence of a movement like 
the May Movement as well as for other changes. The analysis of 
preexisting conditions and change in Curacao is not the sole object 
of this study, however. We are also interested in the career and 
internal dynamics of the May Movement and its consequences for 
the society. In this chapter, we will focus on the career of the May 
Movement and in the following chapter we will turn our attention 
to its impact on the island-society. Thus, from the standpoint of 
social change, we will have analyzed the May Movement in three 
ways: the role social change played in its formation, its internal 
changes, and the social change it in turn generated in the society. 
The preexisting conditions in Curacao that we have referred to 
were necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the emergence 
of the May Movement. Political, racial, and economic strains 
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might have been present in the society for many years to come 
without spawning a movement like the May Movement. Often a 
major crisis will trigger the crystallization of an emerging social 
movement. In the case of the May Movement, a labor crisis 
transformed the fragmented labor movement in such a way as to 
enable it to engage in concerted action for the first time. During its 
career, the May Movement underwent both organizational and 
political changes. As we analyze the career of the May Movement, 
then, we will employ a political-organizational sequence model. 
This approach is similar to the natural-history approach in that it 
allows us to focus on the internal dynamics of the May Movement. 
However, it differs from natural-history models in that we do not 
imply that movements undergo an inevitable sequence of de­
velopment. We suggest instead that the May Movement under­
went certain changes rather than others because of the presence of 
particular internal and external factors. 
LABOR UNREST 
The Antilles were marked by substantial labor unrest in May of 
1969. However, the major labor dispute and the one that eventu­
ally led to the mobilization of much of labor during the May 
Movement involved the Curacao Federation of Labor (CFW), and 
WESCAR, one of several companies that did contract work for the 
Royal Dutch Shell Company. The dispute centered around two key 
issues. At WESCAR, non-Antillean workers—such as those from 
other Caribbean islands and Holland—were paid more than Antil­
lean workers as compensation for working outside their own 
countries. Also, WESCAR employees received less pay than those at 
Shell fordoing the same work. The WESCAR management claimed 
that being under contract to Shell it could not afford to pay its 
employees at the same rate as Shell employees. Thus the dispute 
between WESCAR and the CFW involved demands by the union that 
Antillean employees doing the same work receive pay equal to 
non-Antilleans, and that WESCAR employees engaged in the same 
work as those at Shell also receive equal pay. 
During the month of May, the publishers of Vito waged a 
strenuous campaign to keep the labor unrest at wi SCAR and other 
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companies in the Antilles, which they interpreted in leftist political 
terms, in the public limelight. News regarding strikes in various 
companies was featured in very dramatic terms. Also during the 
labor unrest, Vito increased its attacks on the government and 
business groups for their "exploitation of the laboring class." The 
tone of the periodical's articles was particularly abrasive toward 
certain businesses and strongly hinted that action would or should 
be taken against them if conditions were not improved. One such 
article was in the form of an open letter to the owner of a large retail 
store, Tauber s, who had become the symbol of exploitative 
capitalism among radical union and intellectual groups. The letter 
was also addressed to "other capitalists of bad faith." In the letter, 
the owner of the retail store was asked if he had read the small print 
of his fire insurance policy, and if so, since the policy didnot cover 
damages resulting from revolution and rebellion, it was difficult to 
understand why he followed a policy of exploitation in an age of 
Molotov cocktails and world-wide revolution by young people. 
(Interestingly enough, this man's store became a target of rioters 
on May 30, and was subsequently set afire and burned to the 
ground.) The headlines of another article that appeared in Vito 
during this period read: "How Many More Days Before A Revolu­
tion?" The paper also featured stories about incidents involving 
workers that were interpreted as meaning that the laboring class 
was tired of being oppressed and was near revolution. Through its 
handling and interpretation of events during the May labor unrest, 
then, the Vito movement escalated its efforts to provide cues for 
collective action for the labor movement at variance with the 
latter s traditional role. 
EMERGENCE OF THE MAY MOVEMENT: ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION 
A dramatic transformation of the labor movement in Curacao 
began during this period of labor unrest in May, 1969. This 
transformation involved increasing solidarity within the labor 
movement1 and increasing politicization. Factors both internal and 
external to the labor movement were responsible for these 
changes. During its transformation period, which we have labeled 
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the May Movement, the labor movement went through four 
phases: an economic strike phase, a proto-political phase, a politi­
cal strike phase, and finally a political party phase. The May 
Movement began with a very definite economic focus and gradu­
ally evolved into a mechanism for political as well as economic 
change. We will begin our discussion of the May Movement by 
considering its first phase, that is, the economic strike phase, and 
then proceed to discuss the more political phases in the order of 
their appearance. 
Economic Strike Phase 
The first phase of the May Movement involved an unusual show 
of solidarity by several unions in Curacao. This solidarity came in 
the form of support given to the CFW, which went on strike against 
WESCAR for specific and limited economic objectives, and for this 
reason we have labeled this phase of the May Movement as the 
economic strike phase. During this initial phase, labor leaders 
mobilized workers around bread-and-butter issues. Since most 
unions in Curacao did not traditionally become directly involved in 
politics and the fragmentation within the labor movement was due 
in part to the presence of groups and leaders with competing 
political styles and orientations, it seems highly unlikely that the 
May Movement could have initially crystallized around a political 
rather than an economic issue. On the other hand, a common 
position held even among the fragmented labor groups was that 
workers deserved higher wages. This common denominator, in 
contrast to the disagreement over the role of politics in reaching the 
goals of the labor movement, facilitated the emergence of support 
among labor groups for a sister union striking for higher wages. 
The mobilization of the labor movement began on May 6, 1969, 
when some 400 WESCAR employees went on strike. This strike 
ended on May 8 with the two parties agreeing to negotiate for a 
new labor contract with the assistance of a government mediator. 
During the brief strike, Antillean workers were joined by non-
Antillean workers at WESCAR. Also, the CFW received verbal and 
written support and encouragement from other unions in Curacao. 
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Such expressions were forerunners of the increased solidarity to 
come. The negotiations between the CFW and WESCAR, which 
lasted for nearly three weeks, ended without a new agreement 
being concluded, and on May 27, the CFW went on strike a second 
time. 
On May 28, during the lunch hour, a number of Shell employees 
and employees of other companies under contract to Shell demon­
strated at Post V, the main gate of the Shell refinery, in support of 
the WESCAR strike. The next morning, May 29, about 800 persons 
working for contractors at Shell sites went on a peaceful sympathy 
strike at Post V. On the same day, the CFW received notice from the 
board of WESCAR that it considered the strike illegal and that all 
employees had to start back to work the next day or be discharged. 
That afternoon about 30 or 40 strikers, including several union 
leaders, marched to Fort Amsterdam, the seat of the Antillean 
government. They held a demonstration, and their spokesmen 
were heard by a mediator from the Social and Economic Affairs 
Department. One of the concerns of the strikers was that the 
government itself was interested in keeping wages low in order to 
attract foreign investors. Such issues were to become more salient 
in the political phases of the May Movement. 
At 7:30 P.M. on May 29, a meeting was held by thePWFCatCasa 
Sindical, the headquarters and meeting place for several of the 
Free labor unions. Also in attendance at this meeting were strikers 
from WESCAR. The meeting was called to determine the position 
the PWFC would assume in the labor crisis. The PWFC had never in 
the past made common cause with the employees of companies 
doing work under contract for Shell, which the CFW represented. 
However, the position that the PWFC took in the labor dispute 
would be crucial in that it was the largest union in the oil industry in 
Curacao, and its labor contract with Shell, which made its mem­
bers the highest paid workers in the industry, served as the basis for 
the aspirations of the strikers. 
The leaders of the PWFC came under considerable pressure to 
show their solidarity with the growing strike movement by calling 
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a strike of Shell. This pressure emanated from several sources. 
First, by the time of this meeting several other groups of workers 
had united behind the strikers either by going out on strike them­
selves or by giving support to them in public announcements and in 
statements issued to government officials. For example, the latter 
was done by the large General Conference of Trade Unions (A v vc) 
to which the PWFC was affiliated. Also, the radical segment of 
labor exerted pressure upon the PWFC to show solidarity with the 
strikers. Finally, there was strong sentiment among the rank and 
file of the PWFC to support the other strikers by going out on strike 
against Shell. This sympathy of the rank and file for the cause of 
the CFW strikers can be traced in part to the efforts of radicals like 
Godett and Brown who went among the workers during the crisis 
calling for united action against their common foe, the business 
community. Given these pressures, the leaders of the PWFC felt 
that they had no choice but to call for a strike. They believed that to 
do otherwise would cost them the control of the union. Signifi­
cantly then the moderate leaders of the all important petroleum 
workers union who generally preferred negotiation and accommo­
dation to more militant tactics were effectively neutralized at least 
in part by the actions of more radical labor leaders. Thus at the 
meeting, it was decided to call a 24-hour sympathy strike of all 
Shell employees. The decision to strike was made at about 8:30 
P.M. and was to take effect at 11:30 that same evening. After the 
meeting, a large portion of the gathering, estimated to be around 
1,000, left by cars for the various gates of the Shell refinery to 
inform workers who would be reporting to work on late shifts 
about the union's decision to strike. Many of the workers on the 
job at Shell left immediately upon hearing the decision to strike. 
Shell began to call in supervisory personnel to take over operations 
and some of them were harassed by strikers at the gates. 
Although a portion of the gathering from the union meeting had 
gone to the Shell gates, the number of persons in front of the union 
hall increased, and the crowd started harassing passers by and 
stopping cars. Particular attention seemed to be given to cars that 
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contained or were suspected of containing "European Dutchmen" 
or Makamba (i.e., Dutchmen who had recently come from Hol­
land in contrast to persons of Dutch ancestry born in the Antilles). 
Around midnight, about 1,000 men were gathered at Post V 
There harassment of supervisory Shell personnel occurred, espe­
cially European Dutchmen, and some temporary road barriers 
were destroyed. The crowd, however, began to dissolve about 
2:30 A.M., and the rest of the night was relatively quiet. Yet the 
conflict that occurred at the entrance to the Shell refinery, and that 
which had occurred earlier in front of the union headquarters, were 
forerunners of things to come in the second phase of the May 
Movement. 
The first phase of the May Movement, then, involved primarily 
strike activity on the part of workers directed at economic condi­
tions. Other kinds of strains were also reflected in the early actions 
of some of the workers, however. For example, racial and political 
discontent was expressed by the occasional harassment of whites 
identified as European Dutchmen, and claims made that the gov­
ernment might be directly responsible for the crisis by pursuing the 
policy of encouraging industry to keep salaries low. Nevertheless, 
for most of the workers the expression of political or racial discon­
tent did not occur until sometime later. 
ELABORATION OF THE MAY MOVEMENT! POLITICIZATION 
On the morning of May 30, more unions announced that they 
had gone on strike in support of the CFW. Starting around 7:00 A.M. 
the number of strikers and other persons at Post V grew rapidly, 
and by 7:30 it was estimated that between three and four thousand 
men had gathered there. Union leaders began making speeches to 
the gathering. The head of the CFW appealed to the strikers to keep 
politics out of the protest. However, Papa Godett, the head of the 
radical dock workers union, began moving the issue in the direc­
tion of politics by criticizing the actions of the government during 
the crisis and calling for the strikers to march to Fort Amsterdam to 
overthrow it. 
The Emergence of the May Movement 75 
Up until the point when Papa Godett sounded the keynote for 
political action, the May Movement had essentially an economic 
orientation. At least this was the orientation preferred by the more 
moderate leaders in such unions as the CFW and the PWFC. How­
ever, certain factors, both background and immediate, converged 
making the politicization of the movement highly probable. The 
first has to do with the nature of the social structure of underde­
veloped societies like Curacao. Since economic development is so 
important as well as precarious in underdeveloped societies, the 
government rather than business often establishes policies of direct 
concern to labor unions such as wages, hours, and employment 
practices. As a result, in many underdeveloped societies, labor 
unions have to directly enter the political arena, that is, engage in 
political unionism, if they are to make changes in their economic 
situation. Sufrin has noted for example, "In well developed 
economies, trade unions adjust and adapt to industrial and gov­
ernmental organization. The same is true for developing societies, 
but the more significant type of adjustment and adaptation in the 
latter is to government because it is the more significant institution 
from the viewpoint of the interests of the trade unions."2 The 
Antillean government had assumed a role that was somewhat 
typical in a developing society. For example, it pursued a policy of 
encouraging industries to stabilize wages in order to attract new 
investors. In such a context, when economic institutions or ar­
rangements are not clearly differentiated from political ones, 
economic issues become political ones as well, and an initial 
economic-social movement may evolve into a political movement. 
Thus Curacao was structurally conducive to the emergence of 
political as well as economic protest activity by labor unions.3 The 
presence of leaders who could articulate political aspirations for 
the labor movement and had broad appeal among workers also 
facilitated the shift of the May protest from a primarily economic 
to a political character. For example, prior to the labor crisis, 
radical leaders like Papa Godett and Stanley Brown of the Vito 
movement had established themselves among workers in Curacao 
as important leaders who were prepared to lead them into political 
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action. Yet the two variables mentioned thus far were only neces­
sary and not sufficient conditions in the politicization of the May 
Movement because they had been present in the society for a long 
time without generating significant political action on the part of 
labor. The final ingredient in the equation that led to the politiciza­
tion of labor appears to have been its initial economic mobilization 
that brought together large numbers of workers. Once mobilized, 
the labor movement began to perceive a political role for itself that 
was generally unrecognized prior to the crisis. As long as labor 
was composed of isolated and competing factions, even with the 
existence of the background variables mentioned above, it did not 
engage in direct political activity. However, as a result of the sense 
of solidarity and power felt once they were mobilized at the 
beginning of the May Movement, the workers were encouraged to 
engage in collective political activity. This activity was fairly 
unstructured initially, but assumed a more organized character 
later. And as was the case in its confrontation with the business 
groups, the polarization between the labor movement and political 
authorities furthered the growth of solidarity within the former. 
Finally, once the political protest activity of the May Movement 
was started, it was furthered at certain points by the actions of 
external groups. For example, in some cases this involved receiv­
ing support from similarly dissatisfied groups, and, in others, this 
entailed the nature of the response of social control authorities. We 
will now turn to a discussion of those phases of the May Movement 
whose objectives became increasingly political in nature. 
Proto-Political Phase 
The strike began to assume political significance as Papa Godett 
and other labor leaders called for a march on the government at 
Fort Amsterdam about seven miles away in downtown Willem­
stad. The gathering had grown to about 5,000 as it moved out 
toward the center of Willemstad led by Papa Godett and several 
other labor leaders in a jeep. However, the political objective of 
forcing the government to resign was never to be achieved by this 
particular group as it was later to break up and engage in generally 
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uncoordinated protest characteristic of proto-political social 
movements, that is, movements that represent an early or initial 
form of political action. 
Proto-political movements, or what some scholars have referred 
to as anomic movements,4 occur among groups in a society that 
feel that the more traditional means for bringing about change are 
either closed to them or are no longer effective.5 Segments of the 
labor movement in Curacao were dissatisfied with the response of 
the government to the plight of workers and were also discouraged 
by the prospect for changing the government's approach to the 
problem. It was within this context that the proto-political phase of 
the May protest emerged. 
Willemstad is located on the southern shore of the island of 
Curacao. A picturesque canal-like inlet called Saint Anna's Bay 
bisects the city, dividing it into the sections known as the Punda 
and Otrabanda. Curacao's famed pontoon bridge connects the two 
areas. The bridge opens about twenty times a day to let ships enter 
and leave. Saint Anna's Bay is the route of access to a larger bay 
called Schottegat. The Shell refinery is located on the farther side 
of Schottegat, almost directly opposite the inlet separating the two 
parts of the city. Willemstad can be reached from Post V then by 
way of the Punda or Otrabanda. Although they are nearly equidis­
tant, the route to the Punda is a better access route through the 
built-up portions of the periphery of the city. Fort Amsterdam is 
also located on the Punda side. The marchers took the approxi­
mately seven-mile route by way of the Punda. 
The leaders of the march had not made plans to control the huge 
gathering. For example, crowd marshals were not appointed. One 
leader explained this later by saying that no difficulty was antici­
pated and so no such precautions seemed warranted. The leaders of 
the march had no control, of course, over who joined the protest. 
Thus in addition to the group of strikers and onlookers that had 
initially assembled at Post V. many persons along the route of 
march to Willemstad joined the ranks of the protestors, most 
noticeably young males. One of the strike leaders indicated that he 
began noticing youths joining the march after it had progressed 
about a mile and a half in the direction of Willemstad. 
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As the crowd moved toward downtown Willemstad, ostensibly 
to register its protest with the government, it shifted between acts 
of harassment to violence of a more dramatic and serious nature. 
Cars coming the other way were pushed aside and some were 
turned over. A pickup truck driven by a white man was set on fire. 
A large supermarket was looted, as was a white-owned fruitstore­
carryout. At both stores, a large quantity of liquor was taken and 
consumed by some of the marchers along the way. (It had been 
reported earlier that many of the persons at Post V during the night 
had been drinking.) Many youths began joining the march. A large 
bus was stopped on a major traffic circle and its windows were 
shattered. With this initial damage, word soon reached the city of 
the potential danger, and most traffic was forewarned to avoid the 
route the marchers had taken. The chief of police also warned 
merchants in the city to close their shops for the time being. This 
later resulted in many stores being easy prey for looters as many 
merchants interpreted the police chief to mean that they and their 
employees should leave the stores. 
As the marchers moved down the road, the windows in several 
large commercial buildings were smashed, including those of an 
electrical and air-conditioning contractor and a Coca-Cola bottling 
plant. More cars were damaged and set on fire. As would be the 
case when the riot reached its peak as the protestors arrived in the 
heart of Willemstad, during this period some of the targets, accord­
ing to some protestors, were deliberately chosen because of past 
grievances. For example, the windows in Texas Instruments, an 
American-owned company, were broken and some of the march­
ers went inside and threatened the workers. The company stopped 
production as a result of this. The company had earned the 
reputation of being exploitative because it had resisted efforts by 
workers at unionization. Also during this period as well as later, 
while some targets might have been deliberately selected, other 
potential ones were ignored by the protestors. Residences were 
spared, although the inhabitants of some homes were forced to 
leave them because of smoke from fires set in commercial build­
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ings. Also public and quasi-public buildings were spared by the 
protestors throughout the riot, even as nearby commercial proper­
ties were attacked. 
The small Curacao police force was mobilized when it received 
intelligence reports on the increasingly violent march. Also, be­
fore noon the assistance of the local militia, called the voluntary 
corps, and the Dutch Marines stationed in Curacao was requested. 
A police unit was sent to intercept the marchers before they 
reached downtown Willemstad. The police were given orders to 
first be firm with the protestors and if that didn't work to shoot over 
their heads, and, if that also failed to control them, as a last resort, 
to shoot in the legs those who didn't respond to their authority. The 
police were unsuccessful in their first attempt to halt the march. 
They soon became surrounded by the protestors, who attempted to 
run them down with some of the cars that were in the march. It 
appears that the inability of the under-manned police to enforce 
their authority facilitated the escalation of the violence.6 The 
police set up a second line of defense at Berg Altena, a hill that 
overlooks the downtown area. At this point there were about sixty 
policemen present. The police officer in charge talked to the 
leaders of the march. About this time Papa Godett was shot in the 
back when according to some observers he was attempting to talk 
to the crowd. Godett later claimed that he believed he was shot 
because the government had given orders to kill him. The police 
reported that they were being heavily stoned and threatened by the 
marchers at the time Godett was shot. One high police official said 
of the situation his men were in, "They had to fight for their 
lives." This incident marked a significant turning point in the 
disturbance. The confrontation between the marchers and the 
police escalated, soon to be followed by the major looting and 
arson that would not abate until increased force was applied. A car 
was overturned and burned on the hill. One of two fire trucks that 
had been sent to support the police was set on fire and pushed in the 
direction of the police lines. The man at the steering wheel, later 
identified as an employee of WESCAR, was shot and killed. As the 
80 Social Movements, Violence and Change 
pitched battle continued, the police suffered injuries from thrown 
rocks, and three police cars and another fire truck were damaged. 
A Red Cross ambulance sent into the area was also stoned. 
When the union leader was shot, he was taken immediately to 
the hospital by other union leaders who had been with him. Some 
of the marchers also followed to the hospital. During the next 
several hours, it was rumored that Godett was dead. Because of the 
nature of his injury, he had to spend considerable time in the 
operating room. Afterwards, several of the union leaders were 
permitted to see him to assure them that he was alive. The scene at 
the hospital was characterized by a great deal of bedlam when the 
labor leaders brought Godett in and at other times during the 
disturbance. One observer remarked in reference to the crowded 
and confused conditions as the injured were brought in and rela­
tives arrived, "It was horrible. It was a revolution at the hospital." 
The types of injuries suffered by the wounded brought to the 
hospital included burns, bullet wounds, and cuts. 
With the shooting of Godett and the absence of the other leaders 
who accompanied him to the hospital, the bulk of the crowd 
quickly moved into Willemstad's business district on the Punda 
side of Saint Anna's Bay, spreading out through the streets, 
breaking windows, and looting. The crowd broke up into smaller 
groups, in many cases into groups of three and four persons, and 
moved along the narrow streets where retail stores were located. 
Eyewitnesses consistently reported that most of the rioters were 
young men in their teens and early twenties and that few women 
were involved. The latter was reflected in the fact that very few 
women were arrested during the disorders. 
Although some rioters stayed on the Punda side of the business 
district, others moved across the pontoon bridge, which spans the 
bay, to the Otrabanda area and looted shops. Fires were set in both 
the Punda and Otrabanda areas. The police made arrests. Signifi­
cantly, at noon the first fire on the Otrabanda side was set at 
Tauber s, the retail store that had been earlier singled out by the 
radical paper Vito as being a particularly exploitative business 
establishment. The fire soon spread to other buildings in the area. 
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At one point, the fire at Tauber s was brought under control; 
however, after the police who had been guarding it left, arsonists 
returned and reset the fire and the building burned down. An old 
theatre that was used for storing goods, including considerable 
quantities of liquor, was looted and burned. Back across the bay, a 
number of fires were set in stores that had already been looted. 
Some of the buildings that housed the shops were several hundred 
years old and burned rapidly as the fires spread from roof to roof. 
The compactness of the business district made access difficult for 
fire-fighting equipment. Also fire fighters were hampered by the 
fact that some equipment had been destroyed earlier in the day. 
Boats were used to fight fires in buildings near the waterfront. 
The policemen, who also double as firemen in Curacao, were 
joined by several organizations and private citizens in performing 
emergency roles during the disturbance. The detachment of 
marines stationed in Curacao, as well as marines later flown in 
from the Netherlands, worked under the authority of the local 
police. The marines assisted in fighting fires, engaged in crowd 
control activities, and patrolled the downtown business areas, and 
also guarded strategic structures such as the pontoon bridge. There 
had been attempts by rioters to damage the bridge, which if 
successful would have made it more difficult for fire-fighting 
equipment to reach the Otrabanda. The voluntary corps worked in 
cooperation with the police and marines in fighting fires, patrol­
ling the riot-torn area, and guarding banks, radio stations, and 
other key enterprises. According to reports by members of the 
voluntary corps and other observers, the voluntary corps had less 
difficulty with protestors than the police or marines. For example, 
the voluntary corps did not experience the verbal abuse from 
protestors that the marines took even as late as June 1. Those in the 
voluntary corps felt that they were accepted more than the police or 
marines because they were volunteers. The Red Cross and the 
Rescue Squad, another volunteer group, also were mobilized. The 
Rescue Squad worked in the riot-torn area picking up the 
wounded, later treating many of them at Squad headquarters. The 
Squad also set up a first-aid station and worked at the hospital. The 
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Red Cross also established an aid station and treated the wounded. 
Private citizens assisted many groups in fighting fires and other 
emergency work. In some cases this was on a long-term basis 
while in others it was of brief, on-the-spot duration. In one case of 
the latter variety, for example, a high government official with the 
aid of passers-by was able to remove a burning drum filled with 
highly combustible material that had been placed against a bank, 
thus preventing damage to the building. 
In the afternoon of May 30, several clergymen in Curacao made 
an appeal over the radio for an end to the violence that had erupted. 
One noted, "Punda is on fire. Cura?ao is in a state of alarm due to 
the activities of the striking employees. I appeal to the workers 
who are fighting for just pay to stop their activities. I hope that 
from the remaining ruins a new and better Curacao will rise."7 
Emergency organizations continued fighting fires during the 
night of May 30 and the next day before they were brought under 
control. A curfew was enforced from the evening of May 30 to 
June 2. The downtown riot area was closed off to unauthorized 
persons and a ban on assembly was imposed as well as on the sale 
of liquor. 
A leaflet distributed in Curacao on May 31, which was attrib­
uted to the Vito movement, read in part: 
The people, especially the workers, who have already suffered for 
many years and have endured many situations have become fed up 
with it all! 
The people have become fed up! 
The workers have become fed up! 
Willemstad has burned! 
For the first time in history, the people have reacted and behaved in a 
manner which was thought impossible. 
Willemstad has burned! 
The people could loot and get away with it. 
The people have already showed that they are fed up. 
This is the lesson for the exploiters. 
Now that we have burned everything down, there is new room to start 
building again. Now we must plant something new, and the entire 
population is requested to help. 
The exploiters have been taught a lesson. 
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The authorities, who have always thwarted the people, have been 
taught a lesson. 
Willemstad has burned, and we will have to rebuild it.8 
On May 31, the day after the major disorders started, the 
violence began tapering off. From this point on, authorities were 
mainly concerned with controlling the "hit and run tactics of 
youths." No significant outbreaks of violence occurred between 
May 31 and June 1. On June 1, exhausted local security forces 
were supplemented by 300 marines flown from the Netherlands. 
For a short period, the protest in Curacao even spilled outside 
the island. Some 300 to 500 persons, including Antillean students 
and workers and Dutch students and radicals, held a protest 
demonstration at the Hague in Holland on June 1, after learning 
about the developments in Curacao. The demonstrators, marching 
in support of the workers and unions in Curacao, protested the use 
of Dutch Marines there and called for Antillean independence 
from Holland. Carrying posters with such slogans written on them 
as: "Invasion Troops Out," "No Troops, But Work," "Colonial 
Murder," and "Slaves Fight for Freedom," the protestors sent a 
delegation to meet with Dutch government officials to deliver a 
letter of protest. There were also clashes and fights between some 
of the demonstrators and the police. The protest lasted for a few 
TABLE 3 
COSTS OF THE MAY VIOLENCE 
Personal 
Deaths 2 
Injured (excluding those slightly injured) 
Police officers 22 
Others 57 
Arrests 
Men 308 
Women 14 
Properly 
Businesses burned out 43 
Other buildings burned 10 
Damaged and looted 100 
Damaged only 90 
Vehicles destroyed by fire 30 
SOURCE: Compiled from various reports and interviews. 
84 Social Movements, Violence and Change 
hours and by the time it had ended several of the participants had 
been arrested by the police. 
In the weeks after the violence in Curacao, there was an account­
ing of its social and economic costs. They were as reported in 
table 3. Estimates of the dollar damage ranged from 35 to 40 
million dollars. 
On June 2, the following commentary appeared in a local 
Curasao paper which suggested that while peace was being re­
stored to the island, other crises and changes were still to come. 
After the horrible events of last Friday it seems that peace has 
returned to Curasao. There weren't any serious incidents on Saturday 
and Sunday. This morning it was enormously crowded in the city 
center, especially on the Punda side. The almost unimaginable event 
occurred this morning at about nine o'clock when several hundred 
people gathered in front of La Bohemia shop . . and stole many shop 
goods. According to bystanders the owner of the shop would have 
given the people permission to take the goods. If this is true, which we 
haven't been able to verify with the owner, this would be an outra­
geous situation in view of the past events. Only about 45 minutes later 
policemen and marines arrived on the scene to chase the people away. 
A strange and unimaginable affair. At the moment many foreign 
journalists from many countries, especially from the Netherlands, 
America and Venezuela, are staying in Curasao, indicating that what 
has occurred here recently is regarded as world news. Everywhere 
now responsible people urge others to stay calm and keep the peace. 
At the moment many rumors are circulating such as the one that 
they are missing explosives at the Curacao Mining Company which 
could be used for destructive purposes. There exists great danger 
in such rumors and accusations. 
In the waters surrounding Curasao, two American war ships have 
been seen. We could not get any official information about their 
presence. We also have tried to get some information about the 
meeting and discussions which were held between the union leaders 
and the members of the Staten, however this was impossible. We wait 
in suspense to get the results of the meeting of the Staten which will be 
held this afternoon. We hope that everybody will keep cool and that 
attention will be paid only to the interest of the society and the 
measures to be taken in order to reconstruct Curacao.9 
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At 4:30 P.M. on May 30, the head oftheCFW announced by radio 
that the union had reached a one-year agreement with 
WESCAR and that the principle of equal wages for equal work on 
Shell sites had been accepted. He also announced that the strike at 
Shell by the PWFC was ended. Thus the agreement with WESCAR 
meant that the initial economic goal of the May Movement had 
been achieved. However, this did not mean that the end of the 
movement had been reached because the second phase, that is, the 
proto-political phase, had signaled political as well as economic 
discontent on the part of the workers in Curacao. 
Such outbursts as the one that occurred in Curacao can be 
viewed as a primitive, or rudimentary, form of political activity. 
By themselves, because the demands they articulate are vague and 
concerted action limited, they do not directly achieve long-range 
goals. However, unplanned outbursts may evolve into more or­
ganized protest thus developing the capacity for recalling a gov­
ernment and making other changes.10 Thus in Curacao several 
unions recognizing the political significance and potential of the 
outburst formed a coalition to state in specific terms that which was 
expressed in vague terms by the rioters, that is, the need for 
political change. At this point, the May Movement entered a third 
phase—a political strike phase. 
Political Strike Phase 
During the height of the outburst on May 30, unsuccessful 
attempts were made by some moderate labor leaders who had not 
been in the march to arrange a meeting with the government to 
discuss the growing crisis. Finally, a meeting was held by labor 
leaders from several of the unions in Curacao, both moderate and 
radical, during which it was decided to send an ultimatum to the 
government calling for its resignation and new elections, other­
wise a general strike would be declared.11 This ultimatum was 
signed by the union leaders and sent by messenger to the govern­
ment around 8:00 P.M. About 9:00 P.M. the unions' ultimatum was 
also delivered over the radio by the head of the CFW and Amador 
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Nita, the secretary-general of the dock workers union. This later 
resulted in the latter's arrest, but pressure from the unions led to his 
subsequent release. In accounting for their unprecedented actions, 
the unions declared that they were convinced that the 
government's social and economic policies had failed and that the 
rights of the workers had not advanced along with the development 
of the country. As a result, they reasoned, the workers had become 
frustrated and this frustration resulted in the outburst. Thus the 
growing belief among the labor unions was that significant change 
could occur only through political action. This emerging ideology 
clearly marked a break from the traditional stance taken by most 
trade unions in Curacao. 
At 2:00 P.M. on May 31, the unions held another meeting and 
this time representatives from several unions from Aruba, the 
second most populous island in the Antilles, were in attendance. 
Also present were representatives from the chamber of commerce. 
The latter were invited to the meeting to essentially serve as the 
channel of communication between the unions and the govern­
ment. The utilization of such a go-between further demonstrated 
the isolation the unions felt from the government. 
At this important meeting, the Aruban unions indicated their 
support of the call for the government's resignation, which had 
been made the day before. A joint statement was issued by the two 
groups of unions declaring that a general strike would be called in 
both Curacao and Aruba if the government did not agree to step 
down within forty-eight hours. Thus with this joint action, the 
boundaries of the May Movement were extended beyond Curacao 
and at the same time its power was enhanced. Finally, the union 
leaders explained to the chamber of commerce representatives 
why a general strike was going to be called so that they could relay 
the mood and position of the unions to government officials. The 
chamber of commerce representatives agreed to talk to the gov­
ernment to determine if it would resign as demanded by the 
coalition of unions or make other concessions that might end the 
crisis. 
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On June 1, the unions again met with the chamber of commerce 
representatives who brought the government's reply that it was 
willing to talk only after there was complete order in Curacao, and 
before that it would do nothing. The next action taken by the union 
coalition was to request that they be allowed to come before the 
Staten, which was to meet the following day, June 2. That night 
the unions received word from the president of the Staten that their 
request was approved and so they decided to postpone the general 
strike until they saw what the consequences of their meeting with 
the Staten would be. The next day the unions met with the Staten 
and reiterated their lack of confidence in the government and again 
called for its resignation. On the following day, June 3, the Staten 
voted to dissolve the government and to set new elections for 
September 5, 1969. Thereafter the prime minister resigned and an 
interim government was set up with a new prime minister to carry 
out routine governmental activities and to arrange for the Sep­
tember elections. Thus there was no need for the unions to put into 
effect the general strike plans they had drawn up during their 
several days of meetings,which included the disruption of such 
essentials as electricity and water services. 
In sum, the political or general strike phase, which grew out of 
the proto-political phase of the May Movement, marked the first 
time in the Antilles that a coalition had been formed by the various 
segments of labor who were more accustomed to conflict and 
competition than cooperation. In the political strike phase, the 
unions organized the protest of the rioters and articulated it in 
specific political terms that led to the recall of the government. 
However, this third phase of the May Movement was to give way 
to another, the political party phase. 
Political Party Phase 
Even more structure and conscious emphasis upon long-range 
political goals developed in the May Movement when it served as 
the basis for the formation of anew labor party. With the formation 
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of the party, a political ideology had to be formulated, candidates 
selected, and a campaign organized. As has often been true in 
other developing societies, those persons whose experiences had 
provided them with considerable political concern joined in the 
effort to make the May Movement a truly organized political form. 
This included radical union leaders as well as intellectuals in the 
Vito movement who had returned to Curacao after studying in 
Dutch universities. As Oppenheimer has noted, the latter have 
historically played leading roles in the transformation of move­
ments from proto-political to organized political enterprises such 
as independence movements.12 
The new political party, called the May 30 Labor and Liberation 
Front, was formed in June. Forming the cadre of this political party 
were three men who had played key roles in earlier phases of the 
May Movement: Papa Godett and Amador Nita of the dock work­
ers union, and Stanley Brown, publisher of the radical Vito paper. 
These men had a large following among the laborers in Curacao 
before the May Movement, and their actions during it only served 
to enhance their appeal. All three men had been arrested as a result 
of their activity during the crisis, and Brown, who was sentenced 
to jail for a term of several months on a charge of agitation, was in 
confinement during the party's election campaign. In addition to 
being arrested like the other two leaders, Godett was wounded 
during the outburst on May 30. These three men had high visibil­
ity, then, and became symbols of the May protest. 
Elections involve considerable fanfare in Curacao with candi­
dates making many public speeches and parties using the mass 
media to get their campaign messages and slogans to the public. 
Much use is also made by competing parties of such election 
paraphernalia as campaign buttons, banners, and posters. The 
special September 5 election was no exception to this pattern. 
There were four opposing Curasao parties in the election: the 
Democratic Party, the National People's Party, URA, and the 
Liberation Front. In Antillean elections, each party places at the 
head of its list of candidates the person it considers to have the most 
personal appeal and to be its top vote getter. Former prime minister 
The Emergence of the May Movement 89 
Kroon headed the Democrats slate of candidates, Juan Evertsz 
headed the National Party's list, Papy Jesurun carried the banner 
for URA, and Papa Godett, because of his likely appeal to workers 
as a result of his role in the May protest, headed the list for the 
Liberation Front, which also included Nita and Brown. One party 
spokesman, for example, declared that Godett was chosen to lead 
the party in the campaign because he was "the person to receive 
the first bullet" during the rebellion. Even though he was prime 
minister and leader of the ruling Democratic Party at the time of the 
May rebellion, Kroon accepted none of the responsibility for it. He 
campaigned for law and order, suggesting that his party could 
provide it for the Antilles in contrast to those who would bring on 
more insurrection and instability. The National Party and URA 
offered little in the way of new programs in their campaigns. They 
were to later accuse the Liberation Front of cutting into their 
strength by taking a "racial approach." Some members of URA left 
the party during the campaign to join the Liberation Front's effort 
when it became clear to them that the approach URA was taking 
would basically be no more progressive than that of the Democrats 
and Nationalists. 
During its campaign, the Liberation Front held public rallies 
around the island. Dressed in military fatigues and using such 
props as a campaign poster depicting former prime minister Kroon 
shooting May protestors, the party's message delivered by the 
candidates was similar to the one that had been stated in more 
vague terms by the rioters. It was anti-Dutch, emphasized the need 
for black pride and a positive Antillean identity, and called for the 
establishment of a government that would be responsive to the 
needs of the laboring class rather than to a business and neo­
colonial elite. It called on the workers to turn away from the 
established parties and join in the effort to develop a mass-based 
labor party. 
Stanley Brown had a significant impact on the Liberation 
Front's campaign even though he was imprisoned at the time. Due 
in large measure to his identification with the party, the Liberation 
Front received the backing of many radical teachers and intellectu­
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als. Some made speeches on behalf of the party during the cam­
paign as well as financial contributions. The Liberation Front also 
benefitted from support that came from the dissident group that 
broke away from URA because it felt the party was pursuing 
policies that were too moderate after beginning as a radical alterna­
tive to the Democratic and National parties. Additionally, efforts 
were made to organize support for the Liberation Front by some 
persons not because they favored its politics but because they saw 
an opportunity to end the fifteen-year reign of the Democrats and 
thereby create a fluid political situation that they might later be 
able to use to their own advantage. Such was the case, for exam­
ple, with one prominent Curacaon who made considerable effort to 
gather voter support for the Liberation Front because he had 
ambitions for establishing his own political party and believed that 
he would be most successful in doing this with a weakened Demo­
cratic Party. As he later put it himself, he "needed someone to 
break their backs." He suggested that he was in a position to 
organize three to four thousand votes for the Liberation Front. All 
this external support for the new labor party facilitated the con­
tinued development of the May Movement in a political direction. 
For a new party, the Liberation Front achieved unusual success 
when the elections were held on September 5. It managed to win 3 
of the 22 seats in the Staten and Godett, Nita, and Brown occupied 
these seats and continued to serve as visible symbols of the May 
Movement by their unorthodox styles and rhetoric. It also turned 
out that the cooperation of the new party was needed to form a new 
coalition government and as a result the Liberation Front was 
given two ministerial posts. 
The formation of the political party was an attempt to routinize 
the growing sentiment among the ranks of labor during the crisis 
that significant changes could be realized only to the extent that it 
directly entered the political arena. Overall, this development 
follows the pattern of most developing nations, with the possible 
exception that in Curacao it occurred in a very short time span. 
Without subscribing to a rigid natural-history approach, this 
analysis offers evidence of the tendency of prepolitical and proto­
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political movements to be replaced by more organized political 
forms providing that certain facilitating conditions exist. If the 
necessary facilitating conditions had not been present, the May 
protest in Curacao could have conceivably assumed a nonpolitical 
form like a cult. We have focused on the labor movement's 
internal character as well as relevant external conditions in ac­
counting for the crystallization and subsequent political and or­
ganizational transformation of the May protest.13 This emphasis 
has enabled us to see some other important implications of this 
case study, which we should mention at this point. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 
It was noted earlier that the labor movement in Curacao had 
been for a long period characterized by fragmentation and internal 
conflict. There is a tendency to define such conflict as inevitably 
maladaptive for a social movement. However, our study supports 
the position taken by Gerlach and Hine that conflict in a movement 
is at times adaptive. They note, for example: 
When the success of movements is reported as having occurred 
''because of' rather than "in spite of' organizational fission and lack 
of cohesion, we have come to understand the nature of movement 
dynamics much more clearly. Organizational unity is functional in a 
steady-state social institution designed to maintain social stability and 
the status quo. Segmentation and "internecine dog-fighting" are 
functional in a social institution designed for rapid growth and the 
implementation of social change.14 
The labor movement in Curacao was jolted from its position of 
accommodation with long-established political patterns in the so­
ciety and transformed into an instrument for social change in part 
because of the presence of competing groups. Had it not been for 
the presence of the more radical labor leaders, the moderate labor 
leaders might have been able to guide the labor movement through 
the crisis without significant change occurring within the move­
ment itself, as well as the larger society. The moderate leaders of 
the important PWFC were goaded into a more militant course of 
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action, that is, into supporting the strike during the early phase of 
the May Movement, by the radical leaders. Further, the PWFC 
leaders supported the May Movement out of concern for losing the 
control of their union to the more radical leaders since many of 
their members were clamoring for action. Our findings on this 
matter provide support for Zald and Ash's proposition that: "Goal 
and tactic transformation of a MO [movement organization] is 
directly tied to the ebb and flow of sentiments within a social 
movement. The interorganizational competition for support leads 
to a transformation of goals and tactics."15 The May Movement 
was the first time that the PWFC had engaged in militant strike 
activity with other unions in Curacao. This marked a clear shift in 
tactics for the organization. Finally, the presence of the radical 
leaders in the labor movement was directly related to the eventual 
political orientation that the May Movement took. Had it not been 
for these leaders, labor's innovative political role might never have 
materialized. The internal conflict within the labor movement, 
then, was in part responsible for its large-scale mobilization for 
action during the May Movement and transformation into an 
important political instrument. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF STRUCTURAL SETTING 
There is a broader issue of concern to students interested in the 
development and transformation of social movements other than 
whether their goals are economic, political, or otherwise. This is 
the question of what determines the degree of change they seek. 
Smelser, for example, distinguishes between norm-oriented and 
value-oriented movements. Norm-oriented movements are those 
which call for only normative or reformative changes in a society, 
whereas value-oriented movements are those which demand more 
sweeping or revolutionary changes involving the very values of a 
society.16 And according to Smelser, particular structural settings 
facilitate the formation of either norm-oriented or value-oriented 
movements. 
Despite the use of the term revolution by many of the partici­
pants in the May protest in Curacao, it was never transformed into 
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a revolutionary movement. It began as and retained the character 
of a norm-oriented movement. This can be in part attributed to the 
nature of the social setting in which the May protest emerged, or 
more specifically to aspects of the social control situation. Thus 
our findings support Smelser's general proposition that the opera­
tion of social control is a major determinant of the form a social 
movement will assume. Smelser suggests that two social control 
factors facilitate the development of a norm-oriented movement 
and help it to retain this character during its existence: (1) a high 
degree of institutional differentiation,17 and (2) the general en­
couragement of norm-oriented activities by political authorities 
and the opening of channels for the expression of grievances and 
achievement of normative changes.1" Regarding the first point, 
Smelser suggests that in the absence of a high degree of institu­
tional differentiation there is a tendency for demands initially 
made by a movement for limited and normative changes to 
generalize into demands for broader and more revolutionary kinds 
of changes. He notes, for example: 
In a society with a fusion between religious and political 
authority—many medieval societies could serve as examples— pro­
test against specific normative arrangements inevitably tend to 
generalize into heresies. Under such conditions the mechanisms for 
insulating specific demands from challenges to legitimacy itself are 
not highly developed.19 
In Curacao, there appeared to have been less differentiation be­
tween the political and economic spheres than in more developed 
societies. This structural feature was one of the reasons why the 
May protest broadened to include political as well as economic 
demands. However, perhaps from the standpoint of social control, 
u more important form of institutional differentiation did exist in 
Curacao which appears to have been involved in preventing the 
May Movement from becoming a value-oriented movement. That 
is, in Curacao, there was a clear separation between the govern­
ment in power and the system of government. Thus, in order to 
change the former, which constituted normative change, the latter 
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did not have to be changed or threatened, which would have 
constituted radical change. When the coalition of unions went 
before the Staten and demanded that the government resign, they 
were attacking the policies of the government in power rather than 
the legitimacy of the system of government itself. That govern­
ment officials also saw and accepted this distinction was indicated 
by the fact that they resigned. Thus this differentiation prevented 
the need for labor to seek a modification in the basis for the 
legitimacy of the political system itself in order to change the 
government's economic policies. 
Finally, Smelser's proposition that the opening of channels for 
the expression of grievances and the achievement of normative 
change will encourage a norm-oriented movement to remain as 
such is also supported by the findings of this study. For example, 
after the government in Curacao was toppled and a special election 
was set for September 5, the interim government permitted the 
formation of the May 30 Labor and Liberation Front and recog­
nized it as a legitimate political party. This was the case in spite of 
the role the founders of the new party had played during the crisis 
and the charges that had been brought against them. The response 
by the government had the effect of providing the radical leaders 
the opportunity to use more traditional or legitimate means for 
bringing about desired change in the society. Thus the protestors 
were not forced to work outside the established system or under­
ground in a revolutionary or insurrectionary movement. Indeed, 
some of the supporters of the new party wanted to work outside the 
government. However, because the party was given the opportu­
nity to do so by the government, those who preferred to work 
within the system prevailed. Furthermore, after the September 
elections, the new government became more open to contacts with 
labor leaders in an effort to reduce the latter's sense of isolation and 
in recognition of their increased power. As Smelser suggests 
would be the case, such responses by political authorities facili­
tated the nonrevolutionary character of the May Movement. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The May Movement and Social 
Change and Reform in Curacao 
The rise of the May Movement resulted in many changes in 
Curacao. Some of these were the kinds of changes groups in the 
movement had hoped to achieve, while others were unintended 
consequences of their actions.1 The changes, both intended and 
unintended, involved many aspects of the society. For the purpose 
of organizing our discussion, we can roughly categorize them as 
political, economic, and sociocultural changes. In this chapter, we 
will discuss the major changes in the political, economic, and 
sociocultural areas that emerged in Curacao over a two-year period 
as a result of the May Movement. 
POLITICAL CHANGE AND REFORM 
Since the May protest evolved into a political movement, it is 
not surprising that the most significant changes it generated in­
volved politics. As a new political force, the May Movement 
disrupted established political arrangements and led to the forma­
tion of new political organizations and power alignments. With 
their new-found power, groups participating in the May Move­
ment were able to wrest concessions from other political and 
interest groups. At the same time, however, those most affected by 
the increased power of the newer groups resorted to such tactics as 
forming alliances and mergers in order to restore some of their lost 
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power. The May Movement also furthered the development of 
factions and splits in some political and interest groups in Curacao. 
The most obvious political change wrought by the May Move­
ment was the collapse of the central government and the success of 
the new labor party at the polls in the special September election. 
The significance of this turn of events was that the almost total 
domination of the central government by the Democratic Party of 
Curacao came to an end. This did not mean that the Democratic 
Party was no longer a significant force in Antillean politics, 
because it still was. What it did mean, though, was that it could no 
longer afford to flagrantly ignore the need for supporting some 
government reforms and responding to some of the grievances of 
labor. 
The Democratic Party had been able to remain in power, thus 
selecting the prime minister from its own ranks and dominating the 
selection of cabinet ministers, by forming a majority block with 
three parties from other islands. Prior to the May Movement, the 
seats in the Staten were divided as shown in table 4. 
As the Democratic Party of Curacao became more entrenched in 
the central government over the years, it became increasingly 
indifferent to certain political and interest groups, including labor. 
Opposition parties complained of being ignored by the Democratic 
Party in matters they felt they should have been consulted on as 
members of the Staten. At the same time, the opposition was 
TABLE 4 
SEATS HELD IN THE STATEN 
PRIOR TO THE MAY MOVEMENT 
Parly Seals 
Democratic Block 
Democratic Parly of Curasao 7 
Patriotic Party of Aruba 4 
Democratic Party of Bonaire 1 
Democratic Party of the Windward Islands _1 
Total 13 
Opposition 
National People's Party of Curacao 5 
Aruban People's Party _j+ 
Total 9 
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unable to organize and offer an effective alternative political 
program and approach. The Democratic Party was also criticized 
for engaging in excessive political favoritism when selecting per­
sons to fill vacant public offices and in other matters. 
The ruling Democratic Party became especially isolated from 
the labor unions. Although the party appealed to and received 
extensive support from labor unions and workers, many union 
leaders could see little benefit that the workers received from 
giving such support. There was criticism that the Democratic Party 
followed a program of economic development that benefited 
foreign investors or white locals rather than the average Antillean, 
while at the same time taking no effective action to improve 
inadequate social services. There were also no means whereby the 
labor unions could make an input into the government's economic 
decision-making process, even though decisions were being made 
that directly affected them.2 
Why, then, had the Democratic Party continued to receive 
widespread voter support from workers in Curacao? Part of the 
reason seems to be that since Kroon and others in the Democratic 
Party had helped to organize the PWFC, many workers still saw 
them as sympathetic to their cause, in spite of the apparent failure 
of the party to develop concrete programs beneficial to them. Also, 
given the personalistic feature of Antillean politics, people tended 
to give a great deal of attention to a politician s style, what he said, 
and the small favors he could dispense rather than such things as 
the type of legislation he sponsored. With a highly effective style, 
Kroon had acquired a large personal following and thus was able to 
attract considerable support for his party. Furthermore, until the 
May Movement and the formation of the Liberation Front, there 
was no party in Curacao that seemed to offer a clear cut alternative 
to the Democratic Party. The National People's Party of Curacao 
did not differ significantly from the ruling Democratic Party, and 
the newer URA party, after initially offering some promise, proved 
not to be significantly different either. 
The Liberation Front's success at the polls in the special Sep­
tember election took away the Democratic block s majority. The 
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Democratic Party of Curacao lost one seat to the Liberation Front 
and the Democratic Party of Bonaire lost its seat to a combination 
of two small parties. As shown in table 5, this meant that both the 
opposition parties and Democratic block had eleven seats in the 
Staten. 
In the Antilles, parties with a combined total of at least twelve 
seats must reach an agreement to work together before a new 
central government can take office, and over two months of 
negotiations were required following the September election be­
fore a coalition government could be formed. The Liberation Front 
was asked to participate in the formation of the new government, 
and while there was strong opposition to this from some party 
members, it, nevertheless, became a part of a new coalition gov­
ernment that controlled a majority of fifteen seats in the Staten. In 
addition to the Liberation Front, the coalition included the parties 
that had previously made up the Democratic block, with the 
exception of the Democratic Party of Bonaire, which had lost its 
seat, plus the Bonairean Labor Party-United Progressive 
Bonairean Party. Thus, paradoxically, the Liberation Front found 
itself in the same government with the Democratic Party of 
Curacao, one of the principal targets of the May Movement. This 
course of action was justified by those in the new party who 
TABLE 5 
SEATS HELD IN THE STATEN 
AfTER THE SPECIAL SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS 
Party Seals 
Democratic Block 
Democratic Party of Curacao 6 
Patriotic Party of Aruba 4 
Democratic Party of Bonaire 0 
Democratic Party of the Windward Islands 1_ 
Total 11 
Opposition 
National People's Party of Curasao 3 
Aruban People's Party 4 
Labor and Liberation Front of May 30 3 
Bonairean Labor Party-United Progressive 
Bonairean Party j_ 
Total 11 
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supported it on the basis that as a member of the ruling coalition the 
party would be in a position to push for policies and programs 
beneficial to workers. Others in the party felt, however, that it 
could be more effective as part of the opposition, and that joining a 
coalition that included the Democratic Party meant a turning away 
from the principles of the May Movement. 
The parties forming the new coalition met in Bonaire in 
November, 1969, where they drew up a set of principles called 
"The Agreement of Kralendijk" (see Appendix A) and also di­
vided up the duties of government. The Liberation Front was 
assigned the portfolios for two ministries, social affairs and public 
health. The party selected Nita to fill the social affairs post, while 
someone else was to be later appointed to the public health post. 
The new government created a new department of labor, which 
also came under the direction of Nita as minister of social affairs. 
The labor department was established in response to grievances 
articulated by the labor unions during the May protest. Some of the 
matters that social affairs and the new department of labor were 
expected to deal with were the possible passage of a regulation 
setting a minimum wage for all laborers, the revision of labor 
legislation, and the formation of a committee consisting of rep­
resentatives of labor unions to advise the government on labor 
matters. Soon after the new government was formed, Nita or­
ganized an advisory committee of labor leaders. Slight progress 
was made on labor legislation and considerable controversy was 
generated over the setting of a minimum wage. More will be said 
about this later. 
In the new government, Kroon was replaced as prime minister 
by E. O. Petronia of the Patriotic Party of Aruba. The selection of 
the highly successful businessman made him the first black to 
occupy this office. This development was widely viewed as a 
response to the criticism made by May Movement groups that the 
government did not provide opportunities for blacks to hold high 
office. The appointment of a black man as governor of the Antilles 
by the kingdom government was likewise thought to be the result 
of pressure by those in the May Movement to increase the in­
volvement of blacks in the ruling circle. 
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The May Movement led to some significant developments 
within the Democratic Party of Curacao. One of them centered 
around party leadership. An internal power struggle had been 
brewing in the party prior to the May Movement between a group 
of long-time leaders and a faction of younger members. Kroon 
represented the party's old guard; he along with such men as 
Jonckheer, whom he had succeeded as prime minister and party 
head, and Isa had led the fortunes of the party for over twenty 
years. A younger group of party members, led by Rozendal who 
held a seat in Curasao's Island Council, wanted greater influence 
in party affairs. This group used the May unrest as an opportunity 
to oust Kroon from the top position in the party. 
Kroon, who had been opposed to the participation of the Libera­
tion Front in the new government, wanted to be reinstated as prime 
minister. However, the new coalition refused to do so because he 
was so identified with those things which had led to the May 
Movement and the political crisis. Thus Petronia was selected as 
prime minister instead and the Liberation Front was admitted into 
the new government. These developments weakened Kroon's 
position in the Democratic Party and in July, 1970, the younger 
faction was able to oust him and install Rozendal as party head. 
This later led to Kroon's departure from the party. 
Political stability did not return to Curacao and the Antilles with 
the formation of the new government. In fact the political situation 
remained in a state of flux at least for the next two years. The 
central government underwent several crises and cabinet changes, 
and little legislative work was accomplished in spite of the many 
vital issues raised by the May Movement. 
As was to be often the case, the Liberation Front was at the 
center of the first major crisis the new government had to face. 
There was opposition within the new majority coalition over the 
inclusion of the Liberation Front in the government. Many of the 
established politicians did not feel that the leaders of the new party 
were qualified to deal with the affairs of government or offered the 
proper image. Of the three Liberation Front leaders who occupied 
seats in the Staten, only Brown had had extensive formal educa­
tion. Godett was uneducated, and a laborer, and had a poor 
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command of Dutch, the language in which government affairs 
were conducted. He had the reputation of being a street brawler as 
well as a radical labor leader. The radical political views of Brown 
and Nita also threatened some of the politicians, and others were 
displeased because all three men wore the khaki dress that had 
become symbolic of Third World revolutionaries. The three lead­
ers were also seen as instigators of the violence that had rocked 
Curacao on May 30, 1969, and both Brown and Godett had spent 
time in jail in connection with the violence. Nita was thought to be 
less unacceptable by the coalition than Godett or Brown, and so 
when the Liberation Front offered him as its representative in the 
cabinet he was approved. 
On June 17, 1970, several months after the new cabinet had 
been formed, the forty-nine-year-old Nita unexpectedly died. The 
Liberation Front claimed that he had been poisoned by enemies of 
the party and demanded that the government obtain the services of 
doctors outside the country to perform an autopsy. The prime 
minister agreed to the autopsy and doctors were brought in from 
Venezuela and Cuba who subsequently concluded that Nita had 
died of natural causes. 
After Nita's death, Godett was proposed by the Liberation Front 
as his replacement as minister of social affairs but the coalition 
rejected him because of his lack of education and arrest record. 
Brown, too, was rejected on the basis of his criminal record. After 
rejecting both Godett and Brown, the coalition attempted to form a 
national cabinet—that is, one in which all parties were rep­
resented. It was felt that this was needed because of the recent 
unrest. The idea was to forget party differences and pull together 
for three years until the next election. Negotiations toward this 
goal ended in failure, however. The coalition then began negotia­
tions with the National People's Party of Curacao with the aim of 
including it in the cabinet. Thus in July, 1970, the National 
People's Party entered the cabinet and was given the portfolios of 
social affairs and public health that had been assigned to the 
Liberation Front up until the death of Nita. 
During the negotiations for forming a new cabinet, the Libera­
tion Front was very indecisive. This partly stemmed from the 
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party s lack of political experience. It was also related to the fact 
that the young party was divided over the advisability of being a 
part of the ruling regime. One faction was for remaining in the 
cabinet in order to reap the immediate rewards of a party in power, 
such as appointments and other favors. Another faction, however, 
thought in terms of broader goals such as ultimate autonomy from 
Holland and a socialist order, and believed that the best way of 
achieving them would be to serve as a voice of protest outside the 
majority block until the voting masses had shifted their allegiance 
to the party, enabling it to take over the machinery of government. 
This internal division within the Liberation Front resulted in its 
announcing that it would accept an invitation to remain in the 
cabinet at one point and then announcing that it had no intention of 
doing so at another. The Liberation Front did finally decide to 
rejoin the cabinet, submitting the name of a party member who was 
acceptable to the rest of the coalition to represent it as a minister. 
Thus in August, 1970, the Liberation Front was again a member of 
the ruling coalition that now also included the National People's 
Party. 
The next governmental crisis was triggered over legislation 
related to a wage increase for government employees. The May 
Movement led to considerable pressure for increasing wages in 
Curacao and for establishing a minimum wage. As a member of 
the Island Council of Curacao before becoming the executive head 
of the Democratic Party, Rozendal had proposed legislation for a 
wage increase for all government employees. In December, 1970, 
Petronia attempted to get legislation passed for an increase in 
wages for government employees, which was similar to the earlier 
proposal made by Rozendal to the island government. The legisla­
tion also called for tax increases in order to finance the wage boost. 
Paradoxically, rather than supporting this legislation, Rozendal, 
who had become a minister in Petronia s cabinet, resigned along 
with two other ministers from the Democratic Party because they 
did not like the way the prime minister was running the govern­
ment. The Liberation Front also came out against the prime 
minister's wage and tax legislation, and so he was forced to resign 
because the vote total was eleven for and eleven aeainst his 
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legislative program—a vote of no confidence. In failing to support 
Petronia, the Liberation Front voted against legislation that much 
of the labor movement favored. 
The contradictory action by the Liberation Front was apparently 
related to the highly personal nature of politics in Curacao. The 
party s decision to vote against wage and tax proposals was based 
to a large extent on personal rather than ideological considerations. 
Before the vote on the legislation, Godett had asked the coalition 
government to accept as a second minister from his party a man 
with whom he had developed strong personal ties. This candidate 
was subsequently rejected by the coalition on the grounds that he 
lacked the qualifications for such an office. This was followed by 
the Liberation Front's rejection of Petronia s legislation. 
By the time the Liberation Front had withdrawn its support from 
Petronia, Stanley Brown had left the party as he had threatened to 
do if the party offered Godett's choice for minister to the coalition. 
Like the members of the coalition who refused to accept him, 
Brown also strongly felt that Godett's candidate was ill-prepared 
to assume the duties of a cabinet minister. Thus Godett's action, 
based more on personal rather than political concerns, led to the 
departure of one of the party's most able and articulate spokesmen. 
Because he opposed legislation similar to what he had himself 
strongly advocated earlier and was identified with much of the 
party's in-fighting, Rozendal became a political liability for the 
Democratic Party. As one party member put it, "He was doing the 
party too much harm." As a result, Rozendal was ousted from his 
position as party leader. Isa, one of the old guard members, 
became the new party head and in February, 1971, the new prime 
minister. Thus the old leadership within the Democratic Party, 
with the exception of Kroon, reestablished itself after being out for 
a short period. Under Isa's leadership, the legislation that had been 
rejected when Petronia presented it was passed with few changes. 
In addition to the general political instability we have just 
described, the May Movement was responsible for the merging of 
two parties and the formation of two new ones besides the Libera­
tion Front. Both the National People's Party and URA suffered 
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political setbacks as a result of the protest vote received by the 
Liberation Front in the 1969 central government election. The 
National Party lost two seats in the Staten, and its leaders blamed 
this on the racial appeals the Liberation Front had made to work­
ers. Nor did URA, contrary to its expectations, do well in the 
special national election. The party had won two seats in the first 
local election it had entered. It had received considerable support 
from labor and so its leaders anticipated doing well in the next 
national election. However, URA did not have anyone as closely 
identified with the May Movement and labor as the Liberation 
Front and so it received 2,000 fewer votes than it had received in 
the local election, five hundred less than the required total for 
winning a seat in the Staten. According to one URA party leader, 
"The Liberation Front got all the glory." The National Party and 
URA were hurt more by the Liberation Front than the Democratic 
Party because they were not as well organized and did not have as 
broad a base of support as the Democrats. Because the two parties 
had lost ground to the Liberation Front, they began thinking about 
the possibility of combining forces. Thus in October, 1969, they 
began merger negotiations. The merger became an accomplished 
fact in July, 1970. 
The merger of the National People s Party of Curacao and URA 
reflects the pragmatic and opportunistic character of politics in 
Curafao.3 One nonpolitician who was a government official de­
scribed this opportunism in the following manner: 
Because of the lack of different ideologies, you very often see people 
going from one party to another. For example, you are a legislator 
from the Nationalist Party and suddenly you find it more comfortable 
to be in the Democratic Party, so you go to the Democratic Party. You 
see a lot of examples of this. This creates the tendency for the party 
that is well organized and in office to attract other people who are 
looking for power or for a better position and thereby always ending 
up stronger than they were. 
The merger of the National Party and URA fits this pattern of 
political pragmatism. Only a few years earlier dissidents had left 
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the National Party to form URA supposedly because of major 
ideological differences. The dissidents thought the leadership of 
the National Party was too conservative and so they sought to 
create a more radical alternative to both the National and Democra­
tic Parties. Yet in only five years such differences were either 
forgotten or were seen as unimportant in the face of the more 
practical problem of dealing with the Liberation Front's challenge, 
and so the two groups reunited. Following the merger, the Na­
tional PeopleVuRA Party aimed for the upcoming May, 1971, 
island election.4 
The two other parties that developed as a result of the May 
Movement were MASA and MAN. After being forced to resign as 
head of the Democratic Party, Kroon left the party and formed 
MASA. He had been groomed for several years to assume the 
leadership of the Democratic Party, and the formation of the new 
party enabled him to continue to pursue his political ambitions. At 
least one other former Democratic Party leader joined Kroon in his 
efforts to start the new party. Like the National People's-URA 
Party, the immediate goal of MASA was to win seats in the May, 
1971, local election. 
MAN was also organized before the 1971 island election. Its 
principal organizer was a young black government employee by 
the name of Donald Martina who believed that the Liberation Front 
had lost the initiative and thus a new party was necessary to fulfill 
the promises of the May Movement. Martina felt that the things his 
party would offer, which the Liberation Front could not, were the 
leadership skills necessary for operating in established politics and 
an unwillingness to compromise on the principles of the May 
Movement, MAN saw laborers as a major potential source of 
support, but race was the single most important issue for the party 
and it appealed exclusively to Antilleans of African descent, 
unlike the Liberation Front which also sought backing from prog­
ressive and radical whites. Some of the candidates offered by MAN 
in the May, 1971, local election had previously run for office on 
the Liberation Front's list. 
Political leaders in Curacao saw the approaching May, 1971, 
local election as very important. It was occurring two years after 
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the May 30, 1969, unrest, the fall of the central government, and 
the birth of the Liberation Front. It was believed that the results of 
the local election would provide an indication of whether or not the 
Liberation Front was a viable political party and show to what 
degree the May Movement still existed or had a political impact. 
Furthermore, the emergence of MASA and MAN and the merging of 
the National Party and URA offered a whole new dimension to the 
election. 
The results of the election are given in table 6. In the previous 
island election when there were only 3 parties offering candidates, 
the Democratic Party had won 13 of the 21 seats in the Island 
Council, and the National Party and URA, at this time separate 
parties, won 6 and 2 seats respectively. 
As shown in table 6, the Liberation Front won 3 seats in the 
Island Council and MAN won one seat. These 4 seats represented 
the protest vote and indicated that the May Movement still had 
some impact on politics in Curacao. The Democratic Party fell 
from 13 to 7 seats due to competition from the new parties, 
especially MASA, which won 3 seats; Kroon was able to attract 
some of the voter support to MASA that he had when he was in the 
Democratic Party. The National People'S-URA Party acquired one 
seat less than the combined total they had won as separate parties in 
the previous election. Following several weeks of deliberation 
after the election, the Democratic Party and National 
People's-URA Party formed a coalition island government. 
The island election, like the central government election that 
preceded it, reflected the flux in Curacao politics following the 
May Movement. The history of Curacao is replete with the 
TABLE 6 
RESULTS OF 1971 CURASAO ISLAND COUNCIL ELECTION 
Party Seats 
Democratic Party . 
National People's-URA 
Liberation Front . 
Party . 
7 
7 
3 
MASA .. . 3 
MAN .. 1 
Total . .. TT 
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emergence of new political groups, alliances, factions, and splits. 
In the past, however, such changes have emerged gradually, so the 
island was not accustomed to the extensive changes that the May 
Movement so suddenly produced. 
During Curacao's recent history, many new political parties 
have emerged and then disappeared without making a significant 
impact on the society. Many of them had offered alternative 
political programs during their quest for office but were unable or 
unwilling to follow through on them later. Since politics in 
Curacao are so personal and opportunistic, the initial intentions of 
parties to make changes and solve problems have often been set 
aside to fulfill personal obligations and to remain in power. One 
observer expressed his disappointment with URA in this regard: 
"URA had a lot of intellectuals in it, looked very promising at the 
start. They were ideological and were supposed to break through 
this system of personal relationships, but they didn't manage it." 
Curacao may not be very different from many other societies in 
this regard, except that due to its small size such patterns become 
more obvious. 
Given its prior history, then, it might be that the political 
changes generated in Curacao by the May Movement and reflected 
in both the 1969 and 1971 elections will be fairly short-lived. For 
example, like many small parties before them, the Liberation 
Front and MAN could disappear from the political scene, or, given 
the opportunistic nature of politics, they could attempt to broaden 
their base of support by toning down their protest, or, as URA did, 
even merge with a more established party. Even if any of these 
things occurred, however, politics in Curacao will hardly be the 
same as they were prior to the May Movement because the political 
parties know that it has released a new consciousness among the 
black masses that they could ignore only at their own peril. The 
political parties realize that as a result of the May, 1969, violence 
and subsequent events the labor unions and black masses now have 
some awareness of their potential political strength. The politi­
cians also know that they have become more cognizant of their 
rights, the social and economic disparity between their lives and 
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those of whites, and that they have acquired a somewhat greater 
appreciation for their racial identity. Both the Liberation Front and 
MAN have helped to bring these things to the fore, and they are not 
likely to altogether disappear regardless of what happens to these 
two parties. 
In addition to the political changes already discussed, the May 
Movement led to a number of attempts at political reform. The 
labor movement especially benefited from the new reform mood 
that grew out of the violence of 1969. In Coser's terms, the 
violence was a danger signal that called attention to the need for 
political and other kinds of changes in Curacao.5 In this context, 
the labor unions acquired considerably more influence and atten­
tion from the government and other sectors of the society than they 
ever had before. The unions were asked to participate on a number 
of civic boards for the first time. Government showed more in­
terest in the activities of labor unions and significantly increased its 
consultation with them on matters related to its economic policy. 
In the past, the unions could only hope for favors from the gov­
ernment, having no way of influencing government decision-
making. Mention has already been made of the creation of a labor 
department by the central government after the emergence of the 
May Movement. The central government also reconstituted a once 
defunct social and economic advisory council and appointed labor 
leaders to it in addition to leaders from the business sector. This 
was done so that labor leaders and others outside government 
could have an input in the setting of economic policies and re­
forms. One high government official in the Democratic Party 
characterized the council before the reform as, "the government 
advising government, dominated by the government." Finally, 
the government attempted to give greater recognition to the unions 
by inviting labor leaders to official functions and activities. This 
was seldom done before the May Movement. 
Pressure from the protest movement forced the government to 
be more flexible in other ways. There was a significant lessening 
of the more blatant forms of favoritism when it came to making 
government appointments. It became more possible for people 
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outside the ruling circle to be appointed to government posts. 
There was less hesitancy to appoint blacks to high office. We have 
already mentioned, for example, that blacks were selected as 
prime minister and governor. On the local government level, a 
black was appointed lieutenant governor; the duties of this office 
include heading up the police department in Curacao. Those in 
power also showed a greater tendency to consider the opposition 
parties and to include them in important activities. This was 
seldom considered necessary before the May Movement. In gen­
eral, there was a breakdown of some of the secrecy and isolation 
that had characterized government prior to the May Movement. 
Along with the various reforms, another governmental response 
to the May Movement were efforts to strengthen the police and 
voluntary corps, the local militia. The police received heavy 
criticism following the May 30 uprising, especially from political 
opponents of the Democratic Party. The police were very indeci­
sive when the violence erupted, and much of the blame for this was 
heaped on the lieutenant governor who had been appointed to his 
post by the Democratic Party even though he had had no previous 
police experience. Following the barrage of criticism, the Demo­
cratic Party removed the lieutenant governor from office and 
replaced him with a man who had considerable background in 
police work. Experts were also requested from the Netherlands to 
reorganize the police department. Police officers were given in­
creased riot training, new riot squads were formed, and changes 
were made in written riot plans. The police felt that after May 30, 
citizens were more conscious of their rights, and so in training their 
personnel a new emphasis was placed on the need to be flexible 
and, as they put it, to use "psychology." The size of the police 
department's intelligence force was also expanded in order to 
increase its ability to gather information related to political activ­
ity. And the police department installed new communication 
equipment and acquired such things as antiriot guns and helmets. 
As a result of the May Movement, the voluntary corps was given 
more formalized riot-control responsibilities. It was designated as 
a "secondary police force." A riot plan was written and corps 
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members were given riot training for the first time. The new 
responsibility of the corps during social upheavals included guard­
ing key public buildings and installations such as those related to 
water, electric, and telephone service. To the groups that had 
participated in the May Movement, these changes in the social 
control agencies were the unanticipated and undesirable consequ­
ences of their protest activities. 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND REFORM 
With a few exceptions, employers and the business interests in 
Curacao had taken workers and labor unions rather lightly. Since 
most of the unions were in a fairly weak bargaining position, given 
their lack of organization and resources, there was a great tendency 
for the unions, as they had done with the government and political 
parties, to seek favors from employers rather than contractoral 
agreements. However, after the May 30 upheaval, unions began to 
increasingly make demands of employers as they had done with 
the government. 
There was an unprecedented upsurge in union membership and 
involvement after May 30. One high official attributed this to the 
fact that "the ordinary worker became conscious that he was a 
power in the community.'' The CFW illustrates the growth in union 
membership. Before May 30, it had approximately 1,200 mem­
bers and by July, 1970, it had more than doubled to around 3,500 
members. The emergence of four new unions in Curacao was also 
the direct outgrowth of the new mood created by the May Move­
ment. 
Buoyed by their actions and success during the May crisis and 
by their expansion afterwards, the unions became increasingly 
militant. The unions, especially their rank and file, saw those who 
might oppose them as divided and weakened as a result of the May 
Movement. The older and newer unions negotiated an exception­
ally large number of wage increases with employers who were 
often afraid to turn them down. There was also an increase in the 
number of wildcat strikes as workers began demanding rights as 
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never before. Such a strike was even called against the government 
and eventually resulted in a substantial raise for blue-collar gov­
ernment employees. 
In addition to granting pay increases, employers in Curacao also 
responded to the May Movement by attempting to become more 
Antillean. Shell, for example, began putting emphasis upon re­
placing foreign staff members in technical and managerial posi­
tions with Antilleans. The company also started offering courses in 
Papiamento for its non-Antillean employees. In order to increase 
the number of skilled workers in Curacao so that such persons 
would not have to be recruited outside the Antilles, a training 
program was organized by WESCAR, Shell, and the island govern­
ment. Two years after the May upheaval, which gave birth to it, 
the program was in full swing. 
Some employers in Curacao took the position that a lack of 
communication and understanding between management and 
workers was at least partially responsible for the May violence. 
Thus they provided human relations and sensitivity training for 
their personnel. Companies like Shell and WESCAR also attempted 
to reduce ambiguity as a possible source of labor-management 
conflict by more clearly specifying company rules and 
regulations6 and by setting up more periodic and formal meetings 
with employee groups. 
Changes occurred between as well as within companies as a 
result of the May Movement. As others have noted, employers 
often respond to an apparent consolidation of labor unions by 
consolidating themselves.7 The increased power and, for a time, 
unity of the labor movement served as the impetus for some 
companies in Curacao to join and strengthen company associa­
tions, WESCAR, for example, joined an association of contracting 
companies after the May 30 upheaval. The Curacao Employers 
Association, to which Shell belonged, was loosely organized prior 
to the labor crisis, but afterwards it was reorganized and given 
more attention by member companies in order to enhance their 
capacity for making joint decisions and taking common courses of 
action on labor and other matters. 
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The May Movement also served as the catalyst for the estab­
lishment in Curacao of a public investment organization, the 
Curacao Development Corporation (CODECO). The goal of the 
corporation was to get as broad a representation as possible—for 
example, those from labor, government, business, and the 
public-at-large—to work toward and invest in the industrial and 
business development of Curacao. After a promotional campaign 
in July, 1970, shares in the corporation were sold to various 
organizations and private citizens. The cost of shares was kept low 
to permit their purchase by the average worker in Curacao and thus 
hopefully provide this segment of the population with a sense of 
having some stake in the economic life of the island. 
Paradoxically, as the unions began making gains, the solidarity 
that they had exhibited during the first several months of the May 
Movement began to wane. The old rivalries and differences that 
had previously kept them apart began to reappear. This was espe­
cially true of the Free and Christian unions. For example, a new 
union center with modern facilities was established in Curacao 
with governmental assistance and contributions from unions in 
Holland. The center was supposed to be for the use of all labor 
unions in Curacao, but the AVVC and ccv unions could not agree to 
work together and so it became primarily an AVVC facility, AVVC 
and ccv unions also began to bitterly compete over organizing 
workers. In one instance in early 1970, around 1,300 blue-collar 
workers left the Avvc-affiliated ABVO and formed a new union 
and then became affiliated with the ccv. Yet some gains continued 
to be made by labor even as it began showing signs of disunity. 
This was because the message received from the May 30 crisis by 
the business as well as the political community was that the 
violence could conceivably occur again if some changes were not 
made in the society. 
SOCIOCULTURAL CHANGE AND REFORM 
The history of slavery and colonialism in Curacao has left its 
mark on the island in many ways. One of the most significant 
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consequences of this history is that there is a tendency, as in other 
societies with similar experiences, for Antilleans to view black 
ancestry as undesirable. Thus the least amount of black physical 
traits a person has, the better off he or she is considered to be. In 
Curacao there is also ambivalence, especially among the upper 
classes, about Antillean culture. The long history of domination by 
the Dutch has led some Antilleans to believe that any local varia­
tion from what is considered Dutch culture is inferior. The May 
Movement brought some signs of change in these patterns, how­
ever. 
Some Antilleans became more positive toward the local culture 
after May 30. For example, many Antilleans were less defensive 
about their local or native foods after the emergence of the May 
Movement and more restaurants began selling it. Also middle-
class people who had been embarrassed by a sexually suggestive 
folk dance called tambu, which had at one time been outlawed by 
the Dutch but was kept alive by people in the rural area of Curacao, 
began frequenting the places where it was performed following the 
May revolt. 
The May Movement was widely interpreted in Curacao as a 
significant achievement or victory for the black masses.8 As a 
result, some persons acquired a new sense of racial identity and 
pride. Persons who previously had been hesitant about discussing 
their African ancestry publicly took note of it after May 30. For 
some Antilleans who had not previously participated in the May 
Movement, the reference to their racial affinity with those who had 
was their way of belatedly joining the movement. 
Social activities and opportunities that had been severely limited 
for darker-skinned people in Curacao also opened up more after 
May 30, especially for those in the middle class. "May 30 broke 
all barriers," observed one Curacaon. It became easier for blacks 
to acquire membership in such social-service clubs as the Rotary. 
Also after May 30, the Catholic church involved black grass-roots 
leaders more in its activities and functions. 
Prior to the May Movement, the social-service clubs in Curacao 
had come under severe criticism from many quarters for their 
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exclusiveness and lack of contribution to the general welfare of the 
island. However, the clubs were widely credited with establishing 
one of the most successful post-May 30 programs in Curacao. 
Soon after the violent outburst, the Lions, Rotary, and Kiwanis 
groups set up a Joint Service Club Committee for the purpose of 
developing a program for improving the island. This resulted in an 
organization called Obra y Logra, which translated means work 
and achievement. Obra y Logra was structured on a committee 
basis and included groups that worked on educational programs 
using the mass media, provided movies for various organizations, 
translated foreign-language articles into Papiamento, and pro­
vided speakers through a speakers' bureau. The most enthusiasti­
cally received part of the organization's work was a weekly televi­
sion program called "Confrontation" on which Curasao's social 
problems, such as those which had contributed to the labor unrest, 
were discussed. Much of the success and popularity of this prog­
ram was related to the fact that, unlike in the past, a cross section of 
the population was able to air its views on television. This medium 
is partly subsidized by the government and previously it had been 
difficult for those with views that differed from the government's 
to receive television time or coverage. Obra y Logra was given free 
time for its program. 
The sociocultural changes were somewhat more subtle than the 
political and economic ones, but, as we have indicated, some 
identifiable sociocultural changes did occur. All the changes, of 
course, point out that Curacao was a different social system than it 
had been before May 30, 1969. 
THE SOCIETAL CAPACITY FOR REFORM 
We have explained why the transformation in the labor move­
ment occurred—that is, what factors led to the May Movement 
and its various phases. We have also attempted to explain why the 
May Movement assumed a particular form—that is, became a 
reform or norm-oriented movement rather than a revolutionary 
movement. Our present task is to account for the degree of success 
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the May Movement had during the two-year period that this study 
was conducted. 
As a reform movement, the May Movement sought political, 
economic, and sociocultural reforms. More specifically, it was 
aimed at securing greater political power for the masses, the 
majority of whom were black, to improve their economic lot, and 
to enhance their social status. The movement, as our previous 
discussion indicates, did achieve some reforms of this nature. The 
government, the business community, and other segments of the 
society did make some effort to reduce some of the social strain 
that had led to the dramatic actions by the unions. However, many 
basic political, economic, and social problems of the masses 
remained unchanged. The May Movement could only generate a 
certain degree of reform given its own characteristics and those in 
the social environment in which it had to operate. 
Each society has a particular capacity for reform. During any 
given period there will be present both conditions that are condu­
cive to reform and conditions that hinder or set limits to it. It is the 
interaction between reform-facilitating and reform-limiting condi­
tions that determines a society's reform capacity. Important in this 
regard in Curacao were dimensions of the May Movement, such as 
its leadership and integration, and various properties of the social 
structure of Curacao including its economy, political system, and 
social-control capabilities. 
Facilitating Factors 
Several factors opened the way for reform in Curacao, the main 
objective of the May Movement. First, there were the factors, 
previously alluded to, that gave the May Movement the capacity 
for exerting pressure for change. This included the presence of 
charismatic labor leaders around whom the May Movement could 
crystallize. These leaders gave the movement much of its cohesion 
and direction during its most successful period. The support labor 
in Curacao received from other quarters, such as the unions in 
Aruba and various critics and opponents of the government and 
business community in Curacao, was also important. The Aruban 
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unions enlarged the power base of the May Movement and con­
tributed to its success in deposing the central government. Several 
groups in Curacao, including the opposition parties at one point, 
gave the movement moral support and increased the legitimacy of 
many of its demands for reform by denouncing the ruling Demo­
cratic Party and in some cases the practices of the business com­
munity. In the case of the political parties, as well as in other 
instances, such support was later withdrawn when the new labor 
party was formed and posed a threat to them. But this support still 
had been important, coming as it did during the May Movement's 
major drive for reform and on the heels of the May 30 violence. 
Without this support the government might not have stepped 
down. 
Given the new-found power and militancy of the labor move­
ment after the May 30 upheaval, certain structural conditions in 
Curacao were also conducive to reform. There was always the 
possibility that renewed violence could have developed in Curacao 
if some reforms had not been forthcoming. The government could 
hardly take a chance on this since the police had performed poorly 
in containing the May 30 violence and the voluntary corps was a 
small nonprofessional organization. Most societies would have 
regular military troops at their disposal for such emergencies, but it 
will be recalled that under the kingdom government arrangement 
the Netherlands controls all military forces. The likelihood of 
Curacao again receiving military aid in the event of another out­
break of violence was highly questionable since the Dutch had 
been worried about world opinion and possible charges of neo­
colonialism and intervention even as they committed troops to 
Curacao after the May 30 violence. And the fact that demonstra­
tions had been held in the Netherlands protesting their actions 
made the Dutch even more sensitive about this issue. Thus the 
need to avoid more violence because of the government's uncer­
tainty about its ability to contain it underscored the necessity for 
granting some reforms. 
The factionalism within the Democratic Party also increased the 
opportunity for reform in Curacao with the emergence of the May 
Movement. After the September election in 1969, members of the 
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Democratic Party's old guard, led by Kroon, wanted to prevent the 
new labor party from joining the new government coalition, but 
they were overruled by the then up-and-coming faction of younger 
party members led by Rozendal. Also, when Kroon was ousted 
from the leadership of the Democratic Party, the new ruling faction 
tried to disassociate itself from the old politics by being more open 
to labor and other groups. A unified Democratic Party might have 
doggedly resisted making such changes. 
Limiting Factors 
In spite of the promising changes the May Movement did bring 
to Curacao, the basic issues it had initially raised remained unre­
solved two years after its emergence and there were signs pointing 
to the conclusion that the movement had lost the initiative it had so 
suddenly gained. The May Movement could not sustain its innova­
tive role because it became limited by both internal and external 
factors. Let us first consider those obstacles that were internal to 
the labor movement, the major vehicle of the May Movement. 
One of the main factors that eventually limited the capacity of 
the May Movement to initiate reforms in Curacao was the inability 
of the labor movement to sustain the unity it had manifested from 
the time of the economic strike phase to the initial political party 
phase of the May revolt. The divisions that existed among many of 
the unions in Curacao before the May Movement were so deep that 
when the most dramatic part of the confrontation with the govern­
ment which had united them was over and labor was seen as 
victorious, the old rivalries and conflicts resurfaced. Gradually 
some unions began taking courses of action that indicated their 
belief that a weakened government and business community pro­
vided them the opportunity to make gains for their individual 
unions. The rivalries increased and some unions tried to make 
gains at the expense of sister unions. This individuation of union 
goals and actions, which was in full swing several months after the 
May 30 violence, meant that those forces which might be opposed 
to reforming Curacao no longer had to face a united front of 
unions. 
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The nature of the May Movement's leadership, especially dur­
ing the political party phase, was another internal factor that set 
limits on its capacity to function as an instrument for reform. The 
leadership requirements of a social movement vary with its level of 
development. During a movement's formative period, the charis­
matic type of leader may be best suited to meet its needs. At this 
point in its history, a movement tends to require leaders who can 
inspire and enlist the involvement of potential followers. No 
specialized organizational or administrative skills may be required 
of the leaders, only that they have the kind of style that can rally 
people to the cause.9 Thus up until the political party phase of the 
May Movement, its core group of leaders, Godett, Brown, and 
Nita, had proved to be quite successful. This was not the case, 
however, when the Liberation Front was formed and began operat­
ing in the area of institutionalized politics. During this later phase 
of the May Movement, administrative and organizational skills 
were needed, but the leaders did not possess them and so they 
became less effective. The indecisivenessand inconsistency of the 
Liberation Front reflected, to a large degree, its leaders lack of 
political organizational skill and experience.10 Moving from the 
politics of protest and disruption to institutionalized politics meant 
that the leaders of the new party had to compete and bargain with 
professional politicians on the latters' terms rather than on their 
own. One respondent, in accounting for the Liberation Front's 
difficulty along these lines suggested, "They are a movement 
which never crystallized into a party." 
The extent to which the Liberation Front could push for reforms 
was also limited by serious internal dissension. One faction, led by 
Brown, wanted the party to assume a protest style. The position 
was taken that in order to maintain the purity of its convictions the 
party should not join coalitions because this necessitated com­
promise. Another faction, led by Godett, believed that the party 
should focus on concrete objectives rather than ideology, and 
concluded that these could best be achieved by becoming included 
in the ruling coalition. The party moved in the direction preferred 
by Godett and, being a purist. Brown was highly critical of this 
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development. At one point, writing in the newspaper Vito, he 
publicly accused Nita of using his position as minister for his own 
personal gain and that of his close associates rather than for 
furthering the aims of the May Movement and the people of 
Curacao. In the latter part of 1970, Brown left the party and 
resigned from his seat in the Staten, accusing Godett of allowing 
personal commitments to subvert the goals of the party and of 
permitting the ascendancy of opportunists who had originally 
opposed the party. When Brown departed from the party, leftists 
who had marginally supported it because of his presence also 
withdrew their support. This group had always been hesitant in 
becoming heavily involved in the Liberation Front anyway be­
cause of its lack of ideology. Brown's departure further weakened 
the party because he was one of its few educated leaders. 
External factors also set limits on the changes and reforms that 
could be generated by the May Movement. This included the 
economic structure of the Antilles, which reflected its status as a 
developing society. After the May 30 uprising, it was proposed 
that a minimum wage of 80 guilders per week be set by the 
government for all workers in Curacao. This would have rep­
resented a substantial increase for many workers; for example, 
many hotel employees, one of the major groups of employees on 
the island, were only earning 40 guilders per week. The proposal 
never became law, however, essentially because considerable 
opposition was generated against it based on Curacao's economic 
situation. The Curacao Chamber of Commerce was one of the 
most outspoken critics of the proposal and it published a study that 
suggested that Curacao's economy, which is heavily dependent 
upon attracting foreign investors, would undergo a possibly fatal 
blow with the passage of the minimum wage provision. The study 
suggested that existing industries would be driven out of business, 
especially hard hit would be the labor-intensive industries like 
hotels, and the country would be at a severe disadvantage in the 
competition for new foreign investors. Some labor leaders also 
questioned the wisdom of an across-the-board 80-guilder 
minimum wage, fearing that it might ultimately result in a decrease 
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in the number of jobs in Curasao. Rather than passing what was 
considered by many to be an extreme measure, then, the govern­
ment granted wage increases to government employees, and un­
ions individually negotiated with employers for wage increases. 
Thus as a result of Curacao's economic structure, wage increases 
were kept within certain limits. 
The nature of Curacao's political system also set limits to social 
reform. Politics in Curacao are highly pragmatic and opportunis­
tic. There is considerable wheeling-and-dealing by political par­
ties, both inside and outside the public political scene, often at the 
expense of solving problems or making reforms. The emphasis is 
given to acquiring and maintaining influence. This lack of concern 
for reform is also reinforced by the personalistic nature of politics 
in Curacao. Again it should be mentioned that there is the tendency 
for voters to react to a politician on the basis of his personal style 
and what he can do for them in the way of personal favors rather 
than his performance in office.11 Partly because of this quality of 
politics in the Antilles, there has been little sustained impetus for 
change and reform. 
New parties have emerged in Curacao from time to time to 
challenge this situation only to find themselves submitting to it and 
assuming many of the characteristics they had originally sought to 
reform. This pattern continued after May 30. URA had been or­
ganized to offer an alternative to the opportunism and favoritism of 
the established parties. Yet it laid aside its idealism and concern for 
reform and merged with the National Party when they both were 
hurt at the polls by the Liberation Front. On its part, the Liberation 
Front had promised to oppose those parties which had for so long 
stood in the way of progress for workers. But when it was given the 
opportunity, it joined in forming a government with the Democra­
tic Party, the party that it had earlier declared was most responsible 
for the plight of workers and blacks. In essence, the Liberation 
Front was co-opted by the established parties, and it too became 
caught up in the opportunistic and personalistic politics, thus 
seriously limiting the extent to which it could function as the 
catalyst for reform in Curacao. The Liberation Front's co-optation 
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into the opportunistic political system is mirrored in the advice one 
party leader gave to another: "We have won the revolution. Now 
let's enjoy it." 
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tion. Blanksten notes,' 'Personalismo may be defined as the tendency to follow or oppose a 
political leader on the basis of his personality rather than on ideological grounds—to be 
swayed by personal, individual, and family motivations rather than by an impersonal 
political idea or program." Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," pp. 482-83. 
CHAPTER SIX 
The May Movement in the 
Context of Other Social Movements 
In the previous chapters, we looked at the May Movement and its 
implications for social change in Curacao. In this final chapter, we 
will place the May Movement in a larger context. We will first 
return to the question of the relation of the violent incident on May 
30 to the totality of the May Movement. Such violent incidents are 
usually explained by theories that have little relationship to the 
nature of social movements. We wish to emphasize an explanation 
of the violence in Curacao that places it as one aspect of a political 
process and also to suggest that, by the observation of the nature of 
violence, important clues as to the direction of protest can be 
derived. A second point that will be stressed, drawn from the 
Curacao experience, is that labor movements are particularly sig­
nificant in developing societies. There are certain developmental 
factors that make the work relationship especially critical in such 
societies and thus labor issues are likely to be at the heart of various 
social movements. A third issue to be examined are the similarities 
and differences between the May Movement and the black move­
ments in the United States. Civil disturbances in Watts, Newark, 
Detroit, Cleveland, and many other American cities during the 
1960s can also be seen as one part of the black protest movement in 
the United States, and it is instructive to examine this movement in 
relation to Curacao. In addition to comparing the May Movement 
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with similar efforts in the United States, it is also useful to attempt 
to put the May Movement in the larger context of social move­
ments within the Western world. Was the May Movement unique 
or does it have continuities to other social movements? Finally, we 
will conclude with certain implications that the May Movement 
has for the future of Curacao. 
THE NATURE OF VIOLENCE AND THE DIRECTION OF PROTEST 
From the very beginning we have treated the violence that 
developed on May 30 as one phase of the May Movement. Al­
though the continuity of the various stages of the movement may 
be obvious by now, it is perhaps necessary to add further support to 
the contention that the violence could be understood as a manifes­
tation of protest. Violence associated with mass movements is 
often explained in other ways. One theory suggests that the van­
dalism, looting, and arson that occur are a result of deep-seated 
criminal tendencies which typify those attracted to a movement. 
(There is usually a racist implication in such theories.) Although 
these tendencies may most often be latent, under particular cir­
cumstances of crowd behavior, such criminal tendencies reassert 
themselves and are expressed in socially destructive ways. 
Another theory suggests that rioting can be fun. This theory 
implies that, given certain conditions where there is a lack of 
authority, certain elements in society will evidence a lack of 
self-discipline and self-control. The carnival-type atmosphere and 
the absence of visible authority in riots will provide the opportun­
ity for a "festive" event in which self-control disintegrates and a 
whole range of deviant behavior emerges. A third rather common 
explanation resides in the "outside agitator" theory. This assumes 
that most persons are satisfied and are capable only of being made 
discontented by malcontents from outside the community. Given 
such outside agitation, the locals, stimulated by the crowd, are led 
to deviant behavior. Often when the vandalism and looting are 
recognized as having been selective, this is seen as the conse­
quence of advance planning and preparation by the outside 
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agitators. Jones and Molnar in a wide ranging examination of civil 
disorders in a variety of places and at different historical times 
note: 
Those in power have usually assumed that the rioters had no 
worthwile aspirations and could be motivated to activity only by the 
promise of reward from outside agitators or conspirators. Until the 
deeper aspirations of the poor began to be investigated their periodic 
rebellions and riots were often attributed to the manipulation of a 
political opponent or a "hidden hand." This attitude has been so 
popular in history that it has been shared by all authority, regardless of 
whether the governing elite was aristocratic, middle class, conserva­
tive, liberal, or revolutionary.1 
All of these theories were raised in Curacao in the assessment of 
blame after the rioting on May 30. 
As we have suggested, it is more useful to conceptualize vio­
lence as a part of the political process and as an aspect of more 
inclusive protest activities. In this view, the violence that did occur 
in Curasao on May 30 can best be interpreted as communicating a 
message from an underclass to the larger society. Thus massive 
looting can be seen as one form of group protest. This perspective 
is consistent with recent interpretations of violence, particularly 
that associated with looting which occurred in the context of racial 
disturbances in American cities during the 1960s.2 The evidence 
that has been derived from these situations suggest the following. 
In certain types of crowd situations, looting becomes widespread 
and looters come from all segments of the population, not just the 
criminal element. The looting is not done by outsiders nor by 
isolated opportunists. Looters often work in pairs, family units, 
and small groups. Its collective nature sometimes reaches the point 
where the availability of potential loot is called to the attention of 
bystanders or, in some instances, those not involved are handed 
goods by looters coming out of stores. The public character of 
looting is striking since goods are taken openly and in the full view 
of others—bystanders, coparticipants, and often even security 
forces. During this time there is not only little sanction against 
such behavior, there is even strong immediate support for it. The 
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so-called carnival spirit that has often been noted is more appro­
priately seen as an indication of the degree of open collective 
support for such activity. In the American experience, consumer 
goods are often the target, and grocery, furniture, apparel, and 
liquor stores have been the primary objects of attack.3 
The widespread incidence of this behavior in such situations and 
the social support for it seems to require an explanation that goes 
much beyond conventional notions of criminality. The most ap­
propriate explanation, we feel, revolves around the complexities 
of the nature of property. The word looting comes from a military 
context that suggests taking of "goods and possessions." It is, 
however, more appropriate to see property as a set of rights rather 
than as a concrete thing or as a material object. As Gouldner and 
Gouldner suggest, "property consists of rights held by the indi­
vidual to certain valuable things, whether material or 
immaterial."4 By rights, we mean shared expectations about what 
can or cannot be done with respect to something. In effect, prop­
erty is the shared expectation about who can do what with the 
valued resources within the society. Normally such understand­
ings or expectations are widely shared and accepted throughout a 
society. Many of the basic understandings become specified in 
legal norms that define the legitimate use and control of these 
resources. These understandings become "taken-for-granted" 
with the day-to-day activity in all societies. But they are also at the 
core of the dispute that we label as disturbances. 
In such disturbances, the expectations that have been previously 
accepted change and there is a redefinition of property rights on the 
part of a significant part of the community. The traditional right to 
the use of available resources becomes problematic. If property is 
seen as shared understanding of who can do what with the valued 
resources, then in such situations there is a breakdown in this 
understanding. In this context, new norms emerge, temporarily or 
even momentarily, but these new norms have widespread support. 
Such widespread support makes law enforcement (or more cor­
rectly the old-norm enforcement) almost impossible. Enforcing 
laws that are violated by a few is not difficult but enforcing laws 
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that everyone violates is impossible. At the height of such situa­
tions, looting becomes normative, the socially acceptable thing to 
do. This was evident when the march on May 30 entered the heart 
of the Willemstad business area. Instead of being deviant, looting 
became, in that immediate situation, conforming behavior to the 
new norms that had emerged. Of course, the legal right did not 
change, as governmental officials argued subsequently, but there 
was widespread consensus among the marchers on the "appro­
priate" use of goods and even on the appropriateness of certain 
merchants doing business. 
It should be noted that whereas such shifts in property defini­
tions change quickly, they also change back quickly. Although 
there was some violence at Post V prior to the beginning of the 
march, as well as some along the way, the primary looting and 
arson did not occur until after Papa Godett was shot. On the other 
hand, it is also likely that many of those who engaged in the looting 
and perhaps the arson also played a part in helping stop it. This is 
perhaps illustrated best by one incident that occurred in the late 
afternoon on May 30. A government official was attempting to 
reduce the firespread in the center of the city. As he was struggling 
with a fire hose, he called a passer-by for aid. The passer-by said, 
" I ' 11 be glad to help but you'll have to give me a minute to get used 
to my shoes." He sat down and flexed and stretched his recently 
looted shoes and then turned his attention for the next several hours 
in trying to put out the fire. The looter in one context was also a 
helpful citizen in another. 
The events suggest that a new property norm emerged among 
the rioters and that their behavior was directed by this new norm. 
Thus, their behavior was not expressive—engaging in riotous 
behavior, just for fun—nor did their behavior reveal the 
emergence of repressed criminality. The fact that so many people 
were engaged in looting, vandalism and arson suggests the wide­
spread support for the new norms. 
Clues to the nature of the new norms that guided behavior can be 
detected in observing the pattern of damage that did emerge. The 
violence does, in fact, reveal the complexities of the issues in 
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Curacao, since one, then another, theme became apparent. Cer­
tainly, at the outset, the issues were primarily economic. At the 
morning meeting at Shell, however, Papa Godett redefined the 
issues in political terms. When he suggested the march, the posi­
tive response to his suggestion was not solely a measure of his 
personal power because it was seen as an acceptable means of 
showing the solidarity that had been emerging among the workers 
over the previous several days. As the march started toward the 
source of political power, Fort Amsterdam, the initial looting 
seemed to be of the harassment type where consumer goods were 
taken. Along the way, one factory was entered and the workers 
somewhat harassed. The factory was a recently established one, 
Amercian owned. It had recently discharged workers and had been 
the target of union complaints. One of the first cars burned on the 
morning of May 30 belonged to a Dutchman who some years 
before had been accused of killing a black boy. That the courts had 
dealt with him "leniently" was a matter of common knowledge 
and complaint within the black community. 
The confrontation with the police and the subsequent wounding 
of Papa Godett shifted the dimensions of the march to a more 
political establishment confrontation and the shooting illustrated 
in a vivid fashion to the marchers what traditionally happened to 
their complaints. After this confrontation, the remnants of the 
marchers moved into the downtown area where the major van­
dalism and looting took place. One can argue that the norm that 
was emerging and that guided subsequent behavior was one which 
suggested that "only those who identify with Curacao have a right 
to control any of its resources." This was reflected in the targets of 
looting and is particularly underscored by the first store that was 
set on fire. It was a special target since the store had been one in 
which efforts to unionize had not been successful and its owners 
had a reputation of buying most of its inventory outside of the 
island. The owners were relative newcomers to Curacao, or more 
correctly they were not among the older families, but they had 
become economically successful in a relatively short time. The 
fact that the store had been the focus of attention in Vito a short 
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time before the disturbance was seen as evidence of preplanning 
but it more likely indicates the widespread definition of "exploita­
tion" that the store had gained. The fact that the fires were reset in 
the store after they had been initially suppressed underscores the 
symbolic importance that the store had in the protest. 
The selectivity of the looting and arson was interpreted by some 
as the result of preplanning and ultimately as the work of outsiders. 
It seems clear to us that the leaders of the march were locals, not 
outsiders. The shooting of Papa Godett and his removal to the 
hospital accompanied by many of the other leaders left the remain­
der of the marchers without leadership. The selectivity of the 
subsequent damage seems to indicate the clarity certain targets had 
for those who were in the march. Since the march was initiated as a 
result of the interaction of the crowd and the speakers at Post V, 
and the confrontation with the police and the subsequent shooting 
was also not planned, the patterns that developed as a consequence 
of the actions of hundreds of individuals as they moved into the 
central business district suggest the rather widespread, in fact, 
almost universal definitions certain targets had for them. These 
definitions were positive as well as negative. 
Just as it is important to look at the pattern of looting and 
destruction, it is equally important to look for those elements that 
were relatively untouched during the disturbance. If one assumes a 
probability model in reference to damage and assumes the various 
types of property, particularly in the line of march and in the 
vicinity of the greatest concentration of the mob, had an equal 
chance of being destroyed, there are rather striking patterns of 
omission. (Of course, one would not expect a perfect relation­
ship. Firespread is often unselective while fire origins are often 
more indicative. Looting and vandalism can, of course, be oppor­
tunistic and idiosyncratic and, therefore "irrational.") It is in­
teresting to note that, with some minor exceptions, no residences 
were burned. Neither were public buildings. It would seem that at 
least some damage would have resulted at Fort Amsterdam since 
this was the intended culmination of the march. Even taking into 
account the greater security measures there, this would not be 
sufficient to account for the total lack of attention. Other types of 
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public and quasi-public buildings were ignored. Just prior to the 
confrontation between the marchers and the police as the latter 
moved toward downtown, the marchers peacefully filed past the 
Curacao Red Cross Building without incident. Just after the shoot­
ing of Papa Godett, the majority of the mob passed the post office 
without creating significant damage. Destruction of other types of 
public property, such as fire engines and police cars, tended to 
occur only in the context of periodic confrontations with police. 
The bulk of the damage then was in terms of commercial 
property, but there were also some interesting patterns of omis­
sion here. Immediately after passing the post office, the mob also 
passed Curasao's famed floating market, where ships from Ven­
ezuela that bring fresh produce to the island were docked. These 
"foreign capitalists" did not become the focus of attention. 
In addition, one of the most significant factors was the lack of 
damage to Shell property on the island. Both the gathering point 
for the start of the march and the initial phase of the march were in 
close proximity to Shell property. Various Shell properties, rang­
ing from offices to gas stations, are scattered over the island and 
the lack of opportunity is not a sufficient explanation for the 
marchers' lack of attention. Even random destruction would have 
likely produced some significant losses for Shell. Instead, the 
destruction was directed toward other targets. 
Although the disturbance was widely interpreted afterward in 
the press and on the island as being a black-white confrontation, 
this interpretation is true only to the extent that the whites were 
seen as an oppressor and as an outsider. The nature of Curasao 
with its primarily white upper class and black under class, did of 
course, provide some basis for black-white confrontation. But the 
whites who suffered the most were those who were considered 
outsiders and exploiters. Whites who had been on the island a long 
time and, more importantly, were seen to identify with the island 
as citizens, rather than as visiting colonials, were seldom harmed. 
In the relatively small population of the island, these insiders 
versus outsiders were generally known. In a mass situation, how­
ever, accurate identification becomes difficult and misidentifica­
tion can and did happen. "Correct" identification was often 
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quickly achieved if the white could speak Papiamento, the local 
language. Forexample, after the initial escalation at Shell, a young 
white newspaper reporter was turned on by the crowd, but they 
were diverted by his ability to handle the local language. Also, 
during the initial stages of the march, a car was stopped and the 
driver, a young Dutchwoman, was asked to get out. As she got out 
indignantly, she started swearing in Papiamento. At this, the 
crowd, which had been threatening her minutes before, broke out 
in laughter and someone quickly said, "Let her go, she's one of 
us." 
The inside-outside dimension rather than the black-white di­
mension is further illustrated by the fact that much of the economic 
loss was suffered by merchants, primarily Askenazian Jews who 
were newcomers rather than Sephardic Jews who were long-term 
residents. Another example, which points to the outsider-insider 
dimension rather than to a purely racial confrontation, were the 
many instances of blacks leading white tourists who had been 
caught in the disturbance area back to their hotels to protect them 
from mistaken harassment. 
It would seem that the message that was conveyed in the violent 
episode reinforced other themes that were present throughout the 
May Movement and thus should be considered an integral part 
rather than as something apart. The strongest focus of protest as it 
was revealed through the various forms of violence was directed 
toward those who were seen to exploit the island and its people 
without identifying with Curacao. The major focus of hostility 
expressed was directed toward those who were defined as outsid­
ers. This distinction was particularly significant to the workers 
since they felt that they were the real insiders, the real Antilleans, 
but they felt instead that they were being treated as outsiders, 
excluded from the economic and political resources that should be 
rightfully theirs. The complexities of the issues involved—politi­
cal powerlessness, low economic status, and blackness—tended 
to become joined in the major symbol of Antillean identity. Those 
who identified, regardless of color, could be a party to the continu­
ing discussion of what Curacao was to become. Those who did not 
The May Movement in the Context of Social Movements 133 
identify, as reflected in their previous actions and behavior, had no 
right to continue to control valued resources on the island. The 
point was made in a rather frightening way, but it had been made. 
Subsequently, there was considerable debate as to the costs of the 
message but as Chapter five suggests, the various segments on the 
island began to listen as they had not previously. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF LABOR IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Certainly one of the striking aspects of the May Movement was 
the critical importance of labor in all of its phases. For a number of 
reasons, it seems that the role of labor in social movements may be 
more important in societies developing now than it was in the 
development of older industrial societies. First, the work relation­
ship may be particularly critical within such societies once it is 
reflective of social strain. Second, the development of unions as an 
effective mechanism in resolving worker complaints is somewhat 
problematic. Third, the size of the labor force is attractive as a 
political base and tends to attract leaders who have aims directed 
toward broader political issues rather than to narrow economic 
goals.5 
In developing societies, the work relationship may be a particu­
larly sensitive indicator of social strain that eventuates in the 
emergence of social movements. One of the key transitions in 
developing countries involves the shifting of loyalities from such 
social units as the family or the village to other social units more 
closely tied to the changing economic base. The traditional social 
units lose their relevance for ordering life whereas other associa­
tions become more relevant. Since a universal goal of developing 
societies is increasing the industrial base, the number of jobs 
within the urban industrial sector increases and these jobs become 
key elements that connect individuals and families to the larger 
changes within the society. The worker's job satisfaction, his 
relationship with other workers and with his employer become 
particularly significant in his evaluation of both his own progress 
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and the progress of the larger society. In the Western industrial 
experience, trade unions developed to mediate some of the prob­
lems that workers experienced as a result of industrialization. 
Although conflict often emerged when union objectives were 
sought, unions in many ways provided a stabilizing influence to 
the course of labor relations. In developing countries, there are a 
number of factors that may undercut the potential stabilizing 
effects unions have had in the older industrialized societies. In 
addition, there are factors that make union development more 
problematic. In many developing societies, industrial employers, 
particularly those that utilize a high proportion of unskilled labor, 
are not concerned with the development of a fixed identifiable 
group of workers. They are far more interested in having an easily 
accessible pool of workers that can be drawn upon when the need 
arises. When such a potential labor supply is easily available, the 
employer is free, within certain legal limits, to establish those 
work relationships he deems necessary. This frequently makes job 
tenure insecure and discipline erratic. Given such employment 
tenuousness in situations of marginal employment, any changes in 
job context, rules, regulations, and the like, are seen as extremely 
threatening by the workers. 
The emergence of trade unions to cope with such worker prob­
lems is often slow in developing societies. Employers can easily 
find substitutes for troublesome employees. The traditional back­
grounds from which the workers come provide little experience in 
the development and maintenance of such a complex form of 
social organization as the union. The structure of industry in 
developing countries often requires primary dependence on indus­
trial unionism. The level of technology available now makes the 
construction of larger units possible and economic competition 
makes the construction of larger units necessary. Masses of work­
ers are often drawn together in such enterprises, none of them hav­
ing much previous industrial experience. By contrast, during the 
early stages in the older developed countries, many of the indus­
trial enterprises depended on relatively skilled workers and these 
craftsmen found it relatively easy to create unions organized 
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around their craft skills. When larger-scale industry did develop, 
the craft unions were able to provide an experienced cadre of 
personnel to assist in organizing the new industrial unions. Indus­
trial unions face a more sophisticated task of organization since 
they have to combine different occupational and skill categories 
into a cohesive unit. In developing countries, however, the work 
force is less well prepared to undertake these organizational tasks. 
There are few experienced leaders within the country. There 
usually is no indigenous craft-union tradition on which to draw. 
Many of the highly skilled and experienced workers are likely to be 
drawn from outside the country and, thus, are culturally different 
from the other workers. Therefore the stability that can come from 
effective union organization is unlikely to develop. 
Too, most developing countries have had colonial backgrounds 
and much of the economic development in these countries have 
had colonial origins. Within these countries, the independence 
movement often used working-class unrest as the integral element. 
Thus, nationalist movements often subsume working-class 
movements. After independence, dissatisfaction of the work force 
within the modern sector is often assumed to derive from the 
inability to reduce the colonial and dependent status of the society. 
Particularly if the employers are foreign, either because of colonial 
memories or because of governmentally invited economic de­
velopment, such discontent is often seen as being a consequence of 
the continued exploitation. 
Middle-class nationalists, including intellectuals, have usually 
considered the attempt to organize workers to be an integral part of 
strengthening the nation. They also have recognized that workers, 
when organized, offer concentrated political power that can be 
used in other ways. Workers, frustrated by their limited power, 
often respond to the more inclusive appeals of nationalism and 
liberation as being a quicker and more certain route to their own 
economic improvement. The nationalist issues that do become 
involved in labor disputes, however, often obscure the economic 
and job-security issues that relate more directly to the employees. 
Thus, middle-class nationalist leadership often sharpens labor 
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protest but, on the other hand, it is often not successful negotiating 
with individual employers. In such a context, working-class pro­
test may tend to become politically disruptive rather than econom­
ically effective. 
To new governments in developing societies, disruptions from 
working-class protest seem extremely threatening. Whereas the 
same behavior prior to independence was considered to be highly 
desirable, when it occurs in a postindependence context the gov­
ernment is likely to see it as disloyalty. But these governments may 
also recognize that the existing trade unions are too ineffective to 
establish collective bargaining relationships with their employers. 
Lacking an effective voluntary industrial relations system, the 
state often has to intervene in such disputes. Such intervention 
usually is oriented toward helping the worker develop the work-
welfare conditions that have been developed over time in other 
industrial societies. The state often assumes the responsibility for 
assuring these conditions by establishing governmental programs 
or other forms of governmental encouragements. The long-run 
effect of such state intervention is to inhibit the growth and de­
velopment of viable trade unions since the state can provide a 
much more powerful and effective force to implement workers 
desires. Such intervention is not always altruistic. Governments 
usually have as an objective creating in the minds of the worker a 
sense of loyalty to the state and, more narrowly, toward the 
particular party in power. In democratic systems, the party in 
power, seeking to remain there, makes use of various techniques to 
tie the unions and the labor movement to it. Such a potent political 
base as labor usually guarantees the party's retention of power. 
The party in power often has another reason for becoming 
involved in labor disputes, sometimes contradictory to their politi­
cal dependence on labor. A new state, almost invariably, is com­
mitted to a program of economic development. Sharp and ex­
tended conflict between workers and employers can be disruptive 
to such development. By being in the middle, however, the state is 
caught in an agonizing dilemma—what may be politically expe­
dient for the worker may be catastrophic for the course of 
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economic development. But only governments who stay in power 
can face this dilemma. 
Much of what has been said about the development of industrial 
relations in developing countries fits Curacao and was basic to the 
labor difficulties that led to the disturbance. In Curasao's pattern 
of industrial development, the domination of one industry tended 
to preclude the development of a strong craft-union tradition. 
Skilled workers were brought to the island who were different 
culturally and often racially from the unskilled workers and there­
fore did not provide learning and organizational skills to create a 
viable union structure. Consequently, the union picture is frag­
mented and diffuse. Among the dock workers and construction 
workers, several unions competed for the allegiance of the work­
ers, and often loyalty to a union was achieved by the actions of 
charismatic leadership, often only tangentially concerned with 
economic issues. 
The continuity of Shell and its associated companies from the 
colonial period and its economic dominance on the island provided 
a basis for charges of continued colonialism. (Although the pattern 
of damage on May 30 suggests that Shell has come a long way in 
overcoming this image and now tends to be seen as an insider.) The 
attempt by the government to attract foreign investment and the 
economic concessions that were necessary added support to a 
claim of continued colonialism. Of course, throughout the dispute, 
union leaders used nationalist symbols in an attempt to gain sup­
port for their economic claims. When nationalist movements lack 
their own symbols, they often borrow symbols that convey the 
success of nationalist and liberation movements elsewhere. For 
example, in Curacao certain labor leaders affected revolutionary 
khaki uniforms and were rather dramatic figures riding around the 
island in their jeeps, symbols that could hardly be missed. 
The labor disputes placed the government in a dilemma that 
could not be easily resolved. The Democratic Party could not 
afford to lose its critical labor support but, on the other hand, 
neither could it let its efforts to attract new industrial development, 
which many saw as a longer-run solution to economic problems, 
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be threatened by excessive wage demands. Nor could the govern­
ment risk long and disruptive labor disputes. 
The focus of the march on May 30 — Fort Amsterdam — 
indicated where the unions felt the locus of economic power and 
final decision-making was located. Prior to the march, union 
leaders wondered aloud why the government did not "tell" 
WESCAR to settle the strike. What was initially an economic issue 
became transformed into a political issue, and the fact that the 
government was forced to resign indicated not only the political 
potential of the unions but also the close relationship that was seen 
by many of the workers between economic and political injustice. 
Following the emergence of the May Movement and the success 
of the Liberation Front at the polls, there was an increase in union 
membership and greater union solidarity. On the other hand, the 
coalition of union and nationalist interests within the Liberation 
Front proved rather unstable. The more pragmatic political and 
economic goals of the union leaders conflicted with the more 
abstract and idealistic goals of the nationalist themes, represented 
by Stanley Brown. Over time, the union solidarity that had de­
veloped began to show cracks along the same divisions that had 
separated them previously. 
THE MAY MOVEMENT AND RACIAL 
DISTURBANCES IN THE UNITED STATES 
The emergence of the May Movement in 1969 was frequently 
seen as being somehow related to the much more publicized black 
rebellions that had erupted in such American cities as Los Angeles, 
Newark, Detroit, and Cleveland during the 1960s. There were 
certain similarities, as well as differences, between them. The 
May Movement and the black rebellions in the United States were 
alike in that they were attacks upon traditional societal arrange­
ments that worked to the disadvantage of nonwhites and the 
economically depressed. They were collective efforts by such 
groups in the two societies to create more satisfying social ar­
rangements. The movements in the two countries were also similar 
in that as they developed they became increasingly political in 
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character. As in Curacao, the initial demands of participants in the 
black protest movements in the United States were often vague, 
coming as they did during periods of proto-political violence. But, 
like their counterparts in Curacao, protest leaders in the United 
States helped transform the uprisings into political protest by more 
clearly specifying demands and by calling for such changes as 
greater political representation for blacks, more and better jobs, 
and in some cases even demanding the resignation of mayors, 
police officials, and other authorities.6 And also as in Curacao, 
protest leaders in the United States attempted to give the urban 
movements more organization by coordinating attempts at pressur­
ing white officials into acting favorably on such demands. Given 
such similarities, were the consequences of the May Movement 
similar to those generated by the movements in the United States? 
The May Movement did follow the pattern of the recent protest 
movements in the United States in having consequences for the 
protesting, disadvantaged group as well as for the larger society.7 
The protest in the two societies ushered in periods of innovation 
and experimentation within the disadvantaged communities. A 
willingness to try new solutions to old problems resulted in the 
emergence of many new groups and organizations. For example, 
after the May Movement emerged in Curacao the Liberation Front 
and MAN were established along with new unions. Similarly, 
within the black community in the United States, new economic, 
cultural, and political groups calling for self-determination for the 
black community were born following the urban uprisings. In Los 
Angeles, the militant cultural organization us was formed, as well 
as SLANT, a group with black-power ideology. In Detroit, a milit­
ant organ ization known as the City wide Citizen s Action Commit­
tee was created for the purpose of achieving black control of the 
black community. In Chicago, black police officers organized the 
Afro-American Patrolmen's League to protect the interest of the 
black community in police affairs. The urban uprisings in the 
United States also played a role in the emergence of militant black 
unions and black student organizations. Why did these new groups 
and organizations emerge within the nonwhite, disadvantaged 
communities in both Curacao and the United States? They 
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emerged because the protesting groups believed that existing 
groups and organizations were incapable of solving their prob­
lems. In both Curacao and the United States, then, some of the 
most important changes were generated within the communities 
from which the protest came. 
Societies cannot ignore major protest movements but must react 
to them in some fashion. Given the threat they posed to traditional 
social arrangements, the May Movement and the black protest 
movements in the United States forced established groups and 
authorities into making certain adjustments. And in broad terms 
the adjustments made by established groups and authorities in the 
two countries were similar. That is, on the one hand, efforts were 
made to make certain changes and reforms in response to some of 
the grievances articulated by the movements and, on the other 
hand, actions were taken to counteract and limit the power of the 
movements. From the standpoint of the movements themselves, 
such consequences represented gains and losses. 
We have already described the successes of the May Movement 
in detail. The political gains included the success of the Liberation 
Front at the polls during elections for both the central and island 
governments, the increased political influence of labor, the fall of 
the old government and the greater flexibility of the new, and the 
selection of blacks for such high public office as prime minister 
and governor of Curacao. On the economic and social front, 
unions negotiated an unusual number of wage hikes, the business 
community became less insensitive to labor, some social restric­
tions against nonwhites were lifted, and change-oriented organiza­
tions like the Curacao Development Corporation and Obra y Logra 
were formed. 
Reforms are usually made grudgingly in societies and Curacao 
was no exception. Established groups give up power and privilege 
only to the extent that they feel it is necessary to do so. Thus as 
reported earlier, so far as the protestors were concerned, a number 
of unintended changes also occurred in Curacao because of the 
May Movement. Some of the changes that were made by estab­
lished groups and authorities were designed to counteract and limit 
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the power of the May Movement or to shore up their own lagging 
power. For example, The National Party and URA reunited in an 
effort to recoup losses suffered at the hands of the Liberation Front 
at the polls. Former prime minister Kroon organized MASA in an 
attempt to recapture some of the influence he had enjoyed in 
Curacao politics prior to the May Movement. Also, the govern­
ment took steps to strengthen the capacity of the police and 
voluntary corps to control future rebellions. 
In the United States, too, from the standpoint of the protestors, 
both desirable and undesirable changes resulted from the protest 
movements of the 1960s. On the plus side, political, business, and 
civic leaders in the United States became more responsive to black 
grievances. Thus some local political authorities saw the need to 
hire more black police officers, to organize community relations 
groups, and to establish ghetto city-hall offices ostensibly to give 
ghetto residents easier access to local government and reduce their 
sense of isolation. Also, urban task forces were formed to tackle 
some of the myriad political, economic, and social problems that 
plague black Americans.8 In some cities, leading white business­
men, educators, and government officials joined with black lead­
ers to form problem-solving groups like the New Detroit Commit­
tee and the Committee of Concern in Newark.9 Public and private 
organizations also endeavored to improve employment and educa­
tional opportunities for blacks. And efforts were made to improve 
housing for blacks and to expand recreational programs in some 
communities.10 The federal government enlarged or initiated new 
programs in several communities following the uprisings. The 
Office of Economic Opportunity was a major supporter of these 
programs. Many new black groups and organizations received 
much of their financial backing from federal agencies and private 
sources such as corporations and foundations who because of the 
urban protest movements felt the need for some change and reform 
in the society. 
Yet, as in Curacao, there were also actions taken in the United 
States to counteract and resist the potential power of the black 
protest movements. For example, white segregationist groups 
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emerged in the wake of the protest.11 Also, steps were taken by 
authorities to increase the capacity of law enforcement agencies to 
control future rebellions. Riot plans were written, riot training for 
law enforcement personnel was greatly expanded, and new riot-
control equipment was purchased. There is evidence which sug­
gests that the major response to the rebellions in many cities in the 
United States involved such control measures.12 
These, then, were some of the similarities in the changes gener­
ated by the May Movement in Curacao and the black protest 
movements in the United States. We can now raise the question: 
How successful was the May Movement in achieving change in 
Curacao compared to the recent protest movements in the United 
States? This question cannot be answered with a high degree of 
precision. It is not clear, for example, whether the May Move­
ment was more or less successful than the protest movements in the 
United States in making progress toward solving some of the 
economic problems of the poor. Even with the prodding from the 
movements in Curacao and the United States, programs estab­
lished in the two countries for this purpose were meager and in­
adequate given the size of the task. It seems somewhat safer to say, 
however, that the May Movement had greater immediate political 
effect than the protest movements in the United States. 
The political changes generated in Curacao by the May Move­
ment by no means altered the basic position of the masses. Yet the 
changes appear to be somewhat more significant than those gener­
ated by the recent protest movements in the United States. This 
seems so even if we only consider the fact that the government was 
forced to resign in Curacao whereas this was never a real possibil­
ity in the United States. However, other things also point to the 
conclusion that the May Movement might have had a greater 
political impact than the protest movements in the United States. 
As noted, the May Movement produced two genuine political 
parties, the Liberation Front and MAN, that won legislative seats. 
Also labor acquired more political influence in Curacao as a result 
of the May Movement. They were consulted more often by the 
government and a new labor department was created in recognition 
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of their new status and the increased significance of labor matters. 
Furthermore, blacks were appointed to high government offices 
following the emergence of the May Movement. It does not seem 
that the protest movements in the United States had this type of 
immediate political impact. 
A number of factors can explain the different political signifi­
cance of the protest movements in the two societies. First, even 
though the rebellions in the United States tended to move from 
proto-political violence to political action as the May Movement in 
Curacao had done, the latter assumed a more organized political 
form. This may have been partly due to the involvement of key 
existing groups, the labor unions, at the very beginning of the 
protest in Curacao that at the right moment could serve as the core 
for more organized political behavior. This moment came when, 
in the wake of the May 30 violence and destruction in Willemstad, 
the unions formed a coalition and called for the resignation of the 
government. In the United States, comparable existing groups 
apparently did not get as thoroughly involved in the protest actions 
as the labor unions in Curacao. The success of the labor coalition 
led to even more organized political activity, that is, the formation 
of anew labor party. This turn toward party politics by some of the 
May Movement dissidents, which also ultimately resulted in the 
formation of MAN, was furthered by the ease in which political 
parties can be formed in Curasao and offer candidates for office, 
and a political history that has seen the birth of many small parties. 
Structural factors also seem to have been involved in the dis­
similar political consequences the protest movements had in the 
two societies. A large and highly developed society like the United 
States has a greater capacity for controlling dissidence and thus 
avoiding change and reform than a small, developing society like 
Curacao. Not only does the United States have the technical 
resources for minimizing disruption over the long run, but the 
organizational resources as well. Thus, whereas the Antillean 
government had to rely on outside assistance in quelling the 
violence in Willemstad, the United States, with its well-trained 
police, armed forces, and National Guard units, handled the inter­
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nal threats to its stability with relative ease. It was more difficult, 
then, for government officials in Curacao than those in the United 
States to avoid making some political concessions to groups who 
threatened to call for renewed violence unless reforms were made. 
The different social-control capacities of the two societies is un­
derscored by the fact that sometime after the May 30 violence in 
Curacao the United States supplied the Curacao police force with 
riot equipment. 
The size of the aggrieved groups in the two societies also 
undoubtedly had some bearing on the different political conse­
quences of the movements. In the United States, blacks comprise 
approximately 11 percent of the population whereas in Curacao the 
vast majority of the inhabitants are nonwhite. Thus again it was 
more difficult for authorities in Curacao than those in the United 
States to ignore the demands for change and reform since they 
were coming from those who were part of the majority group in the 
society. 
The different historical experiences of the United States and 
Curacao might also have been related to their varying political 
responses to collective protest. In contrast to Curacao, the United 
States has had a long history of riots, rebellions, and protest 
movements.13 In addition to race riots, the United States has 
experienced antidraft riots and movements, abolition movements, 
slave rebellions, and a stormy history of labor-management rela­
tions. This history would seem to mitigate to some extent the 
impact of the black protest movements of the 1960s. Curacao, on 
the other hand, has not had a history of civilian protest and 
rebellion. Relations between the races had been considered good 
when compared with other multiracial societies. Furthermore, 
given the paternalistic nature of employers and the fact that the 
labor movement is relatively new, there has not been a history of 
labor turmoil on the island. Consequently, when the May Move­
ment exploded on the scene, its impact was enhanced by the fact 
that no one expected it and it was the first movement of its kind to 
emerge in Curacao. Thus the greater immediate political gains of 
the May Movement might have in part resulted from the fact that it 
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was viewed as a more serious threat than the rebellions in the 
United States. 
The May Movement achieved certain black power goals, such 
as the appointment of a black prime minister and governor, that 
would have made black power movements in the United States and 
elsewhere somewhat envious. Yet the May Movement was not 
truly a black power movement. To be sure, MAN had a black 
platform and the Liberation Front called for an end to the oppres­
sion of blacks. It is also true that many high government and police 
authorities blamed the May 30 violence on "black power elements 
in Curacao." Nevertheless, black power or black nationalism was 
not the basic thrust of the May Movement. As we have already 
suggested, a more significant dimension of the movement was 
Antillean nationalism. This was evident in the movement's call for 
equal wages for Antilleans, more and better jobs for Antilleans, 
and recognition of the Antillean language, Papiamento. This is not 
to deny, of course, that the racial issue was a very important part of 
the protest. Clearly it was, and it is not difficult to understand why 
given the fact that the under class in Curacao was overwhelmingly 
nonwhite. Still, however, the black powertheme never became the 
overriding one during the May Movement as was true of the protest 
movements in the United States during the 1960s, and the revolt in 
Trinidad in 1970.14 This might have been because the Netherlands 
Antilles has not had a history of black nationalist thought and 
activity. 
In contrast to Curacao, in the United States, where black 
nationalism has had a long tradition, the black protest movements 
were one of the major factors that helped foster a revival or 
resurgence of nationalist sentiment and programs in the black 
community during the 1960s. Groups spawned by the protest—for 
example, SLANT, US, and the Afro-American Patrolmen s 
League—emphasized black nationalism, or black power, and 
would undoubtedly have applauded even the modest political 
success achieved by the May Movement that we have mentioned. 
One final note might be made in our comparison of the political 
consequences of the May Movement in Curacao and the recent 
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protest movements in the United States. In both countries, 
government-appointed commissions were charged with investigat­
ing the violent phases of the movements. Such commissions were 
told to seek the causes of the violence and to recommend measures 
that might prevent their recurrence. 
A riot commission was established by the Antillean government 
in October, 1969. Five Antillean and three Dutch members were 
appointed to it, the latter upon the recommendation of the Dutch 
government. The eight-member commission included four 
sociologists, an engineer, a lawyer, a retired judge, and a govern­
ment employee with a doctorate in theology. The commission 
gathered data on the May 30 violence and its causes through 
confidential interviews with citizens of Curacao. All segments of 
the island were invited to present their views. Some public hear­
ings were also held by the commission. The commission com­
pleted a report on its investigations at the end of May, 1970. 
How successful was the Antillean riot commission? If its suc­
cess is judged in terms of its effectiveness in getting the govern­
ment to act on its recommendations, then perhaps it was no more 
successful than such commissions in the United States as the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, more com­
monly known as the Kerner Commission. Lipsky and Olson, for 
example, minimize the significance of the Kerner Commission as 
well as other commissions because they have generally failed to 
convince government authorities to implement their major 
recommendations.15 As in the case of the Kerner Report, the 
report of the Antillean commission was met with official silence by 
the government.16 Some changes were eventually implemented in 
Curacao that had been suggested by the commission in its report. 
For example, the government appointed a new lieutenant governor 
with considerable police experience to head the police force in 
Curacao. The commission had been highly critical of the actions of 
the police during the violence on May 30, and suggested the need 
for such a change. Also, as had been recommended by the com­
mission, the government began making fewer appointments based 
on patronage. However, it is difficult to tell if these changes were 
The May Movement in the Context of Social Movements 147 
made because of the commission's report, although at least one of 
the commissioners expressed the view that he thought so. But even 
if such changes were made as a result of the efforts of the commis­
sion, the vast majority of the commission's recommendations 
were not implemented. However, a different conclusion might be 
reached regarding the success of the Antillean commission if it is 
judged on a slightly different basis. For example, Campbell sug­
gests that the true test of the significance of commissions lies in 
whether or not they present important facts about national prob­
lems to those in positions of power and to the public.17 Based on 
this perspective, then, the Antillean commission, as Campbell 
suggests was also true of the Kerner Commission, did meet with 
some success. The Antillean commission wrote a hard-hitting 
report in which' problems of the society were spelled out, espe­
cially those relating to politics. In contrast to what many critics felt 
the Kerner Report failed to do, the report by the Antillean commis­
sion clearly spelled out what were thought to be the government's 
contributions to the underlying and immediate causes of the May 
30 violence. This included statements about political patronage 
and favoritism, governmental isolation from the masses, espe­
cially labor, and police incompetence. A number of factors could 
possibly have contributed to such forthrightness. First, the com­
position of the commission might have been important in this 
regard. As noted, there were Dutch as well as Antillean members 
on the commission. Thus even if the Antillean members had come 
under pressure from local authorities to tone down the criticism of 
the Antillean government, it might have been difficult to do so 
given the presence of the Dutch who would have been less affected 
by such pressure. Perhaps even more significant was the fact that 
the administration that was in power at the time of the violence was 
no longer in office and thus could not exert pressure on the 
commission to deliver a report that cast it in a favorable light. 
Finally, the commission was prodded by radical factions like Vito 
to objectively portray the shortcomings of government in the 
Netherlands Antilles. It is interesting to note that the man who had 
been initially appointed as head of the commission resigned before 
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its work was completed. Prior to his resignation, he had come 
under heavy fire from Vito. 
THE MAY MOVEMENT AND OTHER WESTERN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Although we have put the events in Curacao in the context of the 
May Movement, it is also necessary to place the movement in a 
much more global context. Although all social movements are 
oriented toward change, Turner has suggested that social move­
ments that have the greatest impact in the long run are those which 
are able to create a new sense of what hjust and what is unjust in a 
society.'* While the focus of attention of a particular social 
movement may be a problem of long standing within a society, 
what is changed is that what was once considered a misfortune 
comes to be viewed as an injustice. The difference between a sense 
of misfortune and a sense of injustice among a significant part of 
the population is seen in the difference between petition and 
demand. Those who have been the victims of a misfortune can 
petition those in power to help them, but the victims of an injustice 
will demand that their petition be granted. As Turner has sug­
gested: 
A significant social movement becomes possible when there is a 
revision in the manner in which a substantial group of people look at 
some misfortune, seeing it no longer as a misfortune warranting 
charitable consideration but as an injustice which is intolerable in 
society. A movement becomes possible when a group of people cease 
to petition the good will of others for relief of their misery and demand 
as their right that others ensure the correction of their condition.19 
If one looks at the history of Western Europe, there have been 
times in which the concerns in various societies have been domi­
nated by a particular sense of injustice. Two major eras can be 
delineated. In the liberal humanitarian era, exemplified by the 
American and French revolutions, people demanded the right to 
participate in ruling themselves. There was the insistence that 
people should no longer merely petition their rulers but that society 
should be structured in such a way that all people can be heard and 
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participate in governing themselves. This was the new right. It was 
at the time a radical idea, particularly for those in power. Socialist 
movements later retained the symbolism of freedom and participa­
tion but insisted on the right of people to demand the essential 
material needs of life. This was also a new idea. Even to many of 
the early liberal humanitarians, preoccupied with political rights, 
poverty was still considered a misfortune, not an injustice. This 
was changed when various movements, ranging from the more 
radical communist and socialist movements in Western Europe to 
the New Deal in the United States, pushed for the idea that a 
society was obliged to provide for material wants. 
Turner has suggested that, in the West, a new revision is now in 
progress with a new object of indignation. Today, for the first time 
in history, the idea is being put forth that people have a right to 
personal worth. It is an old theme, biblical and otherwise, that a 
person is to be pitied who does not feel worthy and cannot find his 
identity. But to consider this as an injustice is new and to suggest 
that society needs to guarantee a sense of personal worth for every 
person must be considered radical. Identity may have been seen as 
desirable in the past but it has hardly been considered a right. In 
many contemporary social movements, however, the key com­
plaint is phrased in terms of alienation. This theme is particularly 
strong among the young, involved in student movements, in rather 
affluent societies. In such societies, the political right to partici­
pate is now assumed; economic right for material support is now 
assumed; but still man has not been provided a sense of personal 
worth. Now this too must be guaranteed. In this context—the 
process of transforming misfortunes into injustices—many of the 
elements present in Curacao can be placed. 
In Western Europe and in the United States, the various periods 
with their dominant concerns have extended over several hundred 
years and have, of course, been "solved" in various ways—the 
first, by various forms of political democracies and the second, by 
variations of the welfare state. Now, in most of these societies, 
particularly among the young, the predominant focus of injustice 
merging is centered upon problems of identity. Whereas most 
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Western societies "solved" these problems in a somewhat sequen­
tial manner, in Curacao, all of the eras, and particularly the first 
two, have been telescoped in time. The island's close ties to 
Western Europe and to the United States did provide a continuous 
channel for various ideas concerning injustice. Liberal 
humanitarian ideas, of course, have been present on the island for a 
long time, as evidenced in the abolition of slavery, but one could 
argue that the final acceptance of a new norm of political participa­
tion did not become institutionalized in effect, until the change in 
colonial status making Curacao a semiautonomous part of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1954. There has been somewhat 
concurrently a focus on the theme of economic injustice relating to 
unionization, bargaining rights, and minimum wages. This dis­
cussion has been sharpened in recent years with increasing concern 
with unemployment created by automation in the refineries and 
with increasing economic expectations, at least in part prompted 
by the impact of mass media and by the influx of tourists with a 
vacationer s attitude toward spending money. A sense of 
economic injustice was the initiating focus of the May Movement. 
Also present in Curacao were elements of the third era. Students 
returning from being educated in the Netherlands brought back 
knowledge about the various political and countercultural move­
ments that are current in Western Europe. There was contact and 
interest in various movements within the Caribbean, such as Cas­
troism and various black power ideologies. In turn, black power 
ideologies within the Caribbean are strongly influenced by what is 
happening in the United States. There are also influences that 
come from Latin America, particularly from Catholic radical 
sources. Although the impact of these influences is perhaps over­
estimated by many on the island, they tend to become blended into 
a more general theme of Antillean nationalism, expressed rather 
dramatically in the Vito movement. But elements of all three 
themes of injustice—political, economic, and identity—came 
together and combined in a particularly explosive way on May 30 
and continued in the context of the May Movement. By contrast, 
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most of the Western societies have been able to deal with each of 
these three dimensions of injustice more sequentially. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MAY MOVEMENT 
FOR THE CURACAO OF THE FUTURE 
While we have concentrated on the short-term changes that 
resulted from the May Movement, it is useful in this concluding 
statement to project its impact much further into the future. 
Hoetink, in his discussion of types of race relations in the Carib­
bean, uses the concept segmented society- to describe a particular 
type of society.20 By a segmented society, he refers to one that, at 
its point of origin, consists of at least two groups of people of 
different races and culture, each having their own social institu­
tions and social structure. While each of the segments has its own 
rank within the social structure, such a society as a whole is 
governed by one segment. The historical Curacao is described by 
this concept. Hoetink contends that in such segmented societies, 
there are only two theoretical possibilities for further structural 
development—they can remain segmented or they become more 
homogeneous. 
Remaining segmented, however, necessitates agreement on the 
justice of the segmentation. Historically, such justification has 
usually derived from a religious belief structure that provides an 
orderly hierarchical world such as that which supported the caste 
system in India or from an amalgam of religious and racial ideol­
ogy that characterized the deep South in the United States and, 
more recently. South Africa. Segmentation constitutes the condi­
tions in which there are no marginal groups within the society since 
each is in its proper place. The problem of finding clear examples 
of contemporary segmented societies suggests the difficulties in 
maintaining segmentation. 
Among the factors undercutting the justification of segmenta­
tion have been the social movements in the West that have em­
phasized political and economic injustice. As ideological justifica­
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tions are undercut, it produces the conditions that facilitate the 
process of homogenization. Homogenization can proceed either 
by the elimination of one segment by one or more of the other 
segments or by the gradual racial and cultural mingling of the 
original segments. The elimination possibility has never been 
considered as a realistic alternative in Curacao. On the other hand, 
the gradual mingling, partly racial but mostly cultural, has gone on 
from the very beginning. 
Hoetink suggests that a segmented society initially goes through 
a stage of "pseudo-homogenization" in which the dominant seg­
ment attempts to maintain the society in terms of its own image. At 
the same time, since there is no ideological justification to support 
the segmented arrangement, the other groups within the society do 
not accept it and become marginal to the dominant cultural tradi­
tion. Such widespread marginality becomes an important force for 
change in the direction of further homogenization within the soci­
ety. 
In the early history of Curacao, the Dutch Protestants attempted 
to keep themselves and Curacao in tune with the Netherlands, 
reproducing the architecture, feverently identifying with the king, 
and stressing everything that was Dutch. The presence of the 
Sephardic Jews on the islands created problems for the view of 
Curacao as a simple extension of the Netherlands. Fora longtime, 
they were treated as a separate nation—"the Portuguese 
nation"—and separated from the Dutch by language, residential 
locations on the island and, of course, by religion. Overtime, the 
significant part the Jews played in the economy of the island made 
it difficult to consider them as somehow separate. Too, liberal 
tendencies in the treatment of religious groups in the Netherlands 
affected Curacao since it was the model to follow. As various 
actions became normative in the Netherlands, Jews also began to 
be accepted into governmental positions in Curacao and the role 
that they already played economically was recognized. In turn, for 
the gradual recognition, the Jews increasingly emphasized their 
Dutchness, for example, by accepting the language in their 
synagogue activity. Both the increasing, even if begrudging, ac­
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ceptance of Jews into the society and the modifications that 
occurred within the Jewish community to reduce their differences 
were a part of the on-going process of homogenization. 
The presence of the blacks on the island presented a different set 
of problems for the pseudohomogenized view of the Dutch Protes­
tants. The role of Curacao in the slave trade was created by the 
interests of the Dutch West India Company. Slavery, in itself, 
could fit into a pseudohomogenized view of Curacao. By treating 
people as property, it was not necessary to treat them as being 
members of the society. Slavery allowed the basic Dutchness to 
remain without major contradiction. Only those who were white 
were members of the society; those who were not were neither 
"real" nor permanent members. But the ideas of human dignity 
and freedom coming into the island were also "Dutch." The 
decline of the slave trade and its economic consequences also 
resulted from religious and political considerations present in 
Europe. These considerations led to pressure to reduce and elimi­
nate the trade. As slavery was ending, some other way of treating 
the blacks was necessary. One temporary adaptation was at least to 
keep Protestantism white and Dutch when Curacao could not be. 
Hartog reports that in 1816 when the slave trade was ending and 
the emancipation of all slaves was being anticipated, there were 
only a few white Catholics; and all free colored, except twenty, 
and all slaves belonged to the Roman Catholic Church.21 Such an 
arrangement allowed the white Protestants to maintain the fiction 
of being an extension of the mother country while keeping the 
blacks in a separate religious category. Such adaptations were 
temporary since other factors continued to undermine the Dutch 
Protestant pseudohomogenization. The decline of the economic 
fortunes of Curacao during the nineteenth century resulted in 
out-migrations by some of the Dutch and by some Jews. On the 
other hand, with fewer economic opportunities and with larger 
families, the black Catholic population almost doubled. 
The intensity of Dutch Protestants' desire to maintain their 
image of the society was also reflected in the discussion about 
voting rights cited in Chapter two. Since property qualifications 
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would shift the balance of political power to the Jews and a more 
general franchise would shift it to the blacks, there was content­
ment to leave the political destinies of Curacao in the good hands 
of the colonial office. In fact, a broadened franchise for voting was 
finally "forced" on Curacao. There is no doubt, however, that 
over time it was becoming increasingly difficult to continue to 
maintain the posture of homogeneity around Dutch Protestant 
values. 
The ultimate break in the historical illusion came about when the 
Dutch began to see themselves not just as a numerical minority but 
increasingly as a cultural minority. Ironically, what facilitated this 
feeling of minority consciousness among the Curacao Dutch was 
the building of the refinery. Those Dutchmen coming to the island 
with the technological skills necessary for the construction tended 
to see the locals as rather quaint, isolated colonials. It must have 
been traumatic for the locals to have spent so much energy to 
maintain their Dutchness and then to find that they were not only 
unappreciated but even rejected by the modern European carriers 
of the "authentic" culture. So it was now clear to the whites that 
though Curasao was a variant of Dutch culture, it had a distinctive 
Caribbean stamp. This recognition and self-discovery led to the 
emergence of island nationalism. There was increasing emphasis 
on Papiamento, which symbolized the separation that was being 
recognized and the uniqueness that was being affirmed. Distinc­
tions such as makamba and landskind became more than linguistic 
descriptions. These same themes were later an integral part of the 
May Movement. 
This feeling of estrangement from the Netherlands and the 
growing feeling of unity among the groups on Curacao led to 
pressure toward independence. The motives among the various 
segments within Curacao were different—most in Curacao had 
never belonged so independence was a recognition of what had 
always been true. For the Dutch Protestants it would symbolize 
what had somehow happened. The independence movement itself 
tended to foster feelings of solidarity among the various segments 
on the island. With the severance of the colonial ties and with the 
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new found local autonomy, many of the formal barriers that would 
prevent Curacao from deciding its own destiny were dissolved. 
The homogenization, which was the inevitable outcome of living 
and working together for hundreds of years, had already come a 
long way but it was far from complete. Although much unity had 
been achieved, the political party system as it evolved after inde­
pendence tended to reflect and perpetuate in certain ways the older 
segmentation. With the help of the labor movement, the Democra­
tic Party that symbolized the white Protestant interests was able to 
continue its dominance. 
The May Movement was, then, a further step in the continuing 
homogenization among the various segments within Curasao. The 
distinction that emerged during the violence between the insider 
and the outsider was not a matter of color or class but primarily a 
distinction of where one's loyalties were placed. Since the ques­
tion of political loyalties had been solved by the earlier break with 
the Netherlands and the internal autonomous status, the pivotal 
question in the May Movement was one of economic loyalties. 
Those merchants and employers who were outsiders were the 
targets. The political consequences that the May Movement had 
were somewhat unanticipated but they resulted in the greater 
involvement by groups, particularly blacks, that had been tradi­
tionally excluded. The May Movement was one further step, a 
traumatic one for many, in the inexorable process of Curasao 
moving toward its own identity. 
One of the more striking features in Curacao today is still the 
presence of what can be called multiple minority consciousness. 
Each group within the society tends to think and feel in minority 
terms: black, colored, or white; Catholic, Protestant, or Jew; old or 
new resident; upper middle or lower class; young or old. The social 
locations that had provided the secure anchors of identity for the 
Dutch Protestants have crumbled. Although slavery tore the roots 
of the blacks, a return to Africa, even emotionally, makes no 
sense, nor do the various black movements in the Caribbean or in 
the United States. They may create local interest but seldom 
provide direction. Although many of the residents of Curacao are 
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black, they are Curasao blacks. The Jews of Curacao have had the 
advantage of hundreds of years of marginality. And, in fact, it was 
our observation that the Jews on Curacao were able to see the May 
Movement as less of a personal threat than were the Dutch Protes­
tants. Many Jews played rather key roles in the immediate recon­
ciliation process. Among the groups on the island, the major 
similarity was their common Antillean identity—this, they 
shared, regardless of other differences. 
This common identity, however, already was important and, in 
spite of our emphasis here on the violent aspects, there were 
important indicators that interpersonal relationships on the island 
were in many ways very strong. There is the startling fact that, 
even with the enormity of property damage on May 30, the level of 
personal violence was very low. Two persons were killed and most 
of the injuries were of the kind that required first aid rather than 
hospitalizaton (just for contrast, in racial disturbances in the 
United States, 26 were killed in Newark, 34 in Watts, and 43 in 
Detroit). It is also important to note, that though a large number of 
vehicles were burned, no drivers were injured. This includes the 
car that was stopped by marchers in which the driver was defined 
as symbolizing racial injustice. Such drivers were harassed some­
what by the crowd, and they were obviously indignant, but the 
separation of person and property was carefully made. In addition, 
it is likely that, during the disturbance, if shop-owners had not 
closed their shops and gone home, fewer shops would have been 
looted. Shop-owners who stayed were generally not bothered. 
What this suggests is that the prior reputation of Curacao of 
having relatively good relations among the various groups did 
have a basis in fact and that it was reflected in mitigating the nature 
and extent of personal violence. The attack was primarily in terms 
of definition of property and its use by outsiders. The interpersonal 
ties transcended the potential divisiveness of race and class and 
provided a degree of cohesiveness that prevented an even greater 
explosiveness. 
The primary message of the May Movement was an outgrowth 
of the historic segmentation of Curacao in which the blackness, 
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low status, and the lack of political power were combined within 
the segmented working class. This class, however, had had a 
major role in Curacao's past and wanted to have a continuing part 
in the direction of the future. Their investment, they felt, was 
being threatened. Late on Friday, May 30, an older white resident 
was leaving Willemstad and as he stood at a vantage point looking 
back at the smoke and flames throughout the city, he said to a 
young black passing by, "Look at your city." The young black 
replied, "That's not my city." This brief conversation symbolized 
both the tragedy of that day as well as its ultimate meaning for the 
future of Curacao. The young black was not aware that his reluc­
tance to claim the city was widely shared in groups that historically 
had been dominant. No segment could now be sure that Curacao 
was "his." In his angry reaction, however, the young black 
missed the implication that it was now his city. The May Move­
ment emerged in this ambivalence—the desire to belong and the 
doubt as to whether one did belong. No single segment could be 
sure that the city (the society) was "his ." Even so, the May 
Movement did become a major step in bringing closer the diverse 
groups in Curacao, which had been brought together by the acci­
dents of history. Underneath the conflict, the May Movement 
highlighted the element that all groups in Curacao had in 
common—their Antillean identity. With this bond strengthened, 
the debate on the future of Curacao could go on. 
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APPENDIX A 
The Agreement of Kralendijk* 
The following parties: 
—Democratic Party of Curacao; 
—Partido Patriotico Arubano; 
—Frente Obrero y Liberacion 30 di Mei;

(Labor and Liberation Front May 30)

—Democratic Party of the Windward Islands; 
—Partido Obrero Boneriano jointly with Partido 
Progresista Boneriano Uni; 
(Bonairean Labor Party jointly with United Progressive Bonairean 
Party): 
declare in principle that after extensive deliberations and negotiations 
they have reached an agreement on the basis of which it was decided to 
cooperate with each other towards the formation of a Government for the 
Netherlands Antilles. 
This agreement takes as its point of departure the standpoint that this 
statement of principles is definitive, but it will furthermore be based on a 
statement of principles and basic points of a Government Policy Pro­
gramme. The latter will be worked out in detail by the participating 
*Akwerdo Di Kralendijk, Netherlands Antilles Government Pamphlet (November, 
1969). 
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factions in common consultation, and each faction will hand to the 
Cabinet informer a written contribution as soon as possible. 
They declare, moreover, that no extension of the number of Ministerial 
seats is aimed at, while in accordance with the existing seats the follow­
ing distribution is advocated: 
FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY: 
Economic Affairs 
The policy of this Department shall be changed thusly that in principle 
solely native born citizens can get an establishment permit for businesses 
in the retail trade. Also, the flight of capital shall be combated. 
With due observance of the insular autonomy, the federal government 
shall promote tourism—both within and outside the Netherlands 
Antilles—inter alia by coordinating this economic pillar. 
Economic Development 
The policy of this Department shall be aimed also at promotion of local 
industry, tradesmanship and home industry. 
For the purpose of attracting industry from abroad, through agencies of 
the federal government and of the Kingdom, the federal government shall 
take care of a reasonable spreading of such industries over the various 
island territories of the Netherlands Antilles. 
Finance 
The income tax must be further socialized, and this must find expression 
in the progressivity of the levy. 
The credit-giving policies of the Popular Credit Bank and the Building 
Credit Bank must be revised, to make these institutions better adapted to 
the purpose they were founded for. 
Education 
The policy of this Department shall be aimed at producing within the 
shortest time an orthography of the Papiamento language and, when this 
has been achieved, to introduce this language on the Leeward Islands, 
one and the other as a basis for the eventual adoption of Papiamento as the 
communications vehicle. 
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Culture and Education 
Promotion of physical development for the population of the Netherlands 
Antilles, by the practice of sports. The policy shall also be set at retaining 
and promoting an own Antillean culture. 
FOR THE PARTIDO PATRIOTICO ARUBANO 
General Affairs 
Parties agree that this Cabinet post is attached to the function of Minister 
President. 
Justice 
The policy of the Justice Department shall be aimed at achieving, within 
the shortest span of time possible, a complete modernization and adapta­
tion of the police and prosecution apparatus. Articles 136a and others of 
the Criminal Code, dealing with matters concerning public order, shall be 
deleted. 
Communications 
The policy regarding the communications media of radio and television 
must be such, that these in their utilization shall express the freedom of 
speech and free manifestation of opinion, this in keeping with the free­
dom of the Press. 
FOR FRENTE OBRERO Y LIBERACION 30 DI MEI 
Social Affairs 
Labor 
These two departments shall within the briefest period of time possible 
achieve the following urgent provisions: 
(a)	 introduction of a regulation setting a minimum wage for all labor­
ers; 
(b)	 enactment of a federal ordinance setting up a compulsory pension 
fund for enterprises and private institutions, alongside the existing 
General Old Age Insurance; 
(c)	 introduction of a General Sickness Act for the entire population of 
the Netherlands Antilles; 
(d)	 introduction of an Act regulating dismissals (layoffs); 
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(e)	 enactment of the legal obligation governing the recognition by 
employers of labor unions and of lawful representatives of em­
ployers' and employees' organizations; 
(f)	 formation of a committee consisting of representatives of labor 
unions, with the task of advising the Government on labor matters; 
(g)	 introduction of a general unemployment insurance comprising all 
workers; 
(h)	 revision and adaptation of labor legislation. 
The Government in its entirety, shall take steps to see to it that the 
workers employed by all Curacao Mining Company Ltd. will not lose 
their livelihood as the consequence of the complications with that Com­
pany. 
Public Health 
The policy of this Department shall be aimed at liberalizing the law 
regulating the admission of physicians in such sense, that more physi­
cians and pharmacists who graduated from foreign recognized univer­
sities, can be admitted here. 
The federal ordinance on pharmacy is to be adapted to modern 
philosophies. 
Parties declare that—in proportion to the number of their seats on the 
legislative Council of the Netherlands Antilles—they shall have a voice 
in and be represented in all Government agencies and commissions, the 
'Antillean Home' (i.e., the office of the Minister Plenipotentiary in The 
Hague) and representations abroad. 
Moreover, when appointing the Governor, the Acting Governor, Lt. 
Governors of the Island Territories and Administrators, the wishes of the 
cooperating parties shall be taken into account on the same basis. 
The manifested needs of the island territories of Bonaire and the Wind­
ward Islands, shall merit the especial attention of the entire Council of 
Ministers. 
The distribution of seats on the Council of Ministers shall be as follows: 
for the Democratic Party	 3 seats 
for the Partido Patriotico Arubano	 3 seats 
for the Frente Obrero y Liberacion 30 di Mei 2 seats 
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The replacement of Ministers shall be arranged within the same party,

except the function of Minister-President.

Furthermore it has been decided that the following functions or posts

shall be filled as detailed below: 
Chairmanship of the Democratic Party of 
Legislative Council Curasao 
Vice-chairmanship of the Partido Patriotico 
Legislative Council Arubano 
Vice-premiership Democratic Party 
Minister-Plenipotentiary Democratic Party, 
in The Hague 
In principle it is also agreed upon, that all problems and identification of 
problems of a nature of principle, shall be the subjects of discussions both 
between the Ministers of the cooperating factions as well as between their 
respective factions, in order to achieve a joint formulation of decisions. 
Efforts will be made towards acquiring the greatest possible measure of 
social security for all strata of the population of the Netherlands Antilles. 
The general objectives will have to comprise: 
maintenance of order, peace and safety, with full respect for the rights of 
man, revision of our political position in the Kingdom, creating the 
opportunity for the Antilles to determine their own standpoint with 
relation to international problems; 
reforming of the structure of the insular system of government, especially 
in the financial and political fields, achieving a liberalization of the 
insular autonomy; 
increase of social activity; 
increase of production and productivity of labor, both in the material and 
the non-material sphere, and through this enhancing the national income. 
It must be set as a central point of attention, that a just distribution of the 
national income is necessary, by devoting especial care to creation of job 
opportunities for those able to work. 
The Informer is empowered by the above-mentioned Parties to bring 
contents of this Declaration of Principles to the attention of the Governor. 
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The Informer is, moreover, authorized to notify the Governor of the fact, 
that the purpose of the instructions of the Governor to the Informer dated 
September 22, 1969, has been complied with, to wit: that the new 
Government can bank on a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Coun­
cil, in order to secure the social, economic and political future of the 
Netherlands Antilles. 
Also, they place on record in conclusion that their joint efforts will 
always be aimed at the general interest of the Netherlands Antilles. 
This Statement of Principles will be issued in the form of a pamphlet in 
Papiamento, English and the Netherlands language, and distributed 
amongst the population of the Netherlands Antilles. 
Thus agreed upon in Kralendijk, Bonaire, on November 23, 1969, and 
signed by the representatives of: 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF CURACAO 
S. G. M. Rozendal 
H. L. Braam 
P. A. van der Veen 
O. R. A. Beaujon 
C. D. Kroon 
F. J. Pijpers 
R. M. Martinez 
A. A. Jockheer 
S. W. Rigaud 
C. E. Cathalina 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS 
A. C. Wathey 
PARTIDO PATRIOTICO ARUBANO 
O. Croes 
L. A. I. Chance 
E. R. Finck 
R. O. Pretonia 
G. A. Oduber 
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PARTIDO OBRERO BONER1ANO JOINTLY WITH PARTIDO PROGRESISTA 
BONERIANO UNi 
J. M. Frans 
E. R. Domacasse 
D. J. Egbrechts 
A. F. Sealy 
R. E. Martijn 
F. G. Janga 
FRENTE OBRERO Y LIBERACION 30 DI MEI 
W. Godett 
A. P. Nita 
S. C. Brown 
N. G. Monte 
H. M. Thomas 
C. G. Hurtado 
J. Smeulders 
R. A. Pketersz 
KABINETSINFORMATEUR—E. O. Pretonia 
APPENDIX B

Conclusions and Recommendations, May 30,1969: 
Report of the Commission for the Investigation 
Of the Causes of the May 30, 1969, 
Riots on Curaqao 
CONCLUSIONS 
1.	 From the investigation it is concluded that, although on the evening 
of May 29 different groups were planning to hold a demonstration, 
there are no clear indications of a premeditated, organized mass 
march to town. 
2.	 The Commission could not find any indication of a premeditated 
organized conspiracy for mass arson, looting or plans to overthrow 
the Antillean Government, nor indications of the oft-heard opinion 
that the occurrences on May 30 were instigated by foreign interfer­
ence or by the Black Power organization. 
3.	 For the most part, the arsonists were not selective in the buildings 
they destroyed. 
4.	 The Commission is of the opinion that, in spite of the racial problems 
which are clearly evident in the Caribbean area, the racial element 
did not play a predominant role on May 30th. 
5.	 The WESCAR conflict cannot be considered as an isolated occurrence 
but should be seen as a climax of several labor conflicts in the six 
months preceding May 30th. 
6.	 The incompetent way in which this labor conflict was approached by 
all the parties involved—employer, employee and the 
Government—led to an escalation of tension and conflict which 
would help explain the explosive outbreak on May 30th. 
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7.	 The WESCAR conflict only can be seen as the direct cause of the 
occurrences on May 30th. The basic causes should be sought in: 
a) the existing differences in wage scale between the oil industry 
and the other sectors of the economy; 
b) the large structural unemployment, which had been generated 
in the last ten years; 
c) the recent growing gap in standard of living differences within 
the community, of which the people had become more con­
scious through a greater awareness of the economic circum­
stances and relative differences in Western Europe and North 
America; 
d) the more and more inadequate arrangements experienced in the 
field of social welfare; 
e) the widening gap between the Government on the one side and 
the people, particularly the trade union movement, on the other 
side; 
f) the primacy of economic development (over social welfare), a 
primacy reinforced by the influence of economic assistance; 
g) favoritism in official matters of persons and companies on 
grounds of purely political considerations, which favoritism, 
rightly or wrongly, is accepted by an important part of the 
population as an established fact. 
8.	 The existent feeling of dissatisfaction was considerably intensified 
and radicalized by increasing criticism of a group of young intellec­
tuals and quasi-intellectuals. 
9.	 The Commission is of the opinion that the police force failed in the 
execution of its duty to maintain order on May 29 and 30 because of a 
failure of leadership, planning, communication and coordination. 
The numerical strength and armament of the police force of Curasao 
probably would have been adequate to control the disturbances on 
the evening of May 29 and during the morning of May 30 if the force 
had been led by capable leaders with the right tactical approach. 
Finally, the Commission is of the opinion that the premature convic­
tion of the police authorities that the police force was not able to 
control the difficulties by itself and that military assistance was 
necessary were of direct influence on the lack of energetic and 
effective command. 
10.	 The above mentioned points indicate factors which made the request 
for military assistance during the morning of May 30 inevitable. 
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11.	 While the Commission on the one hand was impressed by the skill 
and leadership of some Antillean union leaders, on the other hand, it 
cannot be denied that militant irrational elements in the union 
movement strengthened their grip on the striking laborers so that the 
bona fide union leaders lost, to a considerable extent, their influence 
on them. 
12.	 The Commission, finally, is of the opinion that only the interac­
tion and convergence of the above mentioned factors could have led 
to the disturbances of May 30th. 
SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.	 The Central Government must always keep close control of the 
police force to be sure that its management is in capable hands. 
2.	 The police force is in urgent need of a good alarm system in case of 
serious public disturbances. This should be accomplished as soon as 
possible. 
3.	 Now more than ever the police chief should increase the confidence 
of the force in its own strength in order to prevent the call on military 
assistance in the future. 
4.	 The Commission is of the opinion that the introduction of compul­
sory education should be done in a short period of time. 
5.	 The Commission is of the opinion that the introduction of 
Papiamento in the basic grades on the Leeward Islands will facilitate 
the change from family to school environment. 
6.	 The Commission wishes to point out that attention should be given to 
the introduction of special education programs for children of less 
fortunate social and cultural backgrounds. 
7.	 The influence of party political considerations when appointing 
civilian personnel is disapproved by the Commission. Due to the 
shortage of manpower which the Netherlands Antilles struggles with 
for the time being, only a policy of "the right man in the right place' 
can guarantee a responsible execution of the task which rests upon 
the Government. 
8.	 The Government should reorganize its financial aid (support and 
loans of the Volkskrediet bank) so that in reality as well as appear­
ance political favoritism is prevented. 
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9.	 Appointment of nonpolitical persons to the Government Information 
Service would improve the communication between the Govern­
ment and the people. 
10.	 Regarding the structural unemployment problem, the Government 
and private sector should take all possible steps to attract foreign 
investors to the Netherlands Antilles. In addition local initiatives in 
trade and industry should be promoted. 
11.	 The Commission considers it inevitable that in the future a general 
minimum wage law will be introduced. Before the introduction of 
such a law, a thorough study of its implications should be made. 
12.	 For development policy, a balanced division between economic and 
social projects is recommended. The Dutch Government should, 
when reformulating its program of financial aid to the Netherlands 
Antilles, support such a policy. 
13.	 More than ever trade and industry should give more attention to 
education within their firms through which the upward flow of lower 
personnel could be accelerated as places become available. 
14.	 Much more attention will have to be paid to personnel-management 
and guidance, as well as to industrial relations. 
15.	 The Commission thinks it advantageous that the Curacao trade 
unions develop stronger bonds among themselves and work towards 
a unified organization. 
16.	 It is necessary to think about the possibility of creating compulsory 
unemployment insurance. 
17.	 The Commission also suggests the introduction of: 
—relief support, according to the minimum demands of the cost of 
living; 
—child support, considering the desirability of birth limitation; 
—large grant support to private institutions for social work. 
18.	 An adequate representation of the Negro population in the highest 
government offices without allowing this to result in any form of 
reverse discrimination. 
APPENDIX C 
Data Collection 
Data for this study were collected on field trips to Curacao in 1969,1970, 
and 1971. Field work was begun by the authors three weeks after the May 
30, 1969, violence had erupted. A week was initially spent in Curacao 
gathering information on the violence and on the sociohistorical back­
ground of the Netherlands Antilles. On this first trip we also established 
contact with persons whom we thought would be valuable sources of 
information on later field trips that we had planned. The second data 
gathering field trip was made to Curacao in June, 1970, just after the first 
anniversary of the May Movement. Nearly a month was spent doing field 
work in Curacao on this trip. A third field trip was made to Curacao in 
July, 1971, more than two years following the outbreak of the 1969 
violence. On this final trip we completed the field work in two weeks. 
The initial focus of the study was on the May 30 violence. We had 
initially decided to study the role of various groups and organizations in 
Curacao during the violence, both those groups and organizations that 
had actively participated in the violence and those which had played a 
role in trying to control it. However, our preliminary research indicated 
quite clearly that the May 30 violence was but one part of a larger social 
movement and that it could be understood sociologically only to the 
extent that this was taken into account in our analysis. Thus the focus of 
the study was expanded to include other aspects of the May Movement in 
addition to its violent phase. Part of this expansion included research on 
the impact of the May Movement during a two-year period rather than 
just on its immediate consequences. 
The principal sectors of Curacao involved in the drama surrounding the 
May Movement were governmental and political groups, business or­
ganizations, and those groups which comprised or supported the labor 
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movement. Thus the better part of the field work on this study was 
concentrated on these groups and organizations. The primary source of 
data was semistructured interviews with key informants from the 
above-mentioned groups and other groups and organizations in Cura?ao. 
The interviews were aimed at eliciting information on the underlying 
conditions that led to the May Movement, the dynamics of the move­
ment, and the changes it generated in Curacao. These interviews were 
conducted in English and they averaged about an hour and a half each. 
These formal interviews were generally done at a group's headquarters or 
office. However, some were also conducted in different settings; for 
example, a few interviews were conducted in a sidewalk cafe in one of 
downtown Willemstad's main public squares, and one was even done in 
the hospital room of a labor leader who had been shot during the May 30 
violence. In addition to the formal interviews, many informal interviews 
were also conducted. These took place during social occasions, such as 
during dinner when we were able to secure supplementary information 
pertaining to the study through conversation with knowledgeable per­
sons. Frequently informal interviews were later followed up with more 
formal ones or provided leads to important new contacts. 
We received excellent cooperation from those we approached for 
interviews. Our initial contact in Curacao was a businessman who was 
also noted for his years of voluntary service on the island. He simplified 
the task of entree by providing us with introductions to many of the key 
groups and organizations in Curacao. However, we wanted to become 
gradually independent of him so that we would not become overly 
identified with one segment of Curasao.1 This was accomplished as the 
persons we interviewed introduced us to others that we wanted to see, 
thus enabling us to rely less and less upon the assistance of our initial 
contact. With a few exceptions, those we interviewed provided us with 
very straightforward answers to our questions. We tried to allay any fears 
that respondents might have had in answering frankly by assuring them 
that they would remain anonymous. In most cases, this was sufficient to 
gain their cooperation. There were no outright refusals to be interviewed 
and in several cases we interviewed persons more than once. It is not clear 
whether or not the fact that we were an interracial team, one black and the 
other white, contributed to the excellent cooperation we received from all 
segments of Curacao. A total of 62 interviews were conducted. The 
interviews were from the following groups and institutional sectors of 
Curasao. 
Government 
Office of the Prime Minister; Office of the Governor-General; 
Office of the Lt. Governor of Curacao; Curac.ao Department of 
Economic Development; Department of Social Affairs 
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Political Parties and Movements 
May 30 Labor and Liberation Front; Vito; Union Reformista Antil­
lano; Democratic Party of Curasao; National People's Party; MAN 
Labor 
ccv; AHU; AVVC; CFW; PWFC; BTG; NAVA; ABVO 
Economic 
WESCAR; Shell; Maduro and Sons Inc.; The Veps Group Inc.; 
Curacao Chamber of Commerce; CODECO 
Special 
Riot Commission 
Military 
Royal Dutch Marines; Curacao Voluntary Corps 
Civil Service 
Curacao Police; Curacao Hospital; Ministry of Health; Curasao 
Public Works; Curagao Port Authority 
Voluntary Service 
Red Cross; First Aid; Obra y Logra; Joint Service Club Committee 
In addition to the interviews, written materials were also collected for 
this study. Newspapers published on the island were used as a sup­
plementary source of information. Also many groups and organizations 
made available to us records and reports that were relevant to our study. 
The riot commission, for example, provided us with copies of its report. 
1. Murch, for example, comments on the importance of this in his study on the French 
Antilles: "Generally, one should avoid becoming identified with any one contact or group 
of contacts, particularly if the researcher seeks the cooperation of competing political, 
economic, and social groups.'' Arvin Murch, Black Frenchmen: The Political Integration 
of the French Antilles (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1971), p. 144. 
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political party, headed by the strike leaders. 
The authors analyze the changes caused by 
the May Movement in the political and eco­
nomic sectors of Curacao and compare its 
impact with other similar movements, especially 
the ghetto riots in the United States. 
Social movements are a major force for 
change in contemporary society. Curacao, 
though small, is an excellent example of social 
complexity, and it provides a basis for under­
standing the dynamics of social movements. 
Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews make 
up its population, which contains a mixture of 
old residents and later arrivals and is divided 
into a complex class structure. Curacao is, 
though predominantly black, multiracial. Mul­
tiple minority consciousness, a consequence 
of this segmentation, in which every group 
has feelings of exclusion, was a crucial factor 
in the development of the May Movement, 
which emerged when more institutionalized 
means for bringing about desired change 
seemed inadequate and which has strength­
ened the common Antillean identity. The 
complex interrelationship between social move­
ments, even those which have episodes of vio­
lence, and social change is a topic both current 
and universal. 
Russell R. Dynes is professor of sociology 
and codirector of the Disaster Research Center 
at the Ohio State University. William A. 
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at Arizona State University. 
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